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I came across synaesthesia in summer 1997 in an issue of the electronic journal 
Psyche dedicated to the topic. At the time I was thinking about the phenomenal 
character of experience. The former seemed to offer a test case for philosophical 
theories of the latter. The upshot of that encounter was an early version of chapter 3, 
given as an informal talk to the Philosophy Department at Edinburgh University. 
Then I argued that synaesthesia seemed to constitute a counterexample to 
representationist theories of the phenomenal character of experience. Now, thanks in 
part to comments on that talk, I think synaesthesia rather indicates ways in which 
externalist theories of experience more generally need to be elaborated. More 
importantly, that encounter changed the focus of my attention to synaesthesia itself. 
There have been a couple of isolated references to synaesthesia in philosophical 
papers, and even a couple of philosophical papers on the topic (one very recent paper 
even defends the position I suggested in my talk), but no one (that I knew of) had 
dealt with different aspects of synaesthesia from a philosophical point of view in the 
same place. I am gratefkl to Timothy Williamson for his initial advice to concentrate 
on synaesthesia, and for many conversations on the topic. I am also indebted to Denis 
Walsh for helping me to see things differently at a number of places. 
Considerable help has come from the responses of audiences at a variety of 
oral presentations of the ideas discussed here. Parts of chapter 4 were given as talks 
to the 1998 Scottish Postgraduate Philosophy Association spring conference at the 
University of Edinburgh, the 1998 European Society for Philosophy and Pvchologv 
annual meeting at Lisbon University and also at the University o f  London. Particular 
thanks go to Matthew Nudds who replied to the last. A version of chapter 2 was 
given at the 1999 British Society for the Philosophy of Science annual meeting at the 
University of Nottingham. A revised version of chapter 3 was given to the 
Consciousness 2000 conference at the University of Arizona. Thanks go to friends, in 
particular, John Tresch and Joerg Tuske, and Ben Young and Alastair Renton, for 
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advice and solidarity over the last three years, to my parents and my brother James, 
who provided diverse forms of assistance, and especially to Alix Cohen for her special 
brand o f  encouragement and support. 
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Abstract 
We are sometimes led to a different picture of things when something unexpected 
occurs which needs explaining. The aim of this thesis is to examine a series of related 
issues in the philosophy of mind in the light of the unusual condition known to 
psychologists as ‘synaesthesia’. Although the emphasis will be on the philosophical 
issues a view of synaesthesia itself will also emerge. 
Synaesthesia is a distinct type of cross-modal association: stimulation of one 
sensory modality automatically triggers an additional phenomenal character of 
experience associated with a second sensory modality in the absence of  any direct 
stimulation of the second modality. Chapter 1 introduces synaesthesia to a 
philosophical audience by outlining the early history of synaesthesia studies, by 
summarising contemporary research and by indicating areas of philosophical interest 
to be considered in the rest of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 uses synaesthesia to examine one important philosophical model of 
the mind, Fodor’s modularity hypothesis, and, in turn, investigates the nature of 
synaesthesia in the light of that model. Fodor claims that cognitive modules can be 
thought of as belonging to a psychological natural kind in virtue of their possession of 
most or ail of nine specified properties. The most common form of synaesthesia 
possesses Fodor’s nine specified properties of modularity, and hence it should be 
understood in terms of an extra cognitive module, and thus as belonging to the above- 
mentioned psychological natural kind. Many psychologists believe that synaesthesia 
involves a breakdown in modularity. A breakdown in modularity would also explain 
the apparent presence of the nine specified properties in synaesthesia. I discuss the 
two concepts of fbnction which underlie the respective theories, defending the 
breakdown thesis, arguing, in any case, that properties deriving from evolutionary 
history should also be used to decide between the two theses and thus ultimately 
membership of a psychological natural kind such as Fodor suggests. The argument is 
then used to respond to two chalienges to the notion of a psychological natural kind. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the phenomenal character of synaesthetic experience. 
Externalists about the phenomenal character of experience tend to argue that the 
character of perceptual experience is to be explained either by the properties objects 
present to percipients, or by the properties objects are represented by percipients as 
having. Some internalists argue that there is a need to postulate hrther properties of 
the individual - in other words, qualia - to account for the individuation of the 
character of perceptual experience. The existence of additional phenomenal 
characters of experience in synaesthesia, which cannot directly be explained by 
reference to features of objects, suggests the existence of extra qualia and thus the 
presence of qualia in normal perception. The aim of this chapter is to meet the 
challenge presented by synaesthesia and the extra quaZia argument, and contrariwise, 
use synaesthesia as a way of fbrther clarifjmg the merits of the respective externalist 
positions. 
In the previous chapters the locution of ‘coloured hearing’ will have been 
adopted. Occasionally the process underlying synaesthesia is described as one of 
‘hearing colours’. Chapter 4 rejects the latter usage. In so doing it focuses on the 
place of synaesthesia vis-a-vis normal perceptual processes. Considerations from 
previous chapters are hrther developed in order to shed light both on the 
metaphysical individuation of perceptual modalities and on how we know the 
distinctive perceptual modalities. Given the actual content of our concepts of 
perceptual modalities, it is argued that the actual world is one in which even 
synaesthetes are unable to hear colours. Consideration is given as to whether there is 
a possible world in which people could hear colours. The justification of the usage of 
‘coloured-hearing’ then leads to a discussion of the relative importance of the 
individuating conditions of modes of perception. 
The thesis focuses largely on coloured hearing. What merits the preceding 
considerations have might be supported if they can be generalised. Chapter 5 goes a 
small way in that direction. 
Chapter I 
Concepts of Synaesthesia 
1.1 The Term ‘Synaesthesia ’ 
The term ‘synaesthesia’ is derived from the union of two Greek words: ‘cry~v’ and 
‘a~mq~010’. (Synaesthesia is the form of spelling which will be adopted here. An 
alternative spelling, synesthesia, has common currency in North America.) The 
translation of neither o f  these words is altogether straightforward, nor, consequently, 
is the translation o f  their combination. 
‘oyd (alternatively written ‘syn’) is usually rendered into English by using 
one or other of the terms ‘with’, ‘together’ or ‘alike’. ‘~LO“CT)ECJLO’ (alternatively 
written ‘aisthesis’) may be translated variously into English by the terms ‘sensation’, 
‘sense’, ‘perception’ and ‘sensory organ . ULCT~E(TL(T’ is at the root of another ’1  ‘ 
English word: ‘anaesthesia’. The union o f  the word ‘ U L ~ ~ E G L O ’  with the prefix ‘UV-’ 
(or ‘an-’), which can be translated as ‘not’ or ‘without’, denotes the absence of 
sensation, sense, perception or proper function of the sensory organ; it is used in 
particular of the process of artificially inducing an insensitivity to pain by the 
administration o f  drugs. The prefix ‘an-’ usually produces a straightforward 
modification in the meaning of the term it is attached to: it reverses the existing 
meaning. The prefix ‘syn-’ however often indicates a more complex modification of 
our concepts than the prefix ‘an-’: it means ‘together’ (e.g. in ‘syndrome’) or ‘with’ 
(e.g. in ‘syntax’) or ‘alike’ (e.g. in ‘synonymy’). If the meaning o f  the word ‘syn-’ 
attaches to is also either vague or ambiguous, as it is in the case of the term 
‘aisthesis’, then it is unclear what the concept expressed by the complex term is. 
Probably for this reason the term ‘synaesthesia’ has been used with a variety of 
meanings. Any study of  synaesthesia must first be clearer about the meaning of the 
- .__ 
Hamlyn 1961: chapter 1 notes the Merent uses of the word ‘aimq~cno’ in antiquity. 1 
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term ‘synaesthesia’ when it is being employed. 
Although the term ‘synaesthesia’ derives from the Greek, and there is 
evidence that the term was indeed used in a philosophical context by the ancients - in 
the Emeaak Plotinus used the term ‘ a ~ v u u n q ~ ~ 1 ~ ’  and its derivations2 - there is no 
suggestion that ancient philosophy was acquainted with synaesthesia in the way that 
we are nowadays. It is not even clear, as the next section explains, that the ancients 
thought of  perception in such a way that would have allowed for the relevant 
synaesthetic modification or association. The adoption of  the union of  the terms ‘syn’ 
and ‘aisthesis’ by Plotinus to refer to a different phenomenon from that referred to by 
the term today might be seen as adding some support to the view that the ancient 
Greeks would not have readily acknowledged synaesthesia as we do. The intended 
inference is that if ‘syn’ combined with ‘aisthesis’ denotes some kind o f  joining in 
perception, for the ancients it could only have been a joining of a different sort than 
the one recognised today: the sort better (although probably not entirely satisfactorily) 
denoted by our term Lconsciousness’ .3 
The term ‘synaesthesia’ seems to have been first introduced with its modern 
meaning by the Swiss psychologist Flournoy. Calkins, the contemporaneous American 
psychologist remarked: ‘The study of  the varying forms of  persisting abnormal 
associations, usually known as ‘ colored-hearing’ and ‘forms’ , but grouped together by 
Theodore Flournoy, under the convenient name Synaesthesia, has hardly as yet 
completed the stage of  scientific observation’ . 4  The classification to which the 
preceding quotation refers occurs in the following passage o f  1893, although here it 
seems to be an endorsement o f  a still earlier usage: ‘De toutes les autres 
denominations que j’ai rencontrees, celle de visuel synesthesie me parait la plus 
adhuate et la moins encombrante. Elle evoque a c6te d’elle les expressions paralleles 
’ See for instance Enneads I 1,11,11; III 8,4,19; IV 3, 26,45; V 4, 2,18 and V 6,5,3. I have Alix 
Cohm to thank for pointing this reference out to me. 
Some commentators cite Pythagoras’ reference to the ‘Music of the Spheres’ and Aristotle’s 
reference to the relationship between the harmony of sounds and the harmony of colours with respect 
to synaesthesia. See for instance Marks 1975 reprinted 1997. But the relationshp of such themes to 
what we know as synaesthesia is tenuous at best. 
Calkins 1895: 90. 
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de synesthesies auditive, olfactive etc. pour designer les phenomenes analogues. ’ ’ 
Since the end of the nineteenth century the word ‘synaesthesia’ has been 
adopted by a number of different fields of research to denote a number of disparate 
phenomena. The Oxford EngZish Dictionary records that in 1901 the term 
‘synaesthesia’ began to be used to refer to cross-modal metaphor. We commonly 
describe some colours (e.g. yellow, orange and red) as ‘warm’ and other colours (e.g. 
blue and green) as ‘cool’. Similarly we sometimes describe some colours as ‘loud’. 
Conversely we might describe some sounds as ‘ c o l o u ~ l ’ .  Or we might describe a 
sound as ‘sharp’. And relatedly we might describe smells as ‘sweet’.6 The cross-modal 
association which Flournoy refers to by the term ‘synaesthesia’ is to be distinguished 
from cross-modal metaphor, although the question of how distinct the two 
phenomena are and what the precise relationship between them is will recur several 
times in the present chapter. On a slightly different track the 1972 edition of The 
Dictionary of Language and Linguistics defines synaesthesia as: ‘the association of a 
particular sound or group of sounds with a particular meaning, e.g. fl- in flare, Oicker, 
flame’. According to linguistics synaesthesia is a form of  phonetic symbolism, 
whereby some phonemes are appropriate to the representation of  objects of particular 
non-auditory experiences. (The explanation for such associations is not clear, but 
they might be related to metaphorical associations. Alternatively there might be 
features common to visual and auditory experiences.) And, more idiosyncratically, 
Ogden and Richards used the term to refer to a certain class of  experiences which 
were ‘most removed from analytic and abstract attention’.’ 
Flournoy’s study of what he called ‘synaesthesia’ (and what we shall be 
concerned with here) came in the wake of a growing number of  published case studies 
all reporting subjects who underwent experiences with unusual additional features. 
Flournoy 1893: 5.  ’Of all the other terminologm that I have come by, that of visual synaesthesia 
seems to me the most fitting and the least burdensome. It evokes the parallel expressions of auditory 
synaesthesia, olfactov synaesthesia etc. to denote the analogous phenomena ...’ Segalen 1981: 
footnote 1 states that the tern ‘synaesthesia’ is actually due to Millet. 
See Day 1996 for a discussion of such metaphorical usage. He calculates that whilst the most 
common form of synaesthesia studied by psychologists relates colours to auditory stimuli, the most 
common form of metaphor in literature relates tactile properties to auditory sensations. 
6 
See Ogden & Richards 1985: 156. 
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Although there was a consistency in many of  the reported features, many of  the 
papers and reviews had also been at variance as to an explanation. Some claimed that 
they were the result of  psychological processes in which two stimuli had become 
associated, so that the experience o f  another token of one type o f  stimulus would 
automatically generate an experience of  the other type of stimulus in the absence a 
token of  the latter. Some claimed that these cases were the result of physical 
disorders, perhaps brought about by damage to the sensory systems or to the brain. 
Moreover, it was not clear that the different case studies were in fact manifestations 
of a single general condition. These substantive disagreements were usually 
accompanied by terminological disagreements. At the International Conference of 
Physzo/og*caZ PsychoZoy in Pans in 1890, a committee of  seven leading 
psychologists was organised to collate and examine the evidence. Flournoy had been 
one of the members of  that committee. The study of synaesthesia he published in 1893 
was his own response to the debate. 
The purpose of the present chapter is to introduce the concept of synaesthesia 
as it is currently employed in psychology. Section 1.2 discusses some historical issues. 
Section 1.3 traces out some of  the events leading up to and following on fiom 
Flournoy’s terminological endorsement. Given the extensive nature of the early 
literature on synaesthesia it cannot be reviewed here in its entirety. The aim will be to 
outline the emergence of  synaesthesia as a scientific phenomenon. Sections 1.4 and 
1.5 summarise the principal findings and theories, which have signalled the 
contemporary resurgence of interest in synaesthesia. Sections 1 -4 considers and 
rejects the view that the psychological processes underlying synaesthesia are not 
different in kind but only in degree fiom processes non-synaesthetes exhibit. Section 
1.5 outlines the recent evidence, which strongly suggests that synaesthesia is indeed a 
distinct psychological process (with underlying physiological causes). Section 1 .6 
presents what I take to be some of the most prominent issues which synaesthesia 
raises for philosophy and which will be considered in the rest of the thesis. 
Concepts of Synaesthesia 5 
1.2 Historical Issues 
Many philosophical issues can be traced back to antiquity. Although the term 
‘synaesthesia’ derives from the Greek there is little hope of trying to trace our present 
understanding of synaesthesia back to the ancients. Why there is not may be found by 
looking at some well-known early theories of perception. It is soon apparent that none 
of these could satisfactorily accommodate the possibility of synaesthesia. This may be 
no surprise. The elementary nature of many aspects of ancient psychology is well- 
known. The discussion of philosophical issues related to modes of perception were 
less elementary and these set the stage for later discussion, in particular, concerning 
the individuation of sensory modalities. 
Aristotle provides as sophisticated an account of perception as is to be found 
in classical philosophy. One of the most detaded statements of Aristotle’s account of 
perception can be found in De Anima. The second half of book two deals in detail 
with the sensory modalities. (‘Sensory modality’ can be taken to denote a distinct way 
in which something can be perceived by a creature. One might also talk about a 
‘sense’ for short.) For Aristotle the sensory modalities were limited to five: sight, 
hearing, smell, taste and touch. A short preceding chapter (chapter six) outlines some 
general features of perception and the sensory modalities. 
Aristotle classified the objects of perception into three types: special-objects, 
common-objects and incidental-objects of perception. The special-objects and the 
common-objects are perceived in themselves, ‘of the two, one is special to each sense, 
the other common to all’.8 The special-objects can only be perceived by a particular 
sensory modality (hence special-objects) and must be so perceived in using that 
sensory modality; ‘in themselves’ does not mean that special-objects are directly 
perceived but that they are essentially related to particular senses. According to 
hstotle,  if we perceive something by means of sight then that thing cannot be for 
Aristotle, De Anima, 41 8a7-11. I shall keep to Aristotle’s terminology here. But one should 
distinguish between perceiving common objects and perceiving common properties (or sensibles). 
The one object might be perceived by different senses in virtue of Merent perceptible properties. We 
may perceive the one dog by hearing it, seeing it, smelling it or touching it. One can imagine that 
no common properties are perceived. If shape were a property of an object it might be perceived by 
different senses: a common sensible. 
8 
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example a sound, we can only perceive colours by sight and we must perceive colours 
when we see. If we perceive something by hearing then that thing cannot be for 
example a colour, we cannot perceive colours by hearing, we can only perceive 
sounds and we must perceive sounds when we hear. And so on for the other modes 
of perception and their special-objects. The justification for this view seems simply to 
be that ‘it is impossible to be deceived’; the senses are incorrigible with respect to 
their special-objects, a sense is not able to confuse its special-object with the special- 
object of another sense. Vision cannot confuse a colour it perceives with a sound 
which is perceived. Hearing cannot confuse a sound it perceives with a colour which 
is perceived. Hamlyn has remarked that it is not clear what Aristotle had in mind by 
making the point that a sense cannot conhse its special-object with that of another 
sense, since the incorrigibility is not. that which philosophers have attributed to the 
perception of sense-data, unless it is a straightforward conceptual point that ‘we 
cannot, logically, smell sounds’. But this, in turn, seems to be based on the 
metaphysical view that sounds are essentially related to hearing. Another 
interpretation is that Aristotle is here distinguishing such cases of inter-modal 
discriminations, where one seems always to be able to discriminate, for example, a 
colour which is seen by means of the eyes from a sound which is heard by means of 
the ears by reference to the respective sensory organs, from such cases of intra-modal 
discriminations, which are not usually to be made with reference to their correlative 
sensory organs and where we can be mistaken in the discriminations we make (e.g. we 
may be mistaken about whether an object has one colour rather than another 
Modes of perception, on this view, can be individuated by their special- 
objects. Although it might be just as true to say that, for Aristotle, each class of 
special-object is individuated by the distinctive nature of each sensory modality. 
Objects, which are common to the senses, include movement, figure, shape and size. 
Movements and shapes are perceptible by both touch and sight. Aristotle seems to 
Aristotle deals cursorily with misperception at 428b.17. Here he claims that perception is liable to 
falsity ‘to the least possible degree’. It is easier to be deceived about incidental objects of perception 
and still easier to be deceived about some common objects of the senses. 
9 
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allot a distinct sense for the common-objects, which are also perceived in themselves. 
Although he allows that common-objects are sensed via the organs of sight and touch 
it is not the essential nature of those organs to perceive the common-objects of 
perception, which is why Aristotle can say that vision only perceives colours.” An 
object of perception is incidentally perceived if the special-object of perception is also 
something else e.g. the son of Diares; Diares would, according to Aristotle, be 
perceived incidentally to the whiteness of the clothing he is wearing. According to 
Aristotle ‘it is the special-objects, which are objects of perception properly, and it is 
these that the essence of each sense is naturally related’. l1  As Hamlyn notes it is not 
clear why the special-objects should be the ‘objects of perception properly’. There 
seems no reason why the common-objects should not also be considered as ‘objects 
of perception properly’ if they have a correlative faculty, the common sense. Aristotle 
is clearer as to why it is that the special-objects to which each sense is naturally 
related are so related. It is this which excludes the possibility of synaesthesia in 
Aristotle’s account of the mind. The mechanisms of perception, which necessitated 
the relation between the distinct senses and their special-objects, will be considered 
shortly. This essential relation, as Aristotle is fully aware, can be traced to earlier 
philosophers. 
An earlier statement o f  the idea that each perceptual modality has its 
correlative class of  objects can be found in Plato’s Theaetatus. In the words of 
Socrates: ‘then there are the perceived things; all sorts of colours for all sorts of cases 
of seeing; a similar variety of sounds for cases of hearing; and so on and so forth, 
every perceived thing being compatible with a perception’.’* Later in the same 
dialogue the strength of the relation between perceptual modalities and their 
correlative objects is emphasised: ‘what you perceive through one power, you cannot 
perceive through another - for instance, what you perceive through hearing, you could 
not perceive through sight, and similarly what you perceive through sight you could 
lt5 There is actually debate about h s .  Some argue that Aristotle postulates a separate common 
sense. Others argue that he does not; common objects are perceived by a capacity which is common 
to the senses. 
Aristotle, De Anima 418a24. 
Plato, Theaetetus: 156c. 
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not perceive through hearing?’13 It is difficult to be clear about Plato’s own position 
on the nature of perception in his dialogues. There is a lengthy statement in the 
meaetatiis, which seems to be the view endorsed by Protagoras. Protagoras also held 
that there is an essential relation between the diverse sensory modalities and their 
special-objects, although Protagoras, Plato and Aristotle all seem to have disagreed as 
to how the relation is precisely realised. According to Protagoras, to each of  these 
special-objects of perception corresponds a special organ of perception. In 
combination they form a mode of perception: 
So, for instance, consider an eye and sometlung which is close to the eye and 
compatible with it, as they engender whteness and the perception whch is ~ tura l l y  
adapted to whteness, which are the unique offspring of the eye and the other object in 
th~s relation. At ths  precise moment, the seeing is set in motion from the eyes and the 
whteness is set in motion from the object whch is the colour-generating half of the pair 
(both these offspring arise between the eye and the object); the eye becomes filled with 
sight, and sees at this time, and becomes not sight but a seeq eye; and the object 
which is the colour-generatmg half of the pair becomes filled with whteness and, agam, 
becomes not whiteness but whte. The object whlch happens to be coloured by this 
colour could be a piece of wood or a stone or an-g at all. l4 
Further treatment of the mechanism of  visual perception is to be found in the ‘creation 
myth’ of the Timaeii.dS Seeing takes place when the pure fire within the body which 
flows through the eye coalesces with its like outside the body, thereby forming a line 
of sight between the object and perceiver. Parallel accounts are given of the other 
sensory modalities. Sounds are perceived when impulses given by the air through the 
ear to the brain are passed on to the soul. Smells arise when air turns into water or 
water turns into air and the result of this affects the ‘whole cavity between crown and 
navel’. Different tastes arise fi-om the different actions of various substances upon the 
‘discriminatory passages which extend fi-om tongue to heart’? 
Related remarks can be found in the Presocratic philosophers. The view of 
Empedocles, according to Theophrastus, seems to make the interaction between 
l3  Plato. Theaetetus: 185a. 
l 4  Plato, Theuetatus: 156d. 
’’ The Timueus is a late dialogue and it discusses many of the new ideas prevalent at the time. The 
views are not far removed fkom those of Protagoras. 
Plato. Timueus chapters 13 & 3 1-36. 16 
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sensory organ and object of perception uni-directional. Empedocles is nevertheless 
able to account for the different sensory modalities. Effluences are given off by 
objects and affect the various sensory organs. Perception arises when something fits 
into the passage of any one of the senses. One sense is not able to perceive the 
objects of another sense because the passages of the different sensory organs are of 
different dimensions. If they are too narrow then objects cannot fit into them, if they 
are too wide then things pass straight through them without making contact with 
them. Hence modes of perception and objects of perception are once again taken to 
be essentially related. l7 
The atomists hrther refined the view of Empedocles. They held that atoms 
and the void are the fhdamental constituents of the universe. All perception had to 
be explained in terms of  these, more specifically in terms of contact between them. 
Leucippus describes the effluences, expounded by Empedocles, as different kinds of 
images which are given off by objects and which affect the different kinds of sensory 
organs. Democritus believed that visual images in the eye arose from both the seen 
object and the observer. Visual image and seen object meet and form an impression in 
the air which then enters the pupil o f  the eye. Different perceptual modalities are 
supposed to arise from the different congruences of  shape and size between the atoms 
in the head and those fi-om outside the head." 
All of the above views express a line of thought in which one sense can only 
perceive the objects suited to it. There seems nothing obvious one might object to in 
this. Synaesthesia is not claimed (by most) to be the process whereby colours are 
heard or sounds are seen. The point is that nowhere in the causal mechanisms of 
perception which these philosophers advanced is their allowance made for the 
possibility of synaesthesia. If a perceptual experience of  a colour only occurs when 
atoms of the appropriate size unite, and only atoms of the appropriate size can unite, 
then it is not possible for an atom, which contributes to an auditory experience, also 
to contribute directly to the experience of a colour. Similarly if a perceptual 
experience of a colour only occurs when an eye and something which is close to the 
l 7  Theophrastus, De Sensu 7, Kirk & Raven 1957: 343. 
Theophrastus, De Sensu 49-83, Kirk & Raven 1957: 421-424. 
10 Synaesthesia 
eye and compatible with it engender whiteness and the perception which is naturally 
adapted to whiteness respectively, then it is not possible for whatever produces a 
sound to generate an experience of a colour. 
The perceptual mechanisms which Aristotle himself advances are complex. 
The elements of his theory can be found in the final chapter of book two of De 
Anima. Aristotle claims that the senses are that ‘which can receive perceptible forms 
without their matter’.’’ How is this possible? The concept of a sense is to be 
distinguished from the concept of a sensory organ. Sensory organs are material 
objects. They are also that in which the potentiality to perceive resides. According to 
Aristotle, what is perceived must be ‘a particular extended magnitude, while what it is 
to be able to perceive and the sense are surely not magnitudes, but rather a certain 
principle and potentiality of that thing’.20 Senses are taken to be the formal principles, 
which actualise the potentiality of sensory organs in virtue of the potentiality of the 
senses to perceive. This combination of sense and sensory organ, the actualisation of 
a potentiality, thus gives rise to a fbrther potentiality. This second potentiality is a 
potentiality to receive the forms of perceptible objects without their matter in virtue of 
the formal isomorphism of the potentialities of the sense and the forms of the objects 
they are related to. The actualisation of the potentiality of a sense, according to 
Aristotle, occurs when the sense is affected by objects around it. An explanation is 
thus given for Aristotle’s earlier claim that ‘that which can perceive is potentially 
such as the object of perception already is actually. [The sense] is not like the object, 
then, when it is being affected by it, but once it has been affected by it, it becomes like 
it and is such as it is’.21 Special-objects of perception can thus only actualise the 
potentiality of related sensory organs and senses. No special-object of perception is 
able to actualise the potentiality of a sense other than the one it is essentially related 
to. 
Aristotle does discuss some processes in which the senses are associated. 
Could these be used as possible explanations of synaesthesia? Joint perception (when 
Aristotle, De Anima, 424a17. 
‘IJ Aristotle, De Anima, 424a 17. 
Aristotle, De Aninia, 4 18a3. 
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we see the colour and taste the flavour of  something at the same time) can be quickly 
discounted. There is no suggestion here that either one of  the special-objects causes 
the perception of  the other. Aristotle discounts the possibility that we could be 
muddled about this and fail to discriminate the senses that perceive the specid- 
objects. Recognition of a special-object we have perceived in the past via a different 
sensory modality (we recognise that something is tasty when we see it: we see it is 
tasty) can also be discounted. The one experience may produce a certain 
representation of  the other, an object may be seen to be tasty without one having 
tasted it. But this is only because one remembers what it’s like to be so: when I see 
that the fruit is tasty it is only because h i t  that has looked the same way has turned 
out to be tasty. It is a different sort of  association from synaesthetic associations; 
there need be no experience of  flavour in such recollections. What of the common- 
sense. Perhaps colours are common-sensibles which can be perceived by both sight 
and hearing? But that possibility is plainly contrq to what Aristotle has taken so 
much time arguing for. 
Aristotle, it is true, mentions certain ‘likenesses’ amongst the senses: the 
likeness of  the harmony of  colours and the harmony of music (colours may stand in 
relation to each other in the same manner as concords do in music) and the likeness of 
the properties of  sharpness and flatness in hearing and in touch.” But this refers to a 
parallel between the senses, not an association of the kind we are interested in. There 
seems to be no part of Aristotle’s account of  perception, which allows for the special- 
objects of one sense to actualise the form of another kind of special-object of 
perception in the sensory organ appropriate to the latter special-object . 
Part of the dficulty for Aristotle and his predecessors is that they do not or 
cannot make clear the distinction between colour and the awareness of colour, sound 
and the awareness of  sound, and so on for the other sensory modalities. Another 
difficulty was that neither Aristotle nor his predecessors had any coherent way of 
explaining perceptual anomalies. And, of  course a hrther difficulty is that they had no 
significant knowledge of  the hnctional role of the brain, placing perceptual processes 
’’ Aristotle, De Sensu et Sensih, 7. 
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in the sensory organs. Progress in these areas had to wait until advances in philosophy 
and science in the seventeenth century. 
Locke has been credited with one o f  the first references to synaesthesia. 
Baron-Cohen and Harrison are clear about the priority they give to Locke. This 
citation may derive fiom Marks. The reference to Locke finds echoes in other recent 
work by Cytowic and Dann. Dann notes correctly that Locke is not refemng to 
synaesthesia, but he mistakenly identifies the reference with Locke’s commentary on 
the Molyneux’ problem: ‘Although Locke’s comments are fiequently cited as an early 
example of  scientific interest in synaesthesia, the passage in question is really Locke’s 
reformulation of the eighteenth century philosophical conundrum known as the 
Molyneux problem: if  a man born blind were to gain his sight in later life, would he be 
able to identiQ the objects around him, by sight done?’23 
The passage of  interest occurs in book 111 of  An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, where Locke is in the process of explaining the relationship between 
words and simple ideas: 
A stud~ous blind man, who had mightily beat hs head about visible objects, and made 
use of the explications of his books and friends, to understand those names of light and 
colours, which often came hs way, betrayed one day that he now understood what 
‘scarlet’ sigmfied. Upon whch, hs fnend demanded what scarlet was, the blind man 
answered, it was llke the sound of a trumpet. Just such an understandmg of the name of 
any other simple idea will he have, who hopes to get it only fiom a defhtion, or other 
words made use of to e x p h  it.24 
They who suggest this passage as an early reference to synaesthesia choose to ignore 
the lines immediately preceding: 
For to hope to produce an idea o f  light or colour by a sound, however formed, is to 
expect that sounds should be visible, or colours audible; and to Make the ears do the 
office of all the other senses. And therefore he that has not before received into his 
mind, by the proper inlet, the simple idea whch any word stands for, can never come to 
know the sipficance of that word by any other words or sounds whatsoever, put 
together by any rules of defimtion. The only way is by applying to hls senses the proper 
object, and so producmg that idea in him, for whch he has learned the name already. 
’’ Bmn-Cohen & Harrison 1997: 4, 
introduction. 
24 1690: bk.3. ch.4, sect. 11. 
Marks 1997: 67, Cytowic 1993: 52 and Dann 1998: 
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Locke is, in effect, here drawing a distinction between knowledge by acquaintance 
and knowledge by description. A comparison of this passage with an earlier passage 
corroborates the view that Locke was not referring to synaesthesia, but emphasising 
his empiricist credentials. According to Locke, it is only possible to acquire the ideas 
of distinctive types of perceptible properties of objects if one has had experiences of 
them and one can only do this via the appropriate sensory modalities. Locke’s 
account of the distinctive types of ideas of perceptible properties of objects finds first 
expression when he writes: ‘some ideas [...I have admittance only through one sense, 
which is peculiarly adapted to receive them. Thus light and colours, as white, red, 
yellow, blue, with their several degrees of shades and mixtures, as green, scarlet, 
purple, sea-green, and the rest, come in only by the eyes. All kinds of noises, sounds, 
and tones only by the ear. The several tastes and smells by the nose and palate.’25 The 
ideas of perception are mental items, which are enabled by distinct properties of 
objects via intermediate entities (lightwaves and soundwaves) the properties of 
objects cause to behave in a determinate way. Different types of ideas are enabled in 
different ways. In the case of our ideas of primary qualities (such as bulk, figure, 
number, situation and motion) Locke claims that these mental items are faithful copies 
of the originals. For properties, such as bulk, figure, number, situation and motion 
belong to objects, independently of whether we are perceiving them, in the way that 
these mental items represent them to be. Consistent with this is the notion that the 
ideas of primary qualities are enabled by primary qualities in such a way that they can 
be mediated by a number of different senses. For example, the idea of shape can be 
enabled both by the sense of vision and the sense of touch. The ideas of secondary 
qualities (such as colours, sounds, smells and tastes), in contrast, are enabled in such a 
way that they can only be mediated by distinct senses. In the case of our ideas of 
secondary qualities, Locke claims, hrthermore, that these mental copies are not 
faitffil to the originals. For these properties do not belong to objects in the way that 
our ideas of them represent them to be. Secondary qualities are powers or dispositions 
(dependent upon related primary properties) to S e c t  our senses. (Might not 
15 1690: bk. 2, ch. 3, sect. 1. 
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synaesthesia, on first view, seem to support Locke’s view of secondary qualities: 
sounds enable experiences of colours, which do not resemble those sounds?) From 
these remarks, it should be clear that, just because he was blind, the blind man could 
not know what the idea of red was and therefore could not understand what the term 
‘red’ denoted. 
Indeed, it might be thought that the possibility of synaesthesia is ruled out as a 
coherent consideration by what Locke also says about perceptual mechanisms: ‘And if 
these organs, or the nerves which are the conduits to convey them from without to 
their audience in the brain, the mind’s presence-room (as I may call it), are any of 
them so disordered as not to perform their fbnctions, they have no postern to be 
admitted by, no other way to bring themselves into view, and to be perceived by the 
From this it seems that ideas, for Locke, are generated in the understanding. 
sensory organs (or sensory systems). If the sensory organs are not fbnctioning or the 
brain is damaged in some way then the mind cannot become acquainted with the ideas 
of a particular sense. Locke fails to allow the possibility that the brain might also be 
disordered in such a way that the one sense might help to deliver the idea of a 
different sense to the mind. In this respect, the actuality of synaesthesia can be seen to 
highlight inadequacies in the details of Locke’s theory of perceptual experience. 
, 26 
Further support, if it were needed, for the view that the above passage does 
not illustrate a case of synaesthesia comes from the lack of corroboration to be found 
in the reply Leibniz gave to Locke in his New Essays on Human Understarzditzg. In 
fact, Leibniz adds his own twist: ‘We cannot know the taste of pineapple by listening 
to travellers tales, unless we can taste things by the ears - like ‘Sancho Panza, who 
had the faculty to see Dulcinea by hearsay’, or like the blind man who, having heard 
scarlet described as a blazing colour, thought it must be ‘like the sound of a trumpet’.’ 
The relevant reasoning is by analogy. The blind man is acquainted with the idea the 
sound of trumpets enable in him. The sound trumpets make is described as ‘blazing’. 
Red is also described as a blazing colour. Therefore, what it would be like to be 
acquainted with the idea of redness is similar to what it is like to be acquainted with 
36 1690: bk. 2, ch. 3, sect.1. 
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the idea the sound trumpets enable. The reasoning is fallacious since our ideas of 
secondary qualities can only be enabled by the appropriate senses. Leibniz makes one 
hrther reference to the association between scarlet and the sound of a trumpet in his 
response to Locke’s remarks on solidity. His point here is that usually people perceive 
just one clear idea of a sensible property. If a person were to have more than one idea 
(or their ideas were indistinct), then they would not be able to communicate with 
others. They would be in a position similar to that of the blind man who is unable to 
understand the notion of colour. 
The foregoing are some of the reasons for t w n g  Locke is not a good 
candidate for providing an early reference to synaesthesia. This still leaves the 
question open, if the reality of synaesthesia is admitted, of whether the blind man 
could understand the colour words, or, at least, have colour concepts. Of course, a 
blind synaesthete would not have colour concepts as the sighted do, nor would he 
have perceptual concepts in the way that he has concepts derived from other sensory 
modalities, nevertheless, it seems plausible to suggest that he might acquire a range of 
concepts of some kind. The problem is unlike the Molyneux’ problem. The issue is 
not, as is the Molyneux’ problem, one of whether the concept of a perceptible 
property, which has already been acquired on the evidence of one perceptual 
modality, can then be applied to the perceptual experience derived from another 
perceptual modality through which the concept of that perceptible property cannot 
have been acquired. The problem of the blind synaesthete would be one of the kind of 
concept that could be acquired where the concept in question is usually acquired by a 
different sensory modality. 
It remains a matter of contention, and of some confusion, who first referred to 
a case of synaesthesia as a distinctive condition. Marks suggests Woolhouse, a near 
contemporary of Locke, as another possible candidate for priority. Woolhouse is 
supposed to have reported a case of a blind person who was nevertheless able to 
experience colours on hearing But it is by no meam clear that this is a 
genuine case of synaesthesia. That it is not a genuine case of synaesthesia is even 
’’ Marks 1997: 51. The claim is repeated by Cytowk 1993: 52. ClaViere refers to Caste1 without 
refemng to Woolhouse. 
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suggested by the fact that it was cited by Castel in 1735, whose own interests were in 
quite a different phenomenon. Castel was interested in establishing Isaac Newton’s 
idea that the seven colours o f  the spectrum and the seven intervals of the musical 
octave were mathematically related. As a part of this project Castel had already made 
an instrument,, a type of organ, which produced colours and sounds simultaneously. 
Synaesthesia would not have added any direct support for this claim, for the 
postulated relation Castel was intent on establishing was supposed to hold between 
colours and sounds, whereas, whatever synaesthesia is, it is a complex relation 
holding between colours and sounds only in so far as it is mediated by a particular 
person’s experience.28 
Goethe disagreed with Newton about the relationship between sound and 
colour. Goethe believed that, although sound and colour might ultimately derive from 
the same source, in the empirical world they have no direct relation. Goethe also 
disagreed with Newton about the latter’s neglect of the experience of colour in any 
account of  colour. So it is more reasonable to think that Goethe might provide an 
early reference to synaesthesia. This is indeed suggested by Krohn, on the basis of 
Goethe’s reference to H o b ’ s  1786 description o f  a Swiss magistrate, for whom 
the sounds of various instruments evoked vivid experiences of colours: ‘the notes o f  
the cello seemed indigo blue, the violin bright blue, the clarinet yellow, the flute dark 
red and the trumpet bright red’. 29 But it is unlikely that this was taken to be a case of 
a new psychological condition at the time. If it were Goethe would surely have used it 
in support of his view that the eye normally contained a dormant light, a view which 
he had been persuaded to from his study of dreams, afterimages and colour 
blindness. 30 
” 
references to colour organs. 
” See Krohn 1892: 21. 
See Marks 1997: 66-67 for more on Castel and conjectured influences, as well as further 
See Dann 1998: Introduction for a similar pint. 
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1.3 D e  Emergence of Synaesthesia 31 
What makes synaesthesia a strtking phenomenon is the way that language frequently 
figures in the cross-modal association. The first clear testimony on record of such a 
case where vowels and words were reported to produce colours can be traced back to 
early nineteenth century Germany, more precisely to Erlangen in 1812. We owe the 
report to an academic, Doctor Sa~hs .~*  His subject was an albino who experienced 
colours (he did not experience all the colours of the spectrum nor were those he did 
experience equally intense) in response not only to vowels and consonants but also to 
a variety of optical and acoustic stimuli (e.g. names, musical notes, the sounds of 
instruments and figures), as well as more abstract stimuli (e.g. epochs of history and 
phases of human life). 
In some more detail his responses to vowels, consonants and numerals were 
the following: a evoked vermilion red, e evoked rose, i evoked white, o evoked 
orange, U evoked black, and ii evoked white; c evoked ash, d evoked yellow,fevoked 
opaque white, h evoked blue grey, k evoked dark green, m evoked white, n evoked 
white, s evoked navy blue and w evoked brown; I evoked indistinct white, 2 evoked 
uncertain, 3 evoked ash, 4 evoked red, 5 evoked yellow, 6 evoked indigo, 7 evoked 
bluish white, 8 evoked brown, 9 evoked dark green, and 0 evoked a pale uncertain 
yellow. When numerals were of more than one figure, such as 435 or 768, the group 
of figures were reported to take on the colour of the last numeral, although tints of 
the other colours nevertheless remained. The figure 0 did not change the colour of the 
figures but it did change the general appearance of the combined figures e.g. 10, 11, 
100, 110, 1 11 were all bright but they differed in degree of brightness and clarity. 
Musical notes were reported to take the same colours as the corresponding letters for 
the notes. Whereas the subject's colours for the names of cities did not correspond to 
the colours associated with the individual letters. Likewise for the days of the week: 
Sunday evoked white, Monday evoked cloudy white, Tuesday evoked an indistinct 
colour, Wednesday evoked yellow, Thursday evoked green, Friday evoked white, and 
31 Material in this section is indebted to the earliest reviews of supposed cases of synaesthesia by 
Suarez de Mendoza 1890, Krohn 1892 and Claviere 1898. Marks 1997 provides a useful 
chronological swnmary of the literature on coloured-hearing synaesthesia. 
3' Sachs wrote in Latin. His  text was translated by Schlegel. See Krohn 1892: 21. 
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Saturday evoked a bluish ash colour. 
That the associations were reported to be produced by such a variety o f  
stimuli and in such a variety of ways must have made anything more than a description 
of the associations difficult. Metaphorical associations between objects of distinct 
sensory modalities are common in language. Was this a strange case of  metaphorical 
association? Or might it have been considered so? It was not until the latter half of the 
nineteenth century that what was to become known as synaesthesia came to be 
generally recognised as a genuinely distinct phenomenon having as its explanation an 
underlying physical or psychological cause. It is a matter of conjecture whether the 
reality of  the condition was regarded with some suspicion in the scientific circles o f  
the first half of  the nineteenth century because its manifestations paralleled certain 
hndamental principles of the poets and artists known as the Decadents or Symbolists 
(principles which can be traced to the writings of Swedenborg and perhaps also to 
elements of Goethe’s thought). This has been suggested by C l a ~ i e r e . ~ ~  
An abiding theme of Symbolist poetry was the correspondence, both in the 
sense of likeness and communication, between the senses. Gauthier, a leading figure 
of the movement, wrote in 1843: ‘Mon ouie s’etait prodigieusement developpee; 
j’entendais le bruit des couleurs. Des sons verts, rouges, bleus, jaunes, m’arrivaient 
par ondes parfaitement distinctes. Un verre renverse, un craquement de fauteuil, un 
mot prononce tout bas, vibraient et retentissaient en moi c o m e  des roulements de 
tonnerre. Chaque objet effleure rendait une note d’harmonica ou de harpe 
e~l ienne. ’~~ Further expression of  the correspondence between the senses is to be 
found in the poetry of  Baudelaire. In the second verse of  ‘Correspondance’ 
Baudelaire writes: 
C o m e  de longs khos qui de loin se codondent 
Dans une thebreuse et profonde unitk, 
Vaste c o m e  la nuit et c o m e  la clarte, 
33 See Claviere 1897: 164. 
34 La Presse, 1843. ‘My hearing was prodigiously developed; I heard the sound of colours. The 
sounds of green, red, blue and yellow reached me like perfectly distinct waves. An upturned glass, a 
crack of the armchr, a word spoken softly, vibrated and reverberated in me like rolls of thunder. 
Each object produced a note as that of the harmonica or the alien harp.’ 
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Les parfiuns, les couleurs et les sons se re~ondent.~’ 
Gauthier and Baudelaire both belonged to a circle known as the Club des 
Haschichim. It met at Boissard’ s salon. According to Baudelaire the correspondence 
between the senses assumed an unaccustomed vividness under the influence of 
hashish.36 Synaesthetic-like effects can be drug-induced. Perhaps the poem is an 
expression of such synaesthetic-like effects. It is not clear whether this intensified any 
existing synaesthetic tendencies or simply appeared to corroborate existing beliefs 
about the correspondence between the senses. Perhaps the most celebrated artistic 
expression of the artificial association of sensory modalities of this period comes fiom 
another French poet, Arthur Rimbaud. On the evidence of his Sonnet des Yoyelres of 
1871 it seems unlikely that Rimbaud was unaware of the growing interest of 
synaesthesia amongst the scientific community, although he admitted two years after 
the publication of  his sonnet that he invented the colour o f  his vowels. The opening 
lines of the sonnet run: 
A noir, E blanc, I rouge, 0 bleu, voyelles. 
Je &rai quelque jour vos naissances l a t e n t e ~ . ~ ~  
The way that scientific psychology and art confkonted each other over 
synaesthesia may be seen differently. Instead of a r t  delaying the serious study o f  
synaesthesia scientific psychology may have served to deflate artistic pretensions. 
Dann has argued that synaesthesia has always been attractive to Romantic ideas 
because synaesthetic responses to stimuli might seem to confirm some of their central 
tenets, on the one hand, ‘the primacy of imagination in human cognition’ and, on the 
other hand, the ‘continuity of sensation before it is divided into different types of 
sensation’. Dann also points out how, to the Romantic, synaesthesia seems to suggest 
an escape fiom the ‘decline’ into a rationalism based upon the evidence o f  the five 
senses. In his turn, Dann notes that this use of  synaesthesia can be seen as a cultural 
35 Baudelaire Les Fleurs du Mal (1857) dedicated to Gautier. ‘Llke the long echoes which blend in 
the &stance in a shadowy and profound unity, vast like the night and like the Light, the perfumes, the 
colours and the sounds communicate.’ 
36 See Baudelaire 1860: 218. 
37 ‘A black. E white, I red, 0 blue, vowels. I will one day speak of your hidden origins’. See 
Rixnbaud 1873 for commentary. 
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barometer for the limitations of Romanticism’s attempts to reverse the tide of the 
Enlighten~nent.~~ 
More reports followed of vowels, letters, words and other sounds producing a 
range of different colours. Comaz, a Swiss oculist, who in 1848 documented several 
such cases, described these as cases of ‘hyperesthesie’ or more precisely 
‘hyperchromatopsie’, his reason being that he took this phenomenon to be caused by a 
hypersensitivity in his subjects’ sense of colours caused by some kind of optical lesion. 
His seems to be the earliest physiological explanation for ~ynaesthesia.~~ In 1864 
Chabalier argued to the contrary: synaesthesia was not pathological in origin, simply a 
slight oddity. In so doing he was supporting the view presented by Perroud in the 
previous year? In discussion Chabalier coined the term ‘ pseudo-chromoesthesie’ to 
refer to the phenomenon. Experiences of colours were not the only associations 
reported. Vautier reported experiencing a painful toothache on hearing a particular 
And there were reports in which stimuli other than sounds produced 
experiences of colours. 42 
One of the more interesting cases of the period involved a pair of twins. In 
1873 Niissbaumer published a detailed account of his experiences and those of his 
brother. As young children they both experienced colours in response to hearing 
sounds. One o f  their childhood games was to use spoons attached to pieces of string 
to make bells. They would argue about the colours produced. For both brothers 
vowels produced colours. Various other sounds would also produce colours, for 
example the notes of the piano, and of other instruments. Nussbaumer called the 
phenomenon ‘ phonopsia’ .43 
38 Dann 1998: Introduction. 
39 Cornaz 1848 & 1851. In this view he was followed by Wartman 1849 and by Marcc5 1860. The 
latter believed that hyper&hesia should be classified alongside the phenomenon of colour-blindness. 
“’ Perroud 1863, Chabalier 1864. See these and Mayerhausen 1873 for more colour associations. The 
voweYcolour associations reported by Perroud and Chabalier show some Merences but also some 
similarities. Perroud reported the following: ‘a  evoked orange yellow, e evoked bluish or pearl grey, i 
evoked carmine. U evoked canary yellow, U evoked sombre brown and diphthongs produced two 
distinct colours’. Chabalier reported that ‘a evoked black, e evoked grey, i evoked red, U evoked 
white and II evoked sea-green’. 
41 Vautier 1860. 
42 See Perroud 1863. 
43 Niissbaumer 1873. 
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By the 1870s synaesthesia was no longer an unusual phenomenon, which was 
only studied at the fringes of the new science of psychology. In 1876 Fechner, the 
founder of psychophysics, used questionnaires as a method of investigating 
synaesthesia. He described 347 purported cases, including two cases of blind people 
who only noticed their synaesthetic experiences &er they had become blind and one 
case of a colour-blind person who only experienced the colours he was acquainted 
with. Perhaps the most extensive early study of synaesthesia was conducted by 
Bleuler and Lehmann. They also employed the questionnaire method. Their study of 
1881 revealed all manner of synaesthetic associations. As well as the standard 
associations between sounds and different colours (with respect to which they noted a 
relation between low sounds and dark colours and high sounds and light colours), 
they found associations between languages and colours, geometrical figures and 
colours, odours and colours and tastes and colours. Bleuler and Lehmann termed the 
synaesthetic experiences ‘ secondary sensations’, distinguishing between ‘ photisms’ 
(the secondary sensations of colour) and ‘phonisms’ (the secondary sensations of 
sound). 
One of the earliest references in the English-speakmg academic community is 
to be found in Galton’s Inquiries into Human Faculties and their Development where 
he summarizes the current knowledge of synaesthesia thus: 
As my present object is to subordinate details of the general impression that I wish to 
convev of the peculiarities of Merent minds. I will simply remark - First, that the 
existence of the colour association with sound is fdly as remarkable as that of the 
Number-Fonn with numbers. Secondly, that the vowel sounds chefly evoke them. 
Thlrdly, that the seers are invariably most minute in their description of the precise 
tint and hue of the colours. They are never satisfied, for instance, with saying ‘blue’, 
but will take a great deal of trouble to express or to match the particular blue they 
mean. Fourthly, that no two people agree, or hardly ever do so, as to the colour they 
associate with the same sound. Lastly that the tendency is very hereditary.44 
The closest antecedent to the,term coloured hearing, currently used with 
reference to the most common form of synaesthesia, was introduced in the London 
Galton 1883. The persistence of the connections between numbers and colours was noted by 
Holden in 1885. who had recorded hs daughter’s association of colours with letters at regular 
intervals. 
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Medical Record in an article published in December 1881, bearing the title Color- 
Hearing. This article was also published in the Medzcinisch Neuigkeiten in Germany 
and the Lancet in Cinn~innati.~~ 
The terminology seems to have been quickly adopted in the French spealung 
academic community. Articles by Rochas, Giiadeau, Baratoux and Lauret all bear the 
title L ’audition ~ o l o r e e . ~  Articles of this period postulated a variety of mechanisms 
underlying synaesthesia. Commenting on the Nussbaumer case Nuel suggested that 
synaesthesia was caused by the proximity of areas of the brain, which subserved 
hearing and vision, and that ‘central nervous irradiations’ fiom the auditory centre 
affected ‘sensory afferent signals’ to the visual area.47 Rochas claimed that in 
synaesthetes there was a connection between those cortical cells, which processed 
visual signals and those cortical cells which processed auditory signals. Baratoux 
claimed that in synaesthetes the chromatic centre of the brain could be excited by 
signals fiom sensory organs other than the visual organs. Steinbriigge suggested that 
the neural connections could be made in one of two ways: either one sensory nerve 
connected with another sensory nerve and thus connected with a different sensory 
area or one sensory nerve extended beyond its own sensory centre to a different 
sensory area? 
The first review length treatment of the topic by Suarez de Mendoza, also 
bearing the title L ’audition coloree, appeared in 1890. Suarez de Mendoza catalogued 
the various types of  secondary pseudo-sensations, which he also believed were 
physiological in origin, under the generic term pseudesthesie physioZogzque as 
follows: 
Pseudo-photesthesie: secondary sensations of colour 
Pseudo-acouesthesie: secondary sensations of sound 
Pseudo-phresesthesie: secondary sensations of smells 
Pseudo-gousesthesie: secondary sensations of tastes 
Pseudo-apsiesesthesie: secondary sensations of touch 
~ 
Claviere 1897: 16 1. The term ‘Das Farbenhoren’ was used in Germany. 45 
46 Rachas 1885. Giradau 1885, Baratoux 1886 and buret 1886. 
47 Niiell876. Pedmno 1882 agrees. 
Steinbriigge 1887. 48 
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He fbrther subdivided each of these by their origins. So, if one considers pseudo- 
photesthesie, it could have its origin as vision, audition, olfaction, gustation or touch. 
Thus, for instance, Mendoza termed the phenomenon whereby a sound enabled an 
experience of colour pseudo-photesthesie d ‘orzgine audative. He also included a 
class of stimuli of purely psychical origin. This last class included stimuli such as the 
days of the week and the months of the year. It is not quite clear how these could 
have been purely psychical. It was surely the names for the days of the week and the 
months of the year, which were associated with colours and these are not purely 
psychical. It is possible that such reports involved a different but superticially similar 
phenomenon to synaesthesia. 
The next major study of synaesthesia was undertaken by Fl~urnoy.~’ Flournoy 
collected together the data on coloured vowels already gathered by Claparede, 
Fechner and Bleuler and Lehmann, as well as adding data of his  own. By way of 
introduction he commented on existing terminology. He noted that the term 
‘coloured hearing’ was inadequate to capture exactly the varied features of the 
condition; sometimes visual features had no relevance whatsoever. His conclusion 
was that ‘synaesthesia’ was a better term, since it could be qualified to denote the 
variety of forms of the condition: ‘visual synaesthesia’, ‘auditory synaesthesia’ etc. 
Flournoy’s term ‘synaesthesia’ also had the advantage that it was neutral between 
psychological and physiological explanations. (Nevertheless he continued to use the 
more convenient term ‘synopsie’ for the condition more commonly referred to by the 
term ‘coloured hearing’.) 
Flournoy divided the significant components of synaesthesia into two: the 
inducer and the induced phenomenon. He then observed that the latter could be 
considered in three ways: by cause, by nature and by intensity. The causes of the 
induced phenomena were twofold: either sensory or psychical. With respect to the 
sensory causes he acknowledged Suarez de Mendoza’s list of stimuli appropriate to 
the five sensory modalities, and added stimuli having thermal, muscular and visceral 
Flournoy 1893 49 
, 
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origins. The psychic causes were idem, such as the ideas of days or names. But it is 
no more obvious that ideas of things can induce experiences independently of 
language and thus sensory features. As for the natures of the induced phenomena, 
these could be threefold: photisms, schemes (symbolddiagrams) and personifications. 
Flournoy explained the difference between the first two types of induced phenomena 
as corresponding to the difference between content and form. The division was not, 
however, neat; the induced photisms tended to have formal features and schemes 
tended to have content. The final class of induced phenomena, concerning 
personifications, included conceptual associations. Lastly, the intensities of the 
induced phenomena had a fourfold classification. Some induced phenomena were 
objective. These were projected, localised and vivid, that is to say, they seemed to fit 
alongside real sensations (although none of his subjects cof i sed  these secondary 
sensations with the primary sensations which enabled them). For some of his subjects 
the induced phenomena appeared two metres before their eyes, for others they 
appeared projected onto the object maktng the sound. At the opposite extreme some 
induced phenomena were thought. These were simply conceptualisations triggered by 
certain experiences. Letters would give the idea of a corresponding colour. One 
subject said that he produced the internally vocalised name of a colour. Another 
subject said that he would pick up a crayon of the appropriate colour in response to 
the specific letter. In between these two extremes were induced phenomena in which 
colours appeared to be ‘in the subject’s head’; they were not projected and were 
usually less vivid. This type of induced phenomena was the most frequent. He divided 
these induced phenomena according to whether they were imagined or localised. 
Flournoy also distinguished a particular type of induced phenomena, that consisting of 
negative photisms. His subjects who had negative photisms would only say that a 
photism was not a certain colour. 
Flournoy believed that stimuli to the optical, auditory and olfactory nerves 
could all produce the same emotional effects. It was his hypothesis that a sensation 
associated with one sensory modality might induce, via its emotional effects, a 
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sensation more commonly associated with another sensory modality. 
details of his analysis of the data, which occupy the greater part of the book. 
But it is the 
In discussing the experiences, which were caused by the letters of the 
alphabet, Flournoy noted a number of findings. If the specific colours evoked by the 
vowels were ignored and only their brightness considered, that is to say classiwng 
colours as bright, medium and dark, he found the following correspondences: i and e 
were bright; a and o were medium bright and U and ou were dark. Flournoy 
concluded that there was a relation between the vowel sounds and the brightness of 
the colours. This he called the Zoi de clarte?’ Flournoy also found that there was 
some consistency in associations between vowels and colours across subjects: a 
tended to evoke white, black, red or blue; e tended to evoke white, grey, yellow or 
blue; i tended to evoke whte, yellow or red; o tended to evoke yellow, red or black; U 
tended to evoke green, blue, violet or brown and ou tended to evoke brown, red or 
grey. He called the tendency of certain vowels to evoke certain colours the Zoi de 
preference. In general, he found red, yellow and white to be the most frequently 
evoked colours, then green, blue and black and least frequently evoked were violet, 
grey and brown. Diphthongs were usually either a mixture of the two composite 
colours or predominantly one of the two composite colours. Consonants were usually 
dull. Words tended to take the colour of the predominant vowel. 
Probably the first experimental work on synaesthesia was conducted by 
Beaunis and Binet at about the same time. They attempted to ascertain reaction times 
for coloured hearing. They asked synaesthetes to respond as soon as they 
experienced a colour in association with a stimulus. The average time was .51  
seconds. The average time for the recognition of letters alone was found to be .45 
seconds; too short, so they believed, to be a psychological association. Philippe 
extended the research. He found that the time for letter recognition was greater than 
the reaction time for experiencing the colour alone; the time until response to letters 
was .76 seconds; the time until response to colours was .70 seconds? 
’‘I Flournoy noted too that colour was a function of the volume and intensity of the sound: the louder 
the sound the brighter the colour. 
” Beaunis & Binet 1892 and Philippe 1893. 
Synaesthesia was taken up in America along with the new experimental 
science of psychology. The early volumes of American psychological journals are 
dotted with papers on synaesthesia. The foremost problem in psychology was that of 
the study of sensation. The importance with which synaesthesia was now regarded as 
an aid to that study can be assessed from Krohn’~ early review article: ‘But the 
pseudo-sensations constitute the subject matter of psychology just as much as those 
arising from ‘bona fide’ stimuli. Indeed, much light is thrown upon the problems of 
psychology by following out this line of study and investigation. Some of the most 
useh1 as well as the most interesting psychological material comes to us in the form 
of pseudo-sensations’ .’* Krohn noted the inextricability of the secondary sensation 
from the primary sensation, concluding that synaesthesia could best be accounted for 
by physiological causes. 
The pioneer female American psychologist M q  Calkin disagreed about 
Krohn’s explanation of synaesthesia. She believed that it was a much more common 
phenomenon than had been suggested by the single case studies. She also believed 
that there was much more variety than was suggested by Flournoy’s 202 de c2urte. In 
accordance with the predominant viewpoint in psychology of the period she argued 
that the correspondences between colour and sound were the result of learned 
associations (often a colour being associated with a word before being associated with 
a letter).53 Kaiser had already proposed in 1871 that synaesthesia was an artificial 
association made by the subject when young between a primary stimulus, usually a 
letter or a word and an imagined colour, in order to aid memory and that in time this 
association had become spontaneous. This view can also be found in a paper by 
Stephens, who claimed that letters were coloured because linked by a chain of 
associations to things that were coloured: letters were associated with words, which 
were in turn associated with objects which were in turn typically associated with a 
particular colour. 54 
The last decade of the nineteenth century md the first three decades of the 
‘’ Krohn 1892: 20. 
53 See Calkins 1893 and 1895. 
54 Stephens 1882. 
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twentieth century saw a sustained investigation into synaesthesia. Not only new cases 
but interesting new forms of synaesthesia were documented. The first case of 
gustatory and tactile hearing was reported in 1907 by Pierce? The subject in question 
was a young woman who was anosmic (she lacked a sense of smell) and also suffered 
from a slight deafhess. The sound of particular words and non-linguistic sounds 
produced experiences similar to those she would have had were she tasting certain 
substances: the word ‘cause’ caused a gustatory experience which she normally had 
when tasting ‘hot, soft corn bread’; the word ‘distinct’ caused a gustatory experience 
which she normally had when tasting ‘preserved pears’. These experiences seemed to 
her to be intermediate between real sensations and imagined tastes. 
In the 1920s Wheeler wrote about and collaborated with Cutsforth on a series 
of papers? These papers report in great detail the phenomenal character of the form 
of synaesthesia experienced by the latter, who had lost his sight at the age of eleven, 
and how synaesthesia relates to a number of other psychological processes: dreaming, 
learning, meaning, perception, reasoning and concept development. An example of 
their research involves an experiment designed to investigate how Cutsforth would 
learn and recognise syllables represented in Braille. The method used by a non- 
synaesthetic control shows only the use of tactile experience, followed by the internal 
vocalisation of nonsense sy Ilables (constituted by consonant-vowel-consonant 
strings). Cutsforth describes his experience as follows: 
I paid no attention to the tactual-lunaesthetic elements in the learning or in the 
perceptions of the letters. As fast as I inspected each syllable the appropriate 
synaesthetic visual lfnage appeared at my fingertips, the coloring and brightness of the 
imagery being determined by the letter. When I then found myself vocalising the 
syllable, the syllable itself tended to take on the colour of the initial letter. As my 
attention shfted from the procedure of inspecting the letters, tactual-lunaesthetic 
fashion, the visual imagery whch at all times remained dominant in consciousness 
shfted to the center of my field of vision. Throughout, the tactual-motor processes were 
dim, vague, indescribable experiences o f  whch I know nothing except in terms of their 
visual associates. U 
_ _  ’’ Pierce 1907: 341 observed that synaesthesia did not yield any facts of profound import for 
psychology. only ‘the mynad diversities of human nature’. 
i6 Wheeler 1920, Wheeler & Cutsforth 1920, 1921a, 1921b, 1922a. 1922b, 1924, 1925. 
’’ Wheeler & Cutsforth 1921a: 453-4. 
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The letters came to be identified by the colours and shapes they took rather than any 
tactile character. Wheeler claimed that there was a sameness of function between the 
blind non-synaesthete’ s experiences and Cutsforth’ s, but a difference in mental 
content. (Cutsforth’s method of learning was not actually quite as efficient as that 
used by the non-synaesthete control because the nonsense syllables produced colours 
which did not relate to one another but ‘floated free’.) It was because the 
synaesthetic experiences of colour seemed to hnction for Cutsforth in the same way 
as tactile experiences hnctioned for the non-synaesthetic blind person that Wheeler 
and Cutsforth claimed that in synaesthesia generally the secondary experiences 
represent an objective feature just as much as the primary experiences. When for 
example a person has coloured hearing a certain blue colour means a flute tone just as 
much as the auditory quality itselfl, the colour has come to fbnction as an integral 
element in the process of perceiving?* 
Synaesthesia was particularly amenable to the introspective methodology of 
the new experimental psychology, which attempted to determine the structure of  the 
experience by analysing it into its basic elements. With the rise of behaviourism as the 
dominant methodology in psychology, there was a corresponding diminution in the 
study of synaesthesia. Marks notes that in the fifty years between 1881 and 1921 there 
were 74 publications on visual-auditory synaesthesia, whereas in the forty-two years 
between 1932 and 1974 there were just 16  publication^.^' Coincidental with the 
cognitive revolution in psychology, and the current interest in conscious phenomena, 
there has been a resurgence of interest in synaesthesia. 
1.4 Synaesthesia: matching and translation 
There is currently some consensus about what the object of research is in 
synaesthesia studies. The most recent survey of synaesthesia includes in its 
introchction the remark: ‘We, along with others (Vernon 1930; Marks 1975; Cytowic 
1989, 1993; Motluk 1994), define synaesthesia as occurring when stimulation of one 
’’ See Wheeler & Cutsforth 1922a: 369. This is discussed further in &on 3.4. ’’ Marks 1975 reprinted 1997. 
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sensory modality automatically triggers a perception in a second modality, in the 
absence of any direct stimulation to this second modality’?’ The example Baron- 
Cohen and Harrison give is the standard one in which ‘a sound might automatically 
and instantly trigger the perception of vivid colour; or vice versa’. 
I shall here adopt this working definition with one modification. It might be 
questioned to what extent the stimulation of one sensory modality produces a 
perception in a second sensory modality. If such were the case it seems to follow that 
synaesthesia is a perceptual process. This is problematic for the straightforward 
reason that we tend to think of perceptual processes as relating subjects to states of 
affairs, which exist independently of their acts of perception. Synaesthesia does not 
do that. So how should the definition be modified? Perhaps we should say that the 
stimulation of one sensory modality produces an experience in a second modality. But 
does ths  then mean that the one stimulus produces one or two experiences? Does a 
single sound produce an experience of the sound and an additional experience of a 
colour? How are experiences to be individuated? In order to mitigate any womes 
along those lines I shall talk of synaesthesia as occurring when the stimulation of one 
sensory modality automatically triggers an additiona2 phenomenal (or qualitative) 
character of experience that would normally be triggered by the stimulation of a 
second sensory modality. Exactly what the phenomenal character of experience is, and 
specifically the phenomenal character of synaesthetic experience, will be fhrther 
considered in chapter three. 
Despite the consensus amongst researchers over the object of research there 
remains some disagreement about how to explain the phenomenon of synaesthesia. 
The present section focuses on one central disagreement: is synaesthesia different in 
kind from normal psychological processes or is it different only in degree from them? 
Marks has endorsed the latter possibility. He claims that synaesthesia is: ‘the 
translation of attributes of sensation fi-om one sensory domain to another? 
Baron-Cohen & Harrison, 1997: 3. M 
‘* Marks 1997: 49. See also Marks 1982a, 1982b & 1987. Marks also cites drug-induced 
synaesthesia and phonetic symbolism as corroboration of the link between normal matching and 
unusual translations. But there is no reason for this evidence to support any particular explanation of 
synaesthesia. 
According to Marks, synaesthesia most commonly occurs in the connections between 
‘color and thermal sensations: yellow, orange and red are fiequently perceived and 
described as ‘warm’ colours, blue and green as ‘cool’ colors’. The inference is 
presumably that the description of colours in terms more commonly used of  the 
properties perceived via another sensory modality presupposes some form o f  
translation between different types of sensation. ‘Much more dramatic examples o f  
synaesthesia’ are those ‘associations reported in the literature on colored hearing and 
colored taste’. Rather than dismiss the seemingly idiosyncratic cases of synaesthesia 
recorded in the psychological literature as having no or little bearing on the operations 
of the normal mind Marks sets out to explain how these often have more regularity 
than they might at first sight appear to. Indeed they reflect ‘important cognitive 
properties that in several respects are common to normal people as well as 
synaesthetes . Following Marks this theory o f  synaesthesia can be called the theory 
of Cross-MOdal Translations of Sensory Dimensions (hereafter CMTSD). 
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Reservations will centre on whether the notion of translation obscures an 
important difference between normal cross-modal associations and synaesthetic 
associations. Some orientation of the discussion is required. Firstly, the idea of the 
parallels between sensory dimensions in non-synaesthetes and synaesthetes will be 
discussed. Secondly, this will be pictured in terms o f  parallels between dimensions in 
quality spaces. Thirdly, a construal of  the psychological process relating sensory 
dimensions in terms of  a matching process d l  be given. Fourthly, a construal o f  the 
psychological process relating sensory dimensions in terms of a translational process 
will be given. And finally it will be argued that there is no clear continuity between the 
two processes which is what is demanded if synaesthetic processes are supposed to be 
different not in kind but only in degree fi-om normal processes. 
Marks starts by considering coloured hearing and in particular that form of  
coloured hearing in which vowel sounds produce experiences of colours. The 
question he asks is: ‘is there an intrinsic relatiorr between sound (vowel quality) and 
associated visual sensations (~olors )? ’~~  His claim is that there is and that it is ‘as 
Marks 1997: 50. 
63 Marks 1997: 51. 
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intimate as is the well-studied relation between brightness and loudness in non- 
synaesthetic subjects’. In non-synaesthetic subjects it has long been known that when 
asked to match brightness of lights and loudness of sounds subjects align increasing 
luminances with increasing loudness in a systematic way. It is Marks’ proposal that 
synaesthesia provides the mechanism for cross-modal matching of this type as well as 
the more unusual associations reported in the psychological literature. 
For many synaesthetes also music displayed a correlation between the 
dimensions of loudness and brightness: the louder the musical sound so the brighter 
the colour experienced. But synaesthetes’ experience of music also manifested a 
correlation between sound frequency (i.e. pitch) and colour brightness. The second 
lesson Marks takes from a reading of the literature on synaesthesia is the correlation 
between pitch and brightness: the higher the pitch of the stimulus so the brighter the 
colour experienced. According to Marks this is not just a correlation between 
‘individual sensations’ but it shows ‘ an association between dimensions of auditory 
and visual experiences’ .64 This would be consistent with what many non-synaesthetes 
say about high-pitched sounds, namely that they are h h t e r  than low-pitched sounds. 
To try to clarify this latter correlation in synaesthesia Marks focused on the 
much-researched association between vowel sounds and experiences of 
Marks observed a consistency between the pitch of vowel sounds (specifically the 
second formants of the vowel sounds, that is to say the acuteness of vowel sounds) 
and colours: a evoked red and blue; e and i evoked yellow or white; o evoked red or 
black; U evoked blue, brown or black. In order to extract more information fiom the 
data provided by previous research he converted it into scores on three bipolar 
dimensions: black-white, red-green and blue-yellow . These are the usual dimensions 
for the Opponent Process theory of colour vision, but they can also be used to 
describe the co-ordinates of the colour solid. To take the black-white dimension first, 
Marks found that i and e (the vowels of highest pitch) corresponded to the position of 
greatest brightness; o and U (the vowels of lowest pitch) corresponded to the position 
of least brightness and a was intermediate between them. In fact the relationship 
64 Marks 1997: 57. This had already been noted by Kggs and Karwoski. 
65 Marks 1975: 51-66. 
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between pitch and the brightness of  the induced colour was almost linear? 
In addition to the correlation between pitch and brightness, which reflects the 
acuteness o f  vowel sounds, Marks hrther claimed that the position on the red-green 
dimension is a fhction of the relative frequencies of  the second and first formants of 
the vowel sounds. This reflected the compactness of vowel sounds such that compact 
vowels (a and o), having a low second to first formant frequency ratio, were more 
red, and the difise vowels (i  and e )  having a high second to first formant fiequency 
ratio were more green. He could find nothing to explain the blue-yellow dimension. 
Furthermore Marks found in the psychological literature correlations between 
two other dimensions. He found that the pitch of  the auditory stimulus correlated with 
the size of  the photism (the induced visual sensation): the lower the pitch of  the sound 
so the bigger the photism. And he found that the loudness o f  the auditory stimulus 
correlated with the size of photism: the louder the sound so the bigger the photism. 
It appeared from these correlations that two auditory dimensions, pitch and 
loudness, might map onto two visual dimensions, brightness and size in contrasting 
ways: brightness increases with loudness and with pitch, and size of induced visual 
sensation increases with loudness but diminishes with pitch. In order to explain this 
Marks claimed that the auditory dimensions needed to be understood slightly 
differently. Marks postulated a dimension of auditory brightness, which he understood 
in terms of the density of  the perceived sound. Position along this dimension (the 
density of  perceived sound) increases with the loudness and with the pitch o f  a sound. 
A different dimension of auditory volume would increase with loudness but decrease 
with pitch. In this way auditory and visual dimensions would coincide. According to 
Marks then what an investigation of synaesthesia shows is that there exist two general 
cross-modal dimensions: one including auditory brightness and visual brightness, and 
another including auditory volume and size of induced visual sensation. Synaesthesia 
on this view involves the association of a stimulus experienced via one sensory 
modality with the character of an experience usually associated with another sensory 
modality according to the positions they share on a common sensory dimension. This 
66 This might be Seen as an endorsement of Floumoy’s loi de clarte. 
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is what Marks means by a translation of sensory dimensions. 
In order to evaluate the CMTSD theory properly one needs to appreciate what 
is supposed to be held in common between the sensory dimensions of different 
sensory modalities. In order to do this it is helpfbl to advert to the idea of a quality 
space. A quality space does not actually inhabit physical space as a normal solid 
might. It can nevertheless be thought of as a space if we think of a space as something 
which can be characterised by a multidimensional order and if we think of an order as 
something which can be characterised by an ordering relation. An order may be taken 
t to consist of a set and relations that order that set. A line may be characterised by a 
one-dimensional order consisting of a point of origin, a set of positions and a greater- 
than relation which orders those positions in relation to the point of origin. 
Multidimensional space needs to add a direction from the point of origin and a m e r  
ordering relation with respect to that direction. How do we determine the order 
which characterises the dimensions of a quality space? Suppose we are presented 
with two tokens, x and y, of sensory stimuli types, X and Y. We fail to discriminate 
them. We are presented with another pair of tokens, y and z, of sensory stimuli types, 
Y and 2. We fail to discriminate them. Then we are presented with a third pair tokens, 
x and z,  of sensory stimuli types, X and 2. We succeed in telling the sensory stimuli 
apart. An order can be generated out of the way we are able to discriminate the 
sensory stimuli. There are several way of doing this. One way is to use the partial and 
total overlaps between classes of indiscriminable stimuli. Tokens of X and Y might be 
in one class. Tokens of Y and Z might be in another class. Since tokens of X and Z 
are in different classes by Leibniz law a token of X cannot be of the same type as a 
token of Y since tokens of X and tokens o f  Y have different relations to tokens of Z. 
Nor can a token of Y be of the same type as a token of Z since tokens of Y and 
tokens of 2 have different relations to tokens of  X. This leaves tokens of Y 
belonging to a distinct class. The chain of overlapping classes can be used to order 
the quality space.67 _ _  
‘j7 The idea derives from Carnap 1967. This is actually a simplification, see Goodman 1951 and 
Clark 1993. New dimensions are postulated in order to avoid placing discriminable characters of 
experience between in&scriminable characters of experience. The definition of dimensionality is 
recursive. The dimension is n+l if there are indiscriminable characters of experience in the nth 
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The quality space is derived fiom psychological processes, from the 
discriminations we are able to make with respect to classes of stimuli. It is for this 
reason that the quality space can be contrasted with a physical space. However, the 
quality space has been produced with the aid o f  physical stimuli. So we might also 
think o f  a correlative space. The colour solid is a representation of  the space, which 
correlates with the quality space generated by visual stimuli. The colour solid may be 
represented by a physical solid. The dimensions of the colour solid are hue, brightness 
and saturation. In order to imagine the colour solid one might imagine a sphere. The 
vertical axis  would represent the brightness of  a colour; at points along the vertical 
axis can be found the non-chromatic greys. In the top hemisphere are the lighter 
shades of colour (at the top pole is white); in the bottom hemisphere are the darker 
shades of colour (at the bottom pole is black). The horizontal planes map out the 
saturation of  shades of colour at particular brightness values. At points close to the 
vertical axis are to be found colours of  reduced saturation, at points distant fiom the 
vertical axis are to be found colours of  increased saturation. The circumference of the 
central horizontal plane is marked out by the saturated primary colours: red, green, 
yellow and blue. Around the sphere will be saturated primary colours of  greater or 
lesser brightness. Throughout the colour solid colours shade into each other. For 
example, starting from one point saturated green shades into saturated yellow in one 
direction, into saturated blue in another direction, into saturated dark green in another 
direction, into saturated light green in another direction and into unsaturated green in 
another direction. Pairs of  shades of colours that are equally distant are equally 
similar. Although the colour solid can be represented using a solid in physical space, it 
must be remembered that it is generated in the first place by the discriminations that 
we can make of sets of visual stimuli. It is for this reason that the saturated hues form 
a circle. 
Something similar can be said for the quality space generated by auditory 
stimuli, although it is not as easy to determine its exact number of dimensions. What 
dimension whch are inconsistent with there being n dimensions. Failures in constructing nth 
dimensional series forces an nth+l dimensional structure. Suppose all patches of a given brightness 
were collected together, an attempt to arrange them would require a two-dimensional arrangement 
that is roughly circular. 
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we do know is that two of the dimensions constitutive of the quality space can be 
generated by discriminations of pitch and loudness. 
Now according to Marks different sensory modalities have common 
dimensions. Recalling that the dimensions of quality spaces are generated by the 
discriminations we can make, the thought seems to be that two different quality 
spaces - those generated by visual stimuli and those generated by auditory stimuli - 
coincide with respect to particular dimensions, brightness and volume, because the 
ordering relations which constitute those dimensions coincide. According to the 
CMTSD theory it is this coincidence which normally allows synaesthetes and non- 
synaesthetes alike to correlate orderings of visual stimuli and orderings of auditory 
stimuli. Moreover, it is this coincidence which is supposed to show that the 
synaesthetic correlations of sounds and colours are simply a heightened expression of 
this normal ability to correlate orderings of visual stimuli and orderings of auditory 
stimuli. 
Let us first consider a case in which both synaesthetes and non-synaesthetes 
are asked to relate visual and auditory stimuli in virtue of their brightness. Consider a 
loud auditory stimulus and a soR auditory stimulus on the one hand and a bright visual 
stimulus and a dark visual stimulus on the other hand. Let us suppose that subjects 
accomplish the task according to the prediction, that they correlate orderings of visual 
stimuli and orderings of auditory stimuli? The question now arises as to how the task 
was accomplished. Marks seems to claim that it is by a process of translation. Is this 
an accurate description for the case outlined above? 
At first sight the task seems better described as a matchmg task. Matching 
tasks are accomplished when the subject is able to abstract some feature in common 
between two given elements. Matching typically requires that we abstract fiom the 
totality of features of the items to be matched in order to identifj7 particular features of 
the items. We match two colour samples by ignoring their particular shapes and by 
focusing on the qualitative identity of their colours. Similarly. we might match the 
shape of something when seen and when touched. Here we match the shape perceived 
61( See Stephens and Marks 1965 and Marks & Stephens 1966. 
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visually and perceived by touch by ignoring the features that mark out the distinctive 
sensory modalities (colours in the one case and textures in the other case). When we 
are asked to match the elements belonging to two sets of elements, visual stimuli and 
auditory stimuli, it seems that this too is accomplished in virtue of some feature they 
have in common. In this case it seems reasonable to suppose that the feature they have 
in common is a dimension along which can be ordered perceived stimuli in a related 
way. It is this order which is abstracted fiom other features peculiar to the distinctive 
sensory modalities and ordered positions on that dimension matched between the 
sensory modalities. 
Therefore it is not that one type of  experience, a visual experience, is simply 
associated with another type of experience, an auditory experience, in synaesthesia. 
They are associated in virtue of occupying related positions along dimensions of their 
respective quality spaces which can thus be regarded as a common dimension. 
Matches between experiences of sound and experiences of colour are possible 
because they also have relational properties in common (how they are ordered along 
dimensions of quality spaces). One can think again of the visual quality space and the 
auditory quality space. Matches wil depend on where the experience of sound and the 
experience of colour occur along the dimensions determined by pitch discrimination 
and brightness discrimination respectively, and these will be determined by ordering 
relations: sounds which are discriminated as being of higher pitch will be matched 
with colours which are experienced as being brighter than other colours; sounds 
which are discriminated as being of lower pitch will be matched with colours which 
are experienced as being less bright than other colours. Although quality spaces are 
individuated by their distinctive dimensions (the experience of hue individuates the 
visual quality space), there are common dimensions of our quality spaces. Experiences 
of colours and experiences of sounds are usually treated as completely different kinds 
of experiences by philosophers. It would be of some interest to philosophy if they 
have significant features in common. 
So the task seems better described as one of matching. Marks sometimes 
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acknowledges this.@ The question is whether this matching task can also be construed 
as one of translation. A typical case of translation occurs when one has two 
languages. Here one also has two sets of stimuli which have to be related. They may 
be sentences or individual terms. It is easier to deal with individual terms. If the case 
of language translation and the case of matching features of different quality spaces 
are to be analogous the items of the two sets of terms have to be related in virtue of a 
feature common to them. In the case of language it is clearly not a dimension common 
to two quality spaces. But one might argue that there is something in common to two 
languages in virtue of which one translates between them, namely the world. In some 
sense, the process which seems to take place in the matching experiment is like that 
which occurs when a language user translates tokens of one language into tokens of a 
second language. Translation between different languages is possible because there is 
a framework in common between the languages. That fiamework constitutes the 
meaning of the individual elements of language. An English word ‘dog’ can be 
translated into a French word ‘chien’ or an Italian word ‘cane’ because there is 
something in common for the English, the French and Italians, namely dogs. When the 
terms are translated it seems reasonable to say that they are matched for meaning. 
However it does not make as much sense to construe other matching 
experiments in terms of translation. When colours samples are matched we do not 
think of this also as a process of translation. When shapes are matched we do not 
think of this also as a process of translation. We might think of the matching of 
auditory and visual stimuli also as one of translation because it is an order (i.e. a 
relation other than each token colour or sound) which is matched. 
So the CMTSD seems to be vindicated. If the preceding is correct then it 
would indeed appear that synaesthesia tells us something about normal perceptual 
processes, but only in the way that a carefbl study of those normal perceptual 
69 Baron-Cohen & Harrison 1997: 117-8 actually call Marks’ theoq the cross-modal matching 
theory. One of their main criticisms is that Marks does not show whether the synaesthetic 
associations involve a culturally inherited metaphor or whether there is an underlying physiological 
explanation. I think, in contrast to Baron-Cohen and Hamson, that translation is a way in which 
one inight initially think of the process underlying synaesthesia. In agreement With them though I 
think that the task non-synaesthetes accomplish is better thought of as one of matching. 
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processes might inform us. But is the process, which only synaesthetes seem to 
perform, really the same type of process as that performed by non-synaesthetes and 
synaesthetes alike? It would be if there were a continuity between the activities which 
would allow them to be classed as tokens of the same type of activity. But there are 
difficulties with the view because there are reasons to doubt the continuity. 
The translational process, which is apparent in the experiment involving visual 
and auditory stimuli, is only apparent because the experiment involves firstly a 
matching process. In other words both synaesthetic and non-synaesthetic subjects 
appear to translate auditory and visual stimuli because they first match orderings on 
two sensory dimensions, visual brightness and auditory loudness, which can then be 
superimposed one onto the other. Even if the associations between auditory and 
visual stimuli turn out to parallel in some respects those made by non-synaesthetes it 
has not yet been shown that this is accomplished in virtue of a matching process. A 
matching process might be doubtfbl in synaesthesia because matching requires that the 
properties to be matched are both present at the start. They are accompanied by a 
number of other properties from which they are then abstracted. This does not happen 
in synaesthesia. 
If synaesthesia employs a translational process then it seems to be a direct 
translation. Sounds which are discriminated as being of higher pitch will be translated 
into experiences of bright colours; sounds which are discriminated as being of lower 
pitch will be translated into experiences of less bright colours. Perhaps this involves an 
unconscious matching process? If it does is it still a type of process different in kind 
rather than different in degree from that which occurs in non-synaesthetes. Why is it 
not just different in degree because different in the degree of conscious processing? At 
this point it can just be reiterated that it does not involve a matching process because 
there are no stimuli to be matched only to be translated. The response might then be 
that, although there is no matching process at present, it was required to set up the 
translational process in the first place. In this respect the translational processes of 
synaesthesia might be like that of language. Originally we match words from two 
languages, we match the word ‘dog’ in English with the words ‘chien’ in French and 
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‘cane’ in Italian by distinguishing them fi-om a set of other words, and, in time, we 
come to translate one term into another without having to match them consciously 
(although in a sense we do match them because we distinguish them from other words 
we could have used). To begin with an English speaker would not be able to translate 
his own language into another one but in time she might match different terms and 
then automatically translate them into the corresponding terms of another language. 
To begin with synaesthetes might match sounds and colours. In time they might 
simply translate the sounds they hear into colours. 
The trouble is that there is no evidence for the development of such 
translational processes via earlier matching processes. But there is another more 
pressing difficulty for the matching/translation theory. Even if the experience of a 
sound were to be translated into an experience of a colour of a certain brightness this 
is but one dimension of the experience. If one considers the visual quality space all 
that has been discussed is its vertical dimension. It is not clear fiom anything Marks 
says where an experience of colour should be placed with respect to the vertical. 
Marks does not specify the rule which maps the translation fiom the experience of a 
sound to the experience of a colour any finer than fiom one brightness value to 
another brightness value. In so far as he fails to do this a sound of a certain brightness 
could be translated in a number of different ways. 
The difference between the normal process described and the unusual process 
of synaesthesia lies in the fact that whereas the task non-synaesthetes perform is 
clearly a matching task accomplished by abstracting a common sensory dimension 
which might, at a stretch, then be construed as a process of translation in synaesthetes 
(though not in non-synaesthetes), the process underlying synaesthesia may be one of 
translation but it cannot be h l ly  accounted for in terms of matching. The process 
would not be one of exact matching but one of relative matching. The brightness of 
colour p might be greater than the brightness of colour q and the brightness of sound 
x might be greater than the brightness of sound y, so the brishtness of colour p might 
be more like sound x than sound y and the brightness of colour q might be more like 
sound y than to sound X. But there would have to be other distinctive properties of 
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the respective quality spaces such that these approximate matchings could be made. In 
other words, a sound could only be matched with a colour in virtue of the properties 
they do not share as well as the relations they do share. The difficulty with 
ascertaining the exactness of a match between a sound and a colour lies in the fact 
that whereas two colour patches can be indiscriminable in every respect and thus 
matched, any sound and any colour will be discriminable in virtue of other properties 
they fail to share and so can never be properly matched.70 
There is a way of making this distinction more vivid. It is the way that is often 
used to individuate synaesthesia in the first place. Whereas the matching process 
accomplished by both non-synaesthetes and synaesthetes is abstractive, it abstracts 
from what is distinctive of sensory modalities, synaesthesia is an additive process, it 
adds what is distinctive of a second sensory modality (its distinctive phenomenal 
character). It is this difference which wil make philosophical issues surrounding 
synaesthesia significantly different fiom those issues surrounding the cross-modal 
associations that have occupied philosophers so much.71 
There is another view, which claims that synaesthesia involves processes 
different not in kind but in degree from normal processes. Grossenbacher has 
suggested that synaesthetes might have abnormally strong feedback activity between 
multi-modal systems and sensory systems.” Normally sensory information feeds 
forward fiom single sensory areas to multisensory areas. In multisensory areas 
information, for example, from the visual system may be related to (matched with) 
information fiom the tactile system (when we touch what we see) or may be related to 
(matched with) information from the auditory system (when we hear what we see). 
Vision is central to the way we understand the world. It is plausible to think that other 
‘(’ This result is a reflection of the fact that Marks could only correlate some dimensions of quality 
spaces. There was little for the colour hues to be correlated with. But if he were to do thu in the way 
he did th~s  for brightness then there would be no matches because there would be no relevant 
distinctions to abstract fiom. 
’* I am thinking in particular of the cross-modal associations involved in the perception of shape. 
One might hnk of the psychological process of matching as a central cognitive process carried out 
on two sensory inputs. Translation of two tokens of language would also seem to be a central 
process. At least if this is not a native language. A different view of synaesthesia would be that it is 
a transformational procedure at the level of input systems. This will be considered hrther in chapter 
two. 
Grossenbacher 1997. 7 2  
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modes of perception deliver information, which might then be related to stored visual 
information. When we hear something we sometimes imagine what it might look like. 
When we smell something we sometimes imagine what it might look like. When we 
touch something we sometimes imagine what it might look like. These associations 
might prepare us for what we may see, that is to say, they might feedback into the 
primary visual areas. According to Grossenbacher synaesthesia is a particular 
manifestation of feedfonvard-feedback mechanisms: synaesthetes may have more 
feedback connections to the primary sensory areas or the primary sensory areas may 
be particularly sensitive to the feedback signals received, leading to feedforward of 
signals fkom the primary sensory area. So feedback from the multisensory area which 
relates visual information and auditory information may during hearing produce 
experiences in the visual system in the absence of any direct stimulation to the visual 
system. 
There is some support for the view. Some of the cross-modal associations 
we normally make are more common than others; the frequencies of different kinds of 
synaesthetic associations to some degree mirror those frequencies. Auditory stimuli 
commonly enable visual images of what might be causing those auditory stimuli. 
Coloured hearing synaesthesia is the most common form of synaesthesia. Less 
common types of synaesthesia include those for which there is normally less multi- 
modal processing. We do not commonly draw inferences about the sound of things 
from the way they smell or taste. Perhaps relatedly there are no reports of synaesthetic 
pairings in which the perceptual modality is gustation or olfaction and the secondary 
experience is a sound experience. 
However there are a number of difficulties for this view. Firstly, there are 
forms of synaesthesia, which do not seem to correspond to normal cross-modal 
associations: taste enables secondary tactile experiences and colours are associated 
with pains. Secondly, the kind of multi-modal associations suggested above are of a 
certain kind. For example, sounds of particular items such as cars - might be imagined 
to belong to a concrete item having a particular visual appearance; the sound of an 
unseen car might make one think of the look of that car. But most forms of 
..- 
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synaesthesia involve other kinds of stimuli e.g. letters or music associated with 
secondary experiences of  quite a different sort: they are not of concrete items having a 
particular visual appearance, but colour experiences. If we hear a voice we might 
imagine a face but we do not imagine a colour. 
This is related to a third difficulty: the nature and purpose of the supposed 
feedforward-feedback mechanism. These feedback processes are supposed to help in 
integrating information fiom different sensory modalities. Presumably the idea is that 
the sound of a car prepares one for the look of the car when it comes round the 
corner. But such a mechanism, if controlled by an auditory stimulus which has been 
perceived as being the sound of  a car, then would surely either prepare the visual 
system generally for a visual stimulus or prepare the central cognitive system for a 
specific type of visual stimulus (e.g. the kind of  stimulus one gets when one sees a 
car) or both. There is little reason to think that our hearing a car should prepare us 
for having particular colour experiences which is what is required for an explanation 
of synaesthesia. Moreover if synaesthesia were caused by a feedforward-feedback 
mechanism, which prepares the subject generally for a visual experience, one might 
expect the associations to be variable. According to most of the research the 
associations are highly reliable. 
It may be that the feedfonvard-feedback mechanism is of a different type to 
the one described above, It might be based on the observation of feedback 
mechanisms in the brain generally. Grossenbacher does suggest this in places. 
Memory images are thought to be generated by feedback mechanisms. But they are 
quite different from colour experiences. If colour experiences could be enabled by 
feedback processes this would go against the prevalent view that colour experiences 
are generated as the encapsulated output of dedicated neural areas. If this is the view 
Grossenbacher intends then it seems to be closer in spirit to other explanations of 
synaesthesia, which see in it a process different in kind rather than in degree fiom 
normal processes. Such a view will be hrther discussed in chapter two. Evidence for 
a more direct route will be outlined in the next section. 
It might be argued that synaesthetic sensations are had by everyone, only they 
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are not conscious to everyone. Would this not make the experiences synaesthetes 
enjoy different not in kind but in degree from those other people enjoy? Such a view 
might have some features in common with some theories of higher-order thought 
models of consciousness. Rosenthal, for instance, argues that sensations can be had 
which are not conscious.73 In the case of synaesthesia, synaesthetic sensations would 
be had by all, but would only be conscious to synaesthetes. (It is a well-attested fact 
that we are informationally sensitive to stimuli that we are not ordinarily conscious 
of)." If we all had synaesthetic experiences then what would make some people 
(synaesthetes) conscious of those experiences and others not conscious of them? On 
the higher-order thought model it would be another thought. It is true that 
synaesthetes are able to reduce or ignore their experiences by attending to other 
things, but there is no suggestion that they can be conscious of such experiences 
because of similar processes. Presumably neural mechanisms would realise these 
higher-order thoughts. But this would then make consciousness-mahng processes 
local and diverse.75 
This does not mean that synaesthesia may not have implications for our 
understanding of the specific mechanisms of consciousness. Synaesthesia has been 
cited in support of  a general explanation of consciousness-making. O'Brien & Opie 
state, concerning the alleged executive or central consciousness-makmg system: 'its 
role [...I is to combine a number of distinct contents hailing from different sense 
modalities into a single work which it then broadcasts polyphonically' .76 According to 
them a key feature of this 'single-track consciousness' model is that it is necessary 
that the representational content of the broadcast be coherent, i.e. if there were such a 
RoSenthdl 199 1. 
see Flanagan 1992 for examples. 
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' This is supported by the evidence of m d e d  Stroop tests. Stroop tests use colour words which 
are displayed in Merent colours in order to test for interference in processing. Mattingley and Rich 
have recently shown that synaesthetes perform worse than non-spaesthetes on tests when the words 
are printed in incongruent colours (i.e. colours which conflict with the colours generated by the 
sound of the wordc But tius only happens when the task is such that the cognitive processing is 
available for conscious report. When the level of processing of both semantic and colour information 
is not available for conscious report synaesthetes and non-synaesthetes performed equally well. This 
suggests that synaesthesia is an automatic process. It also suggests that the synaesthetic experience of 
colours is at a post-lexical stage. 
' 6  O'Brien Bi Opie 1999: 39 1. 
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mechanism an essential property of it would be to prevent incoherent conjunctions. 
Since incoherent conjunctions are not prevented there can be no such mechanism. In 
support of their view they cite synaesthesia as an actual instance of an inter-modal 
incoherent representation and therefore as a counterexample to the single-track model 
of consciousness. The example comes fiom Cytowic and is the case of M W  who 
undergoes the tactile experience of shapes on tasting things.77 O’Brien & Opie claim: 
‘What is important for our purposes is that there is no seen object corresponding to 
the felt object that Michael describes, and hence no accord between the visual and 
tactile modalities. Thus synesthetes exhibit a certain amount of inter-modal 
incoherence - a breakdown in the normal pattern of connections between the parts of 
experience.’ O’Brien & Opie agree that separate representations are realised by 
different cognitive modules. Their target is primarily the existence of a central 
executive, which assimilates or coheres the diverse representations which are the 
outputs of parallel and distributed modular processes. This is different from the 
previous idea because what distinguishes synaesthetes is that they have ‘a breakdown 
in the normal pattern of connections between the parts of e~perience’.~~ Previously 
there was supposed to be a difference in consciousness-making mechanism, not what 
provided information to whatever mechanism makes that information conscious. 
1.5 Synaesthesia: a distinct psychologcal process 
Richard Cytowic’s book The Man who Tasted Shapes has probably been the cause of 
much of the current popular interest in synaesthesia. He has also supplied a more 
technical treatment in S’aesthesia: A Union ofthe Senses. These provide a number 
of self-reports by synaesthetes, which will be o f  use in later chapters. Although his 
explanation of synaesthesia is challenged by many working in the area he has focused 
attention on the task of determining a set o f  distinctive features of synaesthesia. What 
Cytwic takes to be some of those features are given in the following passage. 
77 Cytowic 1994: 65. 
78 O’Brien & Opie 1999: 393. 
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Synesthesia is an involuntary joining in whch the real domation of  one sense is 
accompanied by a perception in another sense. In addition to being involuntary, ths 
additional perception is regarded by the synaesthete as real, often outside the body, 
instead of  unagmed in the mind’s eye. It also has some other interesting features that 
clearly separate it from artistic fancy or purple prose. Its reality and vividness are what 
make synesthesia so interesting in its violation of conventional perception. Synesthesia 
is also fascinatkg because logically it should not be a product o f  the human brain, 
where the evolutionary trend has been for increasing separation o f  function 
anatomically. 79 
Cytowic argues that, in order to avoid confbsion with superficially similar but 
otherwise distinct phenomena, diagnostic features for synaesthesia are required. *’ 
He considers five. 
Firstly, synaesthetic experiences are involuntarily elicited by a stimulus: ‘it is a 
passive experience’, ‘it cannot be conjured up or dismissed at will’, although 
‘circumstances of attention and distraction may make the experience seem more or 
less vivid’. The contents of synaesthetic experiences are usually identified without 
difficulty. A synaesthete has no difficulty identifjmg whether the colour a sound 
produces is red or green. This feature of synaesthesia has been generally endorsed. 
Secondly, the contents of synaesthetic experiences are projected. They are 
‘perceived externally in pen-personal space, the limb-axis space immediately 
surrounding the body, never at a distance as in the spatial teloreception of vision or 
audition’. One of Cytowic’s subjects (DS), a college teacher, on hearing music, also 
‘sees objects’ - falling gold balls, shooting lines, metallic waves like oscilloscope 
tracings - that float on a ‘screen’ six inches fiom her nose. Her favorite music ‘makes 
the lines move upward’. Although many synaesthetes do have such experiences many 
do not experience projected colours, but experience colours as if they were ‘in the 
head’.*l So it is not obvious that ‘projectibility’ should be used as a diagnostic 
criterion. 
Thirdly, synaesthetic percepts are ‘durable’ and ‘generic’, never sporadic and 
never elaborate. By the term ‘durable’ Cytowic means that the cross-sensory 
-associations do not change over time. This has been shown many times by-test-retest 
79 Cytowic 1989: 1.  
‘I’ Cytowic 1989: 64-65, 1993: 65-66 and 1995. 
” See Baron-Cohen et al. 1993. 
46 Synaesthesia 
sessions given years apart without warning. By the term ‘generic’ Cytowic means 
‘unelaborated’; while non-synaesthetes might imagine a pastoral landscape while 
listening to a piece of music what synesthetes experience is simple: ‘they see blobs, 
lines, spirals, and lattice shapes; feel smooth or rough textures; taste agreeable or 
disagreeable tastes such as salty, sweet, or metallic’. These characteristics of  
synaesthesia have also been generally endorsed. Perceptual processing seems to 
involve a number of levels and synaesthetic experiences do not appear to range over 
all these levels: they occur at the early levels of perceptual processing. 
Fourthly, synaesthetic experiences are memorable. Cytowic claims that 
synesthetes have excellent figurative memory. Many of their anecdotes are about how 
the ‘extra bits’ help them to remember telephone numbers, appointments, and the like. 
It is not clear that this is really a distinguishing characteristic. All sorts of  experiences 
can be memorable. But there is another problem as Cytowic admits. What is 
memorable is the synaesthetic experience. So the synaesthetic experience has to be 
related to the original stimulus in order to act as a memory aid. It is not clear that 
synaesthetes are able to do this any better than non-synaesthetes who use other 
mnemonic aids. One synaesthete reports ‘She had a green name - I forget, it was 
either Ethel or Vivian’. In this example, it is the synesthetic greenness and not the 
semantic label that is recalled. In other words, if  Ethel is a green blob, the next time 
you see her you don’t say, ‘it’s Ethel’ you say, ‘It’s the green blob: therefore, it is 
Ethel.’ It is not clear how synaesthesia increases memory. Although the original 
stimulus produces an additional phenomenal character of experience this additional 
phenomenal character experience presumably still has to be linked by a memory 
process to the original stimulus. There is no spontaneous generation of  the experience 
of the original stimulus by the induced colour in the way that there is a spontaneous 
generation of the induced colour by the primary stimulus. 
Finally synaesthesia, according to Cytowic, involves the emotions. The 
experience is ‘accompanied by a sense o f  certitude (*hp ‘this is it’ feeling) and a 
conviction that what synesthetes perceive is real and valid. The relation between 
synaesthesia and emotion features rarely, i f  at all, in other theories o f  synaesthesia. 
Concepts of Synaesthesia 47 
The reason for this is, as it is for the fourth of Cytowic’s diagnostic criteria, that it is 
not clear that the emotional response of synaesthetes should be treated as an essential 
property of synaesthesia rather than a response synaesthetes make to their 
experiences. 82 
All that can usehlly be gleaned fi-om this list are the first and third features. 
Synaesthesia is characterised by discrete unelaborated experiences, which are 
consistently elicited by stimuli usually associated with a different sensory modality. 
Of more interest are the experiments Cytowic developed and from which he argued 
for the distinctiveness of synaesthesia as a psychological process. These experiments 
were conducted on two subjects each having different forms of synaesthesia. 
One (MW) had what Cytowic sometimes calls ‘geometric taste’ and the other 
(JM) had what is generally known as ‘coloured hearing’.83 Under experimental 
conditions Cytowic’s two subjects produced a range of responses to a variety of 
stimuli. In the one case M W  experienced a set of shapes in response to a set of tastes. 
In the other case JM experienced a range of colours in response to a range of sounds. 
Controls who were not synaesthetic were similarly tested with tastes and sounds. 
They were asked to make associations between the tastes and shapes and between the 
sounds and colours. Cytowic found that the difference in ranges of responses between 
the two synaesthetes and the controls was significant. The responses of the 
synaesthetes were significantly restricted in range in comparison to those produced by 
controls. Non-synaesthetes would respond to the tastes with a wide variety of 
different shapes and to the sounds with a wide variety of colours. The shapes M W  
experienced were mainly restricted to circles and pyramids, which at the same time 
showed an ordered transformation. The colours JM experienced were associated with 
a cluster o f  frequencies. This indicated to Cytowic different forms of mediation 
between primary and associated experiences in synaesthetes and controls. In particular 
- ~ ~- 
- 8’ For a critical discussion of Cytowic’s view of emotion and its relation to reason Korb 1996: 
section 3.  
MW’s experience of tactile sensations in response to gustatory stimuli is described by him thus: 
’When I taste something with an intense flavor the feeling sweeps down my arm into my fingertips. I 
feel it - its weight, its texture, whether it’s warm or cold, everythMg. I feel it like 1 am grasping 
something.’ Cytowic 1993: 4. 
83 
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it suggested to him that the cross-modal association manifested in synaesthesia was 
the result of physiological processes operating at an early stage of  perceptual 
proce~sing.~~ 
Although Cytowic believes that synaesthesia is marked by a unification of  the 
senses, his theory is actually based on the idea that this occurs when parts of the brain 
that are normally involved in processing sensory information get disconnected from 
each other! To be precise a stimulus causes the normal processing of the limbic 
system to become disconnected fi-om the higher cortical areas allowing limbic 
processes to become conscious and experienced as the simple, discrete elements, in 
Cytowic’s terminology the ‘form constants’, of synaesthetic experience. Form 
constants are, according to Cytowic, not just visual phenomena but constants that are 
apparent in any spatially extended sense. He claims that synaesthesia is the result of  
the premature display o f  normal cognitive processes. 
Because of  limited synaesthetic subjects for study, Cytowic bases his theory 
partly on synaesthesia’s similarity to other psychological conditions: hallucination, 
eidetic imagery, epilepsy and drug-induced synaesthesia. Unfortunately for the 
theory, it is not clear that synaesthesia is relevantly similar to these processes. For one 
thing synaesthetic experiences are enabled by specific stimuli, which also produce 
normal phenomenal characters of experience. More troubling for the theory is the 
fact that Cytowic bases it on the physiological responses of a single case study of  an 
unusual form of synaesthesia (MW). The evidence that this is produced by lower 
cortical processes is controversial. There has been no corroborating evidence fiom 
more advanced scanning techruques than those Cytowic used to support the view that 
the limbic system is involved in the more prevalent variety of coloured-hearing 
synaesthesia. 86 
Baron-Cohen and Harrison also see the question of distinguishing synaesthesia 
fiom other similar states of affiiirs as hndamental. In contrast with Cytowic, who 
- -  - 
x4 See Cytowic & Wood, 1982a & 1982b. 
n5 Cytowic 1993: 163. Baron-Cohen and Harrison call this the ‘Disconnection Theory’. 
More recent evidence suggests a neo-cortical location for synaesthesia. See Costa 1996 and the nh 
work of Baron-Cohen et al. Perhaps h s  only underlines the danger of claiming a general 
explanation for different forms of synaesthesia. 
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relies on a set of diagnostic criteria to distinguish synaesthesia, Baron-Cohen and 
Harrison have attempted to devise techniques, which demonstrate more conclusively 
that synaesthesia is present. The weakness of Cytowic’s approach is that it relies too 
heavily on the subjects’ own accounts of their experiences. In many cases all of 
Cytowic’s diagnostic criteria might be met by a subject who would not be regarded as 
synaesthetic according to other evidence. Without hrther ‘third-person’ 
corroboration it is unclear whether what seem to be cases of synaesthesia really are 
so. 
There are two aspects to the issue of distinguishing synaesthesia from other 
similar states of affairs. Firstly the other possibilities, fi-om which real cases of 
synaesthesia have to be distinguished, need to be enumerated. And, secondly, methods 
of distinguishing real synaesthesia from other such possibilities have to be put in 
place. 87 
With regard to the first of these tasks, Baron-Cohen and Harrison, distinguish 
five possible conditions. All of them have more or less closely related features, and all 
of them might be described as a ‘mixing of the senses’ and thus denoted by the term 
‘synaesthesia’. But, since all of them have quite different origins, it would be 
inappropriate to treat them under the same heading. 
‘Developmental synaesthesia’ is the term used by Baron-Cohen and Hamson 
to refer to the form of synaesthesia., which is idiopathic or naturally occurring. The 
term ‘idiopathic’ means for them ‘a discrete natural disease category for which the 
cause is presumed to be within the biological make-up of the patient, but is currently 
u n k n o ~ ’ .  Baron-Cohen and Harrison note a number of characteristics of 
developmental synaesthesia, which seem initially to distinguish it. Developmental 
synaesthesia appears in early childhood. It is automatic, reliably caused and durable. It 
is a surprise to synaesthetes that others do not have similar experiences. It is vivid, 
although it can be dampened and enhanced by focused attention (although they do not 
spec@ what is to be understood by ‘vivid’ nor what the sigmficance of this should 
Baron-Cohen and Harrison 1997: 5-12. Part of the difficulty of studymg synaesthesia, they 
suggest. has been the lack of appropriate subjects. Hence researchers have tended either to study 




be). It is different fiom hallucination, delusion or other psychotic phenomena 
(although they do not specifl in what way it is different from other such psychotic 
phenomena). And, finally, it is different from imagery arising from the power of  the 
imagination (although they do not spec@ in what way it is different from such 
imagery). 
Baron-Cohen and Harrison, along with several others who discuss 
synaesthesia, believe that developmental synaesthesia involves a breakdown in 
cognitive processing of some kind. Baron-Cohen and Harrison themselves believe 
synaesthesia involves a breakdown of barriers between cognitive modules. This 
suggestion is developed in more detail and put to the test in chapter two. 
The term ‘dysfunctional synaesthesia’ may be used to refer to the first of two 
forms of acquired synaesthesia. Dyshnctional synaesthesia is caused by some sort of 
acquired neurological damage (perhaps stroke damage or some other form of damage 
to the brain). It usually occurs when major developmental processes have already 
taken place. The manifestations of dyshnctional synaesthesia are usually less complex 
in structure than developmental synaesthesia. The issue o f  the fbnctionality or 
dyshnctionality of developmental synaesthesia will be considered hrther in chapter 
two. 
The second of  the two forms of acquired synaesthesia is ‘drug-induced 
synaesthesia’. Synaesthetic experiences can sometimes be the transient product o f  
psychomimetic drug use. These drugs mimic the effects of naturally occurring 
neurotransmitters in the brain. They can cause confhsion between the sensory 
modalities, engendering the belief that a stimulus to one sensory modality is actually 
being perceived by another sensory modality. 
Drug-induced synaesthesia often produces sensory combinations, which do 
not occur in developmental synaesthesia. But it has another feature not possessed by 
developmental synaesthesia (apart from the fact that it is acquired rather than 
developed). When synaesthesia is induced by psychomimetic drugs there seems to be 
a diminishment of or even loss of reality-monitoring. Developmental synaesthesia 
seems to be accompanied by no such diminution of cognitive abilities. So, despite the 
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, fact that drugs can induce synaesthetic experiences it is not to be inferred that a 
similar, explanation should be given of developmental synaesthesia to drug-induced 
synaesthesia. 
Some cases of metaphorical synaesthesia were described in section 1.3. 
‘Metaphorical synaesthesia’ refers to the first of two forms of pseudo-synaesthesia. 
There are many other references in the literature of the period of one sense acting as 
metaphor for the object of another sense. For instance, Huysmans, employs sound as 
a metaphor for tastes: ‘Each and every liquer, in his opinion, corresponded in taste 
with the sound of a particular instrument. Dry curaqao, for instance, was like the 
clarinet with its piercing, velvety note; kummel like the oboe with its sonorous, nasal 
timbre, creme de menthe and anisette like the flute, at once sweet and tart, so& and 
shrill’. 88 In different artistic mediums there are other cross-modal associations. 
Kandinsky’s abstract style of painting is intended to be a pictorial equivalent of music. 
That Kandinsky knew of cases of synaesthesia there seems little doubt. Some of 
Scriabin’s musical poems are intended to serve as musical accompaniments to displays 
of colours. 
89 
When associations between sensory modalities are portrayed by means of 
metaphors no reference is made to any reliable causal relation between one stimulus 
and the experience characteristic of another sensory modality. The intention is 
typically to express some other form of relation between the senses. The topic of 
metaphorical synaesthesia is best dealt with as one of metaphor rather than 
synaesthesia. 
Finally the term ‘associative synaesthesia’ can be used to refer to the second of 
the two forms of pseudo-synaesthesia. ORen a name and some other stimulus, 
invariably a colour, are associated when learning the written representation of a word. 
In this case no sensation is necessarily triggered and the subject will usually admit that 
the association is voluntary. It has been suggested that books having coloured 
alphabets, which are used to teach children reading skills, are at the root of some 
Huysmans 1884: 84. 
Kandinsky 1977: 23-26 refers to a case in which ‘an exceptionally sensitive person’ could not eat a 
88 
89 
certain source without tasting blue i.e. without experiencing a feeling of seeing a blue colour. 
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purported cases of synaesthesia; sometimes letters are associated with objects and 
these objects are associated with colours, hence letters are associated with colours. 
Such are in reality instances o f  associational synaesthesia. 
Baron-Cohen and Harrison mention a number of distinguishing features of 
developmental synaesthesia but they nevertheless stress that hrther evidence is 
required before a case be considered as one of synaesthesia. There are three fbrther 
lines of evidence, which they argue are required to support the attribution of 
synaesthesia to a subject. 
The first source of evidence comes from experiments designed to establish the 
genuineness of the condition in subjects who seem to manifest the features of 
developmental synaesthesia. The first such study involved a single subject (EP) who 
claimed to experience colours when she heard words? The aim was to test for the 
stability of colour responses to letters (the 26 letters of the alphabet) and words (50 
meaningfbl words in five semantic categories - animals, place names, objects, 
occupations and abstract terms - as well as names of days and forenames) over a 10 
week interval, controlling for possible memory strategies. EP was not told of the 
memory test. The 103 items were also given to a 27 year-old lawyer of similar 
intelligence and excellent memory who acted as a control subject. The lawyer was 
asked to use strategies of association to relate the test items with a particular colour. 
The evidence that EP’s was a genuine form of experience rather than an imagined 
association comes fi-om the later retests. For EP retest on all 103 items 10 weeks 
later yielded identical descriptions. Retesting 8 months later also yielded perfect 
consistency. By contrast the control subject when retested on 10 random stimuli just 
3 hours later was consistent on only 3 items and when retested on the entire list 2 
weeks later was consistent on only 17% of the items, and most of these were for items 
that suggested a natural colour associate (e.g. ‘white’ for ‘refrigerator’). The form of 
synaesthesia seemed to be related to words as wholes and unrelated to either 
phonemes or graphemes. Baron-Cohen et al. dubbd this form of synaesthesia 
chromatic-lexical synaesthesia. 
Baron-Cohen et al. 1987. 90 
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A later experiment, using similar techmques, involved nine hrther ~ubjects.~' 
The results of this study showed that subjects with synaesthesia gave exactly the same 
colour correspondence 92.3% of the time, in spite of being tested again over 1.5 years 
later. Subjects without synaesthesia were only 37.6% accurate, in spite of being 
asked to try to remember the colours they associated with words and being tested 
only one week later. During this experiment Baron-Cohen et al. also tested to see 
whether the variety of synaesthesia was the same as had been indicated in the previous 
experiment. To achieve their aim subjects were also tested using five phrases with 
homophones (e.g. barehear, sodsun) and pairs with the same initial phonemes (e.g. 
knockhice, writer/rice). These would allow chromatic-lexical, chromatic-phonemic 
and chromatic-graphemic synaesthesia to be distinguished. Chromatical-lexical 
synaesthesia occurs when a word as a whole enables a colour. Chromatic-phonemic 
synaesthesia occurs when the sound of a word enables a colour and chromatic- 
graphemic occurs when the written letters of a word enable a colour. Since colours 
seemed to be enabled by the first letter of words rather than the word itself or its 
constituent vowels in all nine subjects Baron-Cohen et al. concluded that the subjects 
experienced chromatic-graphemic synaesthesia. What the subjects heard seemed to be 
transformed into a graphemic representation, which in turn produced the experience 
of a colour. However many of the subjects did respond to vowel sounds. The 
experimenters argued that the possibility of a neurological explanation was raised not 
only by the consistency of vowel responses across these subjects but also the 
agreement of these responses with reports of over a century ago. 
The second means of support comes from advanced scanning techniques. In 
the technique of Positron Emission Tomography (PET) scanning brain activity is 
mapped in three-dimensional space. The tomograph detects the distribution of a 
radioactive substance, which has been injected into the subject. In the study by 
Paulesu et al. 1995 the radiotracer injected into the subject was 0 1 5  (in the form of 
H201 5).92 Since the oxygen radionuclide enters the bloodstream, the radioactivity in 
the brain is proportional to regional Cerebral Blood Flow (CBF). When areas of the 
Baron-Cohen et al. 1993 91 
'' Paulesu et al. 1995. 
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brain are involved in increased neuronal function, an increase in rCBF is demonstrable 
within seconds. As the 015 decays it emits positrons (positively charged electrons), 
which collide with electrons and mutually annihilate, producing two gamma rays, 
emitted at 180 degrees to one another. The PET camera is able to detect these paired 
emissions and builds a map of the rCBF in the subject’s brain. The results from two or 
more processes are compared. This is the subtraction method, so called because rCBF 
bloodflow maps are subtracted from one another in order to see which brain areas are 
activated. The result of subtracting the map of process x fiom process y is to indicate 
the brain areas active in process y. 
Paulesu et al. investigated six subjects with synaesthesia for words (but not 
other sounds), and six control subjects. All the subjects were blindfolded and asked 
firstly to listen to words played through headphones and then to listen to sounds (pure 
tones of varying pitch) played through headphones. The blood flow maps for 
synaesthetes listening to words showed significant differences in brain activity in areas 
traditionally believed to subserve visual processing when compared to blood flow 
maps, firstly, for synaesthetes listening to tones and, secondly, for control subjects 
listening to words or tones. In synaesthetes, a number of additional visual associative 
areas, including the posterior inferior temporal cortex and the parieto-occipital 
junction were activated when listening to words. The posterior inferior temporal 
cortex has been implicated in the integration of colour with shape and in verbal tasks, 
which require attention to visual features of objects to which words refer. It is 
believed that some of these brain areas are those which underlie the transition from 
viewer-centred to object-centred  representation^.'^ Synaesthetes also showed 
activations in the right prefrontal cortex, insula and superior temporal gyms. By 
contrast, no significant activity was detected in relatively lower visual areas, including 
Vi, V2 and V4. In short most notable was the comparatively greater activation of 
visual association areas in subjects with synaesthesia. Paulesu et al. proposed that the 
brain activity detected in synaesthetes were the neurophysiological counterpart of 
synaesthetic p e r ~ e p t i o n . ~ ~  These results have been confinned by fMR irnagi~~g.’~ 
93 See Goodale 1995. ’‘ One of the conclusions they drew fiom this was that a conscious visual experience can occur in 
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The third means of supporting the view that synaesthesia is a genuine and 
distinct condition has come from genetic studies of the families of synaesthetes. In one 
recent study the pedigrees of seven families was ascertained. The genetic markers 
suggested that the condition is transmitted as an autosomal or dominant X 
chromosome-linked condition.% Other studies, which show that synaesthetes are 
predominantly female, confirm the view that it is a dominant X chromosome-linked 
condition. There is however some dispute about the actual figures. In the U.S. 
Cytowic 1989 found a ratio of 3:l  in favour of females fiom the cases he had 
communicated with, while in the U.K. Baron-Cohen et al. 1993 found a ratio of 8: 1 .97 
A genetic difference suggests a developmental difference. There are no direct 
neural connections between auditory and visual areas of the brain in the adult. 
However in the early development of many species of mammals there is evidence of 
transitory direct neural connections between visual and auditory areas9' One 
hypothesis is that these connections continue to exist in some adults causing 
synaesthetic experiences? Maurer claims that human babies normally mix the input 
from different sense organs.'O0 Some evidence for this comes fiom a study of one- 
month-old children."' After having been presented with a patch of white light for 
twenty trials, they are then presented with bursts of white noise of different intensities. 
Interspersed with the bursts of sound were presentations of the original patch of white 
light. It was found that heart rate typically increased as a hnction of noise intensity. 
However, at one noise intensity (74dB) the increase was significantly reduced. 
Lewkowicz and Turkewicz argue that the chldren were responding to the auditory 
the absence of activation in the primary visual area, V1, implying that hgh  level associative visual 
areas can contribute on their own to conscious visual perception. 
'' See Gray et al. 1997. 
'' On the feasibility of genetic analysis in synaesthesia see Bailey & Johnson 1997. 
98 See Kennedy et al. 1989 & 1997. 
99 The hypothesis is by no means original. See Bleuler & Lehmann 1881 and, slightly more recently. 
to transfer the information they receive from one sensory modality, such as touch, to another sensory 
modality. such as vision. for they are able to recogruse by sight objects, such as dummies, they have 
only been in contact with by touch. See Meltzoff & Borton 1979. 
'IK' Maurer 1993, reprinted 1997. 
Baron-Cohen et al. 1995. 96 
Mvers 19 1 1 and Downq 19 12. There is some experimental evidence to suggest that babies are able --. -. 
The original study is described in Lewkotvicz & Turkewicz 1980. 101 
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stimuli in terms of their similarity to the previously presented visual stLlnul Maurer 
uses this to support her view that there is a stage in normal development in which 
infants mix the input from different sense organs. 102 
Baron-Cohen & Harrison have suggested that, although genes may predispose 
subjects to synaesthesia, it is possible that specific brain structures might also be 
influenced by the environment of the infant.'03 It is well-known that visual experience 
is required for the normal development of vision. It may be that the environment 
somehow reinforces transient synaesthetic connections. Something would be required 
to trigger the reinforcement. It is not clear whether stimuli such as coloured alphabets 
would be sufficient. It may be that synaesthetes are particularly susceptible to such 
reinforcement. 
It is not yet clear what the mechanism controlled by the genes and their related 
alleles would be. It might be the regulation of the migration of neurons or it might be 
the paring off of selected neuronal pathways. If one or other of these are true this 
would provide hrther evidence against theories of synaesthesia discussed earlier, 
which place the explanation with psychological associations. lo4 
1.6 The Philosophical Relevance of Synaesthesia 
Synaesthesia has so far been considered from a psychological point of view. The 
purpose of the previous sections has been to show that there is an interesting 
psychological phenomenon to be studied. The aim of the present section is to outline 
" Q  She cites further evidence as support for her view. Auditory evoked potentials to language evoke a 
potential in the visual area of the brain, which is not evoked in older subjects. Also potentials that 
are normally only increased by tactile stimulation are also increased in infants by white light. 
Another related theory of synaesthesia derives from the evidence for neurons which respond to both 
and visual and tactile stimuli. Halligan et al. forthcoming have suggested that synaesthesia might 
arise when the brain has not got sufficient information to cfistingulsh the source of a stimulus, only 
the ambiguous response of the bimodally responsive neurons. -- 
Baron-Cohen & Harrison 1997: 116-7. 
The breakdown of barriers between processing areas might involve a lack of differentiation of 1 04 
sensoxy areas of the brain or a further development of neurons once the brain has undergone 
differentation. Both of these alternatives have almdy been described in 1.2 with reference to the 
literature of the nineteenth century. 
103 
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briefly what wdl be explored at more length in the remaining pages: the relevance of 
synaesthesia for philosophy. 
Consider the following passage fiom Merleau-Ponty ' s ?he Phenomenology qf 
Perception: 
Seen in the perspective of the objective world. with its opaque qualities. and the 
objective body with its separate organs, the phenomenon of synaesthetic experience is 
paradoxical. The attempt is therefore made to explain it independently of the concept of 
sensation: it is thought necessary, for example, to suppose that the excitations ordinarily 
restricted to one rwon of the brain - the optical or audltory zone - become capable of 
playing a part outside these limits, and that in thls way a specific quality is associated 
with a non-specific one. Whether or not this explanation is supported by arguments 
drawn from brain physiology, thls explanation does not account for synaesthetic 
experience, which thus becomes one more occasion for questioning the concept o f  
sensation and objective thought. For the subject does not say only that he has the 
sensation both of a sound and a colour: it is the sound itself that he sees where colours 
are formed. This formulation is literally meaningless if vision is defined by the visual 
quale, and the sound by the acoustic quale. But it rests with us to word our definition in 
such a way as to provide it with a meaning, since the sight o f  sounds and the hearing of 
colours exist as phenomena. Nor are these even exceptional phenomena. Synaesthetic 
perception is the rule, and we are unaware of it only because scientific knowledge shifts 
the centre of gravity of experience, so that we unlearn how to see, hear, and generally 
speaking, feel, in order to deduce, from our b d l y  organization and the world as the 
physicist conceives it, what we are to see, hear and feel.'05 
This passage exemplifies the primacy Merleau-Ponty gave to what is delivered to the 
subject in perceptual experience. Merleau-Ponty considers synaesthesia to be of 
considerable philosophical importance just because he assumes the primacy of the 
subject's perceptual experience and synaesthetic experiences are taken to be 
perceptual experiences. The following thesis endorses the view that synaesthesia be 
considered as of interest for philosophy, although, in nearly all respects a perspective 
and final position opposite to that of Merleau-Ponty will be taken. 
Merleau-Ponty mentions a number of issues here, which will become of central 
concern in what follows. There is the issue of how we should talk of this unusual 
condition. Earlier in this chapter the adoption of the technical terminology of 
'synaesthesia' and the suggestion of the less technical terminology ui" 'coloured 
hearing' were outlined. Why should we use such terminology rather than that of 
Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 228-9. 105 
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‘hearing colours’ and ‘seeing sounds’? Merleau-Ponty remarks that ‘if vision is 
defined by the visual quale, and the sound by the acoustic quale’ then it cannot be the 
case that experiences involving auditory quale can be acts of seeing. Presumably it is 
assumed that visual qualia somehow involve colours and auditory qualia somehow 
involve sounds. According to Merleau-Ponty this then means that sounds cannot be 
seen, nor can colours be heard; a metaphysical claim comes to be based on a 
conceptual claim. But then this runs counter to the statements o f  the synaesthetic 
subject who does not claim ‘only that he has the sensation both o f  a sound and a 
colour: it is the sound itself that he sees where colours are formed’. As Merleau-Ponty 
notes this formulation would be meaningless if the concept of  seeing essentially 
involved ‘visual quale’. The point Merleau-Ponty is driving at is that it is the 
perceptual experience which has primacy. It is perceptual experience on which all 
other knowledge is ultimately based. According to him the experience of  synaesthetes 
supports the claim that ‘the sight of sounds and the hearing of colours exist as 
phenomena’ and the claim should be credited because it is founded on experience. 
Since it is then for us to word our definition on such evidence we should not define 
seeing in terms of  visual quale and hearing in terms of  auditory quale. There are two 
issues here. Firstly do synaesthetes really claim to hear colours and see sounds? And 
secondly, if they do, should this make any difference to the way we think of  
synaesthesia? 
In order to respond to this second issue properly we might want to know 
more about what it is like to be a synaesthete. Synaesthesia offers a test for recent 
philosophical theories of  phenomenal experience. Considering unusual psychological 
conditions should not be controversial, for a number of  psychological conditions have 
already been employed as a means of  testing philosophical theories: blindsight in the 
context of  the philosophy of consciousness,106 and visual agnosia in the philosophy o f  
perception. lo7 
There is underlying the issue of theories of phencxenal character the issue of 
what synaesthesia can tell us about the nature of perception and mind more generally. 
‘06 See Kirk 1994 and Tye 1995 for discUssion. 
’(” h w e  1993. 
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Merleau-Ponty says that ‘the attempt is therefore made to explain [synaesthesia] 
independently of the concept of sensation’. He gives one frequently cited hypothesis: 
‘the excitations ordinarily restricted to one region of the brain - the optical or auditory 
zone - become capable of playng a part outside these limits, and that in this way a 
specific quality is associated with a non-specific one’. He is right in pointing out that 
‘whether or not this explanation is supported by arguments drawn from brain 
physiology, this explanation does not account for synaesthetic experience’, for we 
cannot directly understand what the properties of the mind are from those of the 
brain. The process of understanding the mind involves much more than simply reading 
mental properties off from the properties of brain. Merleau-Ponty thinks that 
synaesthesia is another reason for questioning the objectivity of our thought. 
In the next chapter a different stance is taken. It will be clear that how 
synaesthesia is to be explained cannot be inferred directly from neural properties. One 
might think that it could be if synaesthesia were a pathology of the brain. Studying 
pathologies of the brain is accepted as a methodological tool in neuropsychology for 
uncovering the structure and hnction of the mind. Synaesthesia is of interest because 
it is not immediately clear whether it should be understood in the way that traditional 
neuropathologies should be understood, namely, as a breakdown in the components 
of a knctional system. So the next chapter considers the question of whether the 
additional neural structure (if that is indeed what it is) underlying synaesthesia should 
be considered as giving rise to additional hnctions. The chapter considers how we 
are to fit synaesthesia into a picture which views the mind as being at least partially 
composed of distinct cognitive modules. More specifically, the question is posed as 
to whether synaesthesia involves the emergence of an extra module or a breakdown in 
modularity. Synaesthesia is, in turn, used to test and ultimately revise the view that 
the mind is partially constituted by modules having a set of nine characteristic 
properties. This will also give a response to Merleau-Ponty’s (and some others’) claim 
_-that synaesthesia is the rule. 
But where does this leave the primacy of the deliverances of experience to the 
subject? The issue of perceptual experience is, so it is often claimed, difficult to 
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accommodate within traditional psychological methods. It is for this reason that the 
question of  the nature o f  experience has occupied philosophy so much recently. The 
question of  the nature o f  experience arises forcehlly in the context of synaesthesia. 
Chapter three focuses on this and, in particular, on whether synaesthesia can be used 
as a way of  motivating the existence of  so-called ‘qualia’. 
Having considered the implications of  synaesthesia for the structure of  mind 
and the constitution of  the character of  experience, by chapter four we will be better 
situated to consider how we should talk of  synaesthesia. Merleau-Ponty’s suggestion 
that we need to revise our talk of  perception in such a way that we should actually 
speak o f  synaesthesia as hearing colours and seeing sounds is rejected. In so doing the 
chapter focuses on the place of  synaesthesia vis-a-vis normal perceptual processes. 
Considerations from previous chapters are fbrther developed in order to shed light 
both on the metaphysical individuation o f  perceptual modalities and on how we know 
the distinctive perceptual modalities. 
This thesis concentrates on coloured hearing. What merits the preceding 
considerations have might be supported if they could be generalised. Chapter five 




Modules, Synaesthesia and Functional 
2.1 The Constitution of a Psychological Natural Kind 
Exactly how we should think of natural kinds in science is contentious. Fodor remarks 
that a natural kind might be initially thought of as: ‘a class of phenomena that have 
many scientifically interesting properties in common over and above whatever 
properties define the class’.’ He suggests that all cognitive modules are members of a 
psychological natural kind in this sense. 
There are two ways in which Fodor’s suggestion, taken in isolation, might be 
interpreted. On the first interpretation different types of alleged cognitive modules 
(such as visual processing modules and language processing modules) might 
constitute different psychological natural kinds in virtue of the possession by their 
respective tokens of certain scientifically interesting properties. Individual visual 
processing modules would be tokens of one type of module, the visual processing 
module, in virtue of one set of properties. Individual language processing modules 
would be tokens of another type of module, the language processing module, in virtue 
of a different set of properties. In other words, these module types might constitute 
different first-order psychological natural kinds. On the second interpretation all 
cognitive modules would belong to one natural kind in virtue of their common 
possession of scientifically interesting properties. This second interpretation is the 
more likely one in so far as Fodor hrther remarks that what initially defines the class 
is the hnctional similarity of all input systems. If Fodor’s suggestion is true then 
cognitive modules might serve to distinguish psychology fiom other levels of enquiry. 
Fodor 1983: 46. 
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The scientific investigation of so-called psychological modules stems in large 
part from a history of mapping the correlations between psychological features and 
physiological properties. Phrenology is a well-known early attempt to transform folk 
psychological theories of distinctive moral and intellectual faculties (underlying such 
abilities as verbal memory and spatial relations) into a properly scientific theory: the 
physiological bases of mental faculties were inferred from the carefbl measurement o f  
the skull.* Following the primitive attempts of phrenology, over a century of cognitive 
neuropsychology has endeavoured to map the brain and divide it into discrete areas 
responsible for distinct psychological functions, firstly by inference from the effects of 
localised brain lesions on psychological function, then by observing the consequences 
of direct physical stimulation of specific areas of the brain, and most recently by 
scanning the brain performing well-defined cognitive tasks.3 
More recently this project has been complemented by the theoretical task o f  
articulating the concept of modularity which underlies many but not all such 
correlations. Pre-eminent amongst these is arguably Fodor’s account. I shall call 
Fodor’s view that the mind is, at least partially, composed of cognitive modules the 
mddarity hypothe~is.~ Fodor claims that the mind is not hlly explainable in terms 
cognitive modules; central systems would be required to cut across and thus relate the 
outputs of modular systems. He claims that cognition possesses a (more or less) 
tripartite finctional arrangement: transducers (sensory organs) are analogue systems 
which turn proximal signals into co-varying neural signals, input systems are 
computational systems which perform complex inferential transformations on the 
‘See Gall 1822-5. 
For an account of the history of neuropsychology by one of its most eminent current practitioners 
see Changeux 1985. 
Fodor 1983. Earlier arguments for modularity come from computational considerations. See Simon 
1969. Marr 1976: 485 reiterates the computational considerations but also notes evolutionary 
considerations: ‘Anv large computation should be split up and implemented as a collection of small 
sub-parts that are as nearly independent of one another as the overall task allows. If a process is not 
designed in this way, a small change in one place will have consequences in many other places. This 
means that the process as a whole becomes extremely difficult to debug or to improve, whether by 
liuman designer or in the c~urse of natural evolution, because a small change to improve one part has 
to be accompanied by many simultaneous compensating changes elsewhere.’ 
4 
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inputs they receive fiom transducers, and central systems operate on the 
representations of distal properties computed by the input systems. 
Input systems are, according to Fodor, cognitive modules, and, in turn, 
members of a psychological natural kind, in virtue of their possession of most, or all, 
of nine specified properties: 
(i) Input systems are domain specific. 
(ii) The operation of input systems is mandatory. 
(iii) There is only limited central access to the mental representations that input 
systems compute. 
(iv) Input systems are fast. 
(v) Input systems are informationally encapsulated. 
(vi) Input systems have shallow outputs. 
(vii) Input systems are associated with fixed neural architecture, 
(viii) Input systems exhibit characteristic and specific breakdown patterns. 
(ix) The ontogeny of input systems exhibits a characteristic pace and sequencing. 
Fodor notes that these need not be considered individually as necessary conditions of 
modularity, but it is essential that a number of them be realised for the attribution of 
modularity and each property is anyway such that if several of the properties are 
realised then most of them are likely to be realised. What is significant for present 
purposes is that, taken together, they offer a jointly sufficient condition for the 
attribution of modularity: whatever possesses most or all of these properties should be 
regarded as a cognitive module? 
The purpose of the present chapter is to examine the nature of synaesthesia in 
the light of Fodor’s modularity hypothesis. Synaesthesia will, in turn, be used to 
consider hrther the question of what constitutes a psychological natural kind such as 
’ Fodor 1983: 3 8 4 .  More recently, evolutionary psychologists have argued that central processes 
are also subserved by modules and therefore, that the mind should be considered massively modular. 
See Tooby & Cosmides 1995. For a challenge to this view see Samuels 1998. 
Fodor 1983: 47 is explicit on this point: ‘if there are other psychological systems which possess 
most or all of these properties then, of course, they are modular too’. 
a S’iuesthesia 
Fodor suggests. Synaesthesia, it will be recalled, is a distinct type o f  cross-modal 
association: it occurs when the stimulation of one sensory modality automatically 
triggers an additional character of experience that would normally be triggered by the 
stimulation of  a second sensory modality. As previously mentioned cognitive 
neuropsychology standardly studies brains lesions as a means of investigating 
cognitive modules; where a local lesion has disrupted normal function in a 
characteristic way it may be inferred that a cognitive module having a particular 
function has been disrupted. Whilst synaesthetic-like manifestations may be acquired 
in the presence of  specific brain lesions, synaesthetic manifestations seem also to be 
the result of endogenous factors. It is this latter form o f  synaesthesia which will be of  
main concern here. One closely-studied form of  synaesthesia manifests most, if not 
all, of Fodor’ s nine specified properties o f  modularity . Hence synaesthesia, according 
to Fodor’s understanding, should be considered as involving the emergence of  a new 
type o f  module. I shall call this proposal the Extra Module thesis (the EM thesis for 
short). The extra module thesis has been outlined by Gabriel Segal? It is held by 
others, on the other hand, that synaesthesia involves a breakdown of  modularity. 
Baron-Cohen et al., for instance, have suggested that the above-mentioned form of  
synaesthesia indicates a breakdown o f  barriers between the speech and colour 
processing modules, I shall call this proposal the M&larity Breakdown thesis (the 
MB thesis for short). 
The modularity hypothesis is by no means undermined by this disagreement, 
indeed, the fact that both accounts presuppose the theoretical usefblness o f  
postulating cognitive modules endorses the hypothesis. l0 Nevertheless, this 
Although there are phlosophical issues arising from this methodology these will not be the focus of 
the present discussion. See Shallice 1987 for a detailed consideration of a number of 
methodological issues arising in cognitive neuropsychology . 
see Se@ 1997. 
See Baron-Cohen et al. 1993. For reasons given in the discussion of the fixed neural architecture 
of input system the explanation for synaesthesia might lie not in the breakdown of properties of 
modularity but in the failure to develop certain properties of modularity. If this is so a slightly 
different thesis could be substituted for the MB thesis without si@cant implications for the overall 
argument. 
Opponents of cognitive modules typically argue that the nine purported properties of modularity 
can be explained just as well by other models of cognitive architecture such as production systems or 
connectionist systems. See Stillings 1989. Here I bracket this issue, although it might be that the 
1 tl 
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theoretical difference presents a clear challenge to the notion of modularity as 
characterised by Fodor: either it is correct as it stands and synaesthesia should be 
regarded as involving an extra cognitive module, which is thus a member of a 
psychological natural kind, or synaesthesia should not be so regarded and thus the 
properties Fodor postulates for the individuation of cognitive modules are insufficient 
for individuating modularity. Many philosophers take it for granted that a hrther 
story has to be told about the provenance of cognitive modules; one aim here is to 
focus that issue.'' 
Section 3.2 outlines the plausibility of the EM thesis by a rehearsal of the way 
the nine properties of modularity seem to be manifested by colour-graphemic 
synaesthesia. At the same time the discussion shows how those features can be 
explained in a different way by the MB thesis. Section 3.3 examines how the EM 
thesis originally arises from a computational, non-teleological view of fbnction. 
Although this view of fbnction is consistent with Fodor's view of fbnction, it can be 
seen as being in some tension with his attitude to natural kinds; instances of natural 
kinds, according to Fodor, are those instances whose terms are the bound variables in 
proper laws. The claim to be endorsed here is that what distinguishes cognitive 
modules is that they can figure positively in equations of evolutionary fitness. Section 
3.4 discusses the MB thesis as a consequence of a teleological view of hnction. 
The following argument is another application of externalist considerations, in 
this instance to the constitution of a psychological natural kind. One natural 
consequence of an internalist approach is to view synaesthesia as an extra module. If 
one believes synaesthesia is a breakdown in modularity, then one needs to introduce 
externalist considerations to support this view. If one believes one needs to introduce 
extemalist considerations to support the MB thesis then this externalist criterion 
should apply to the individuation of other cognitive modules. To decide between the 
EM thesis and the ME3 thesis a tenth property needs to be added to the list of 
direction of the present chapter can be construed as undermining support for cognitive inodules, in so 
far as it emphasises the underdetermination of Fodor's modularity hypothesis by the present data. 
Thus we have both a classificational and an empirical issue. The issue is classlficational in so far 
as the correct concept of modularity requires adverting to a tenth property. The issue is empirical in 
so far as whether h s  tenth property is instantiated is an empirical matter. 
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properties of modularity : input systems are teleofbnctional kinds. Psychology is taken 
by Fodor (and others) to be an independent science. Synaesthesia can be seen as 
providing difficulties for that attitude. Section 3 .5  reconsiders, in the light of the 
current remarks, some objections that have been raised against the possibility o f  
psychological natural kinds. 
2.2 Two Theories of Synaesthesia 
If the traditional division of  the sensory modalities is correct there could be a wide 
variety of types of synaesthetic connections: experiencing colours when perceiving 
sounds, experiencing tastes when perceiving colours, experiencing sounds when 
perceiving smells etc. Cases of several different types of synaesthesia have indeed 
been described. l2 Coloured-hearing synaesthesia is the most commonly occurring type 
o f  synaesthesia. And what Baron-Cohen et al. have termed chromatic-graphemic 
(hereafter CG) synaesthesia appears to be one of  the most common forms of 
coloured-hearing synaesthesia. In coloured-hearing synaesthesia experiences of 
colours and shapes are triggered by experiences o f  sounds in general. In CG 
synaesthesia experiences of colours and shapes are triggered by the sounds of words 
via their spellings. 
The experimental procedure adopted by Baron-Cohen et al. was designed to 
distinguish between a number of possible forms of coloured-hearing synaesthesia that 
appear to be associated with the auditory presentation of  lang~age.‘~ Chromatic- 
lexical synaesthesia occurs when different spoken words produce experiences of 
colour in virtue of  the particular words they are, i.e. there seems to be no clear 
determination of the colour either by the sound of the word, or by the alphabetical 
representation of  the word, or by the meaning of  the word. In an earlier experiment, 
Baron-Cohen et al. found that for their experimental subject: the spoken word 
‘Moscow’ consistently produced a darkish-grey colour, with spinach-green and pale- 
blue in places; the spoken word ‘Maria’ was violet-blue; the spoken word ‘fear’ 
l2  see chapter one. 
l3  Baron-Cohen et al. 1993. 
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produced a mottled light-grey colour, with a touch of soft green and purple and the 
spoken word ‘Daniel’ was coloured a deep purple, blue and red. There was no 
obvious semantic explanation for their subject’s synaesthetic correspondences since 
the words ‘man’, ‘male’ and ‘masculine’ all produced different colours. (It is difficult 
to know what produced this subject’s experiences of colour.)’“ Chromatic-phonemic 
synaesthesia occurs when different spoken words produce experiences of colour in 
virtue of their sounds, more particularly, it would appear, in virtue of their dominant 
vowel sound. The sound of the letter ‘a’ will oRen produce a red colour and the 
sound of the letter ‘0’  will often produce a white colour. Chromatic-graphemic 
synaesthesia occurs when different spoken words produce experiences as of colour in 
virtue o f  their spelling, generally in virtue of the first letter of a word. So the spoken 
word ‘dog‘ might produce an experience of crimson via the letter ‘d’ or the spoken 
word ‘tree’ might produce an experience of the colour ochre via the letter ‘t’. 
Although there was some consistency of response amongst subjects in the more recent 
study, there was also some variability. 
From their study of CG synaesthesia Baron-Cohen et al. concluded that a 
breakdown of barriers between modules might be responsible for synaesthesia 
generally. More recently, Segal has claimed that what their results might actually 
indicate is the emergence of an extra module and thus hrther confirmation of Fodor’s 
modularity hypothesis. 
The immediate task is to examine CG synaesthesia in the context of Fodor’s 
nine specified properties and, moreover, to examine Fodor’ s nine properties of 
modularity in the context of synaesthesia. This will demonstrate the plausibility of the 
EM thesis. At the same time it will show how the MB thesis can also explain the 
manifestation of these nine features in synaesthesia. As should quickly become clear, 
the constitution of modules, via their nine defining properties, underdetermines the 
nature of modularity. The exercise is of additional interest in that it sheds some hrther 
light on the features of the nine purported properties of modularity. l5 
See Baron-Cohen et al. 1987. 1 1  
l 5  The literature on modularity is fast expanding. Speclfic challenges have been made to the details 
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(i) Domain Speczficity . Synaesthesia has some interesting implications for domain 
specificity that do not yet seem to have been considered. One might have thought o f  
six obvious candidates for input systems: one for each o f  the traditional sensory 
systems and one for language. According to Fodor this is not the ‘intended doctrine’. 
The intended doctrine is that ‘within (and quite possibly across) the traditional modes, 
there are highly specialised computational mechanisms in the business of generating 
hypotheses about distal sources of proximal stimulations’.16 In the case of  vision, 
candidates for input systems might include mechanisms for colour perception, 
mechanisms for the analysis o f  shape, mechanisms for the analysis of  three- 
dimensional spatial relations and mechanisms for the recognition of faces. In the case 
of  audition, candidates for input systems might include mechanisms ‘that assign 
grammatical descriptions to token utterances’ mechanisms that ‘detect the melodic or 
rhythmic structure of acoustic arrays’ or mechanisms that ‘mediate the recognition of 
voices of conspecifics’ . 
What does Fodor mean by domain-specificity? Such modules as the preceding 
could have been domain-specific simply in virtue o f  the causal relations holding 
between them, sensory organs and properties of  objects. If for instance the mechanism 
for the analysis of shape is only related to specific distal stimuli then ‘it follows 
trivially that their computational domain qua mechanisms of visual perception is 
specific to the class of possible retinal outputs’.” And so on for the other 
computational mechanisms related to visual stimuli and the computational mechanisms 
related to stimuli of  other types. This is not how Fodor conceives of domain- 
specificity . Nothing interesting about cognitive processing would follow from such 
specificity . It is consistent with domain-specific processing so defined that each 
of Fodor’s modularity hypothesis fmm both philosophers and psychologists. On the issue of domain 
specificity see papers in Garfield 1989. especially those by Arbib and by Stillings. On the issue of the 
mandatoriness of central processes see Marlsen-Wilson & Tyler 1989. Putnam 1984 and Churchland 
1989 have challenged the detail of the encapsulation of modules and the nature of their fllpposedly 
shallow outputs. See also Marlsen-Wilson & Tyler 1989 (with respect to the encapsulation of 
language processing modules) and Arbib 1989 (with respect to the encapsulation of visual processing 
modules). Marshall 1981 has challenged the impenetrabilitv of the internal processing of modules. 
whilst Karmiloff-Smith 1994 has challenged the innateness of modules. 
”Fodor 1983: 47. ’‘ Fodor 1983: 48. 
Cognitive Modules, Synaesthesia and Functional Explanation 69 
mechanism uses the same types of computations. According to Fodor, modules are 
specialised in virtue of the specific computational processes they utilise to generate 
the range of representations they produce. The specific computational mechanisms 
that are used to represent colours for instance cannot be employed to represent 
shapes. 
Evidence for domain-specificity comes largely fiom experiments on language 
processing. For instance, Fodor focuses on the evidence that only a specific class of 
stimuli are ‘capable of throwing the switch’ for the perceptual systems that effect the 
phonetic analysis of speech. These mechanisms are different from those which effect 
the perceptual analysis of auditory nonspeech. The existence of only a small subclass 
of the logically possible linguistic systems is according to Fodor evidence of a speech 
input system which generates representations of distal linguistic utterances by means 
of idiosyncratic computational processes upon proximal acoustic signals. Whereas 
only humans possess computational mechanisms for processing language according to 
Fodor it is perfectly plausible that species other than humans have visual-object input 
systems which generate representations of distal objects by means of different types 
of computational processes on proximal light signals. Neither of these types of 
computational processes could perform the fimctions of the other. Another way of 
putting this is in terms of the different computational tasks each computational 
mechanism has to perform. The first seeks an answer to the question: ‘how does the 
theory of language apply to the analysis of the stimulus now at hand?’ The second 
seeks an answer to the question: ‘how far to the nearest prototype?’ The moral of all 
this is that the more elaborate the mechanism of an input system becomes so the more 
eccentric the stimulus domain becomes. l 8  
How does synaesthesia impact on ths  discussion? Can the EM thesis accept 
Fodor’s notion of domain-specificity as stated? Segal admits that it is not clear to 
what extent the module which realises CG synaesthesia is domain-specific. In CG 
synaesthesia there does on the face of it, appear to be a specific processing of 
Fodor 1983: 51. Fodor notes some problems with the inference from the eccentricity of the 
stimulus domain to the specficity of processing mecharusm: ’chess playing for example exploits 
eccentric information. but nobody wants to postulate a chess faculty’. The inference from modularity 
to eccentricity of domain is more plausible than the one from eccentricity of domain to modularity. 
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information in that representations of  sounds are mapped onto representations of  
letters which, in turn, are mapped onto representations of colour. For instance, when 
a subject hears the word ‘phonology’ the underlying mechanism reliably produces the 
particular colour experience associated with the letter ‘p’.  It is commonly believed 
that there is a computational system that maps the sounds of words onto their 
spellings which are stored in a mental lexicon. The EM thesis claims that there is an 
additional capacity to process representations of  one type - in this case colours - from 
representations of another type - in this case written letters - via a domain-specific 
mechanism. The trouble with this view is that it is not clear whether this really gives 
any additional support specifically to idiosyncratic computational mechanisms, as 
Fodor conceives them. For one thing non-linguistic information often produces 
synaesthetic representations o f  colour. Another difficulty is that it is not clear what 
computational task the alleged module would be undertaking. This problem is 
particularly sharp in that different subjects have different associations. One ad hoc 
modification to the thesis, which Segal advocates, would be to postulate a domain- 
specific component to CG synaesthesia and other components which may or may not 
be domain-specific to non-linguistic auditory inputs. 
The MB thesis claims that, in the case o f  CG synaesthesia, there is a 
breakdown of barriers between the modules which typically process speech inputs and 
inputs from colour sources respectively. This, however, seems to raise a dilemma for 
the thesis. How. if computational domain-specificity is partially constitutive of the 
barrier between modules, is it possible for the information which has been processed 
by the speech processing module to be fbrther processed by the visual processing 
module? Although breakdowns within modules can, and should be acknowledged, the 
breakdown of barriers between modules should be impossible because one module, by 
hypothesis, would provide a representation to which any other processing module 
should not be able to respond, except at the proper interfaces. In the present case, the 
speech processing module would provide a representation to which the visual 
processing module should, by hypothesis, be unable to respond. It might at this point 
be observed that the answer is easily available: the speech processing module already 
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seems to generate visual representations in the form of graphemic representations 
(again cognitive modules are not to be identified with perceptual modalities), so there 
will be no special difficulty generated by the domain-specific mechanisms. But, if this 
is the case, this is where the dilemma ensues; there seems to be no clear barrier 
between modules to break down. 
One response might be that the speech processing module may normally 
produce graphemic representations of speech which typically fail to receive the 
attention of the central processing system. They only do receive the attention of the 
central processing system when there is a breakdown between the speech processing 
module and the colour processing module. In this case the breakdown of barriers 
would involve not domain-specificity but other properties of modularity. This may be 
a satisfactory response for CG synaesthesia, but there seem to be other forms of 
coloured-hearing synaesthesia, such as colour-phonemic synaesthesia, which do not 
require the mediation of graphemic representations. And there are other forms of 
synaesthesia. These forms of synaesthesia (which would coincide more closely with 
the breakdown of traditional notions of sensory modalities) suggest either that there 
are no computational domain-specific mechanisms preventing cross-modal 
associations or require that the mechanisms responsible for the extra phenomenal 
character of experience can somehow play an explanatory role. But any explanation 
along the second of these lines seems to play into the hands of the EM thesis. In order 
to maintain the MB thesis, it seems a revision of Fodor’s notion of domain-specificity 
is required. But this need not be controversial. After all, there seems to be no clear 
consensus amongst psychologists concerning the specificity of computational 
processes underlying particular psychological abilities. l9 It may even turn out that 
synaesthesia is hrther evidence that the domain-specificity of modules is constituted 
by hardware rather than software. 
(ii) Maniatory operation. The mandatoriness of operations captures the idea that 
once an input of the relevant kind is received by the sensory transducers, such as a 
l 9  See Shapiro & Epstein 1998: 174 for further discussion. 
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token utterance or a written token of  a language we understand, we cannot prevent 
ourselves from processing it in a way such that we are aware o f  it as a familiar 
linguistic token.*’ The output fiom our language comprehension system is a 
representation of an element of  a language we understand rather than an unfamiliar 
noise or unfamiliar set of visible properties. This is not to deny that we are able to 
focus our attention upon other input representations, such as the phonological or the 
graphemic representation of  language, but it demands considerable attentional 
resources.21 Mandatoriness does not apply in the same way to non-perceptual 
processes: ‘outside perception, the way that one deploys one’s cognitive resources is, 
in general, rationally subservient to one’s utilities’. 
The experience of  synaesthetes suggests that synaesthesia too has this 
property o f  modularity. Salient amongst coloured hearing synaesthetes’ remarks is 
the remark that the colours evoked are automatic and unsuppressible. Synaesthetes 
sometimes remark that they can prevent their synaesthetic experiences but, consistent 
with the mandatory operation of  modules, it seems as though they do this indirectly, 
by attending to other stimuli, as we ordinarily do if we are trying to ignore a 
stimulus. 22 
But if this supports the EM thesis it also supports the MB thesis. Synaesthesia 
could still be the result of a breakdown of barriers between modules such that the 
signal fiom one module cannot be prevented fiom reaching another module. 
(iii) Irformation is inaccessible to central processes. Part of  the reason for our 
ignorance about synaesthesia lies with the third of the specified properties o f  
modularity . According to Fodor ‘the computations that input systems pedorm 
typically proceed via the assignment of a number of intermediate analyses of  the 
proximal stimulation’, but the internal operations of  input systems are inaccessible to 
Fodor 1983: 52. ’* Fodor 1983: 53.  
’’ See the questionnaire response in Baron-Cohen et al. 1993: 423: ‘They al l  recalled the surprise of 
discovering that tlus was not the case for everyone. All subjects also reported that the colours evoked 
were automatic and unsuppressible. and said that they saw the colour vividly, ‘inside’ their head’. 
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inspection by the subject? If synaesthetes are able to deduce the association between 
graphemes and colours, such a deduction would be by processes one thinks of, 
typically, as central processes. So they cannot tell whether they have an extra module 
or suffer a breakdown of barriers between in modules. More than that, since whatever 
knowledge is at the level of detail that is typically elicited by psychological 
experiments, whether they have an extra module or suffer a breakdown in modularity 
is unavailable by direct means to anyone else. We have to look for hrther forms of 
explanation. 
(iv) Processes are rapid. Evidence for the rapidity of synaesthetic processes is largely 
anecdotal, although some early attempts were made to measure them. Experimental 
evidence for the rapidity of synaesthetic processes comes from the last decade of the 
nineteenth century. Claviere describes experiments in which Beaunis and Binet asked 
synaesthetes to respond as soon as they experienced a colour in association with a 
stimulus.24 The average time was .51 seconds. The average time for the recognition 
of letters alone was found to be .45 seconds. Claviere reports that Philippe even found 
that the time for letter recognition was greater than the reaction time for colours 
alone; the time until response to letters was .76 seconds; the time until response to 
colours was .70 seconds. These experiments have not been reproduced more recently, 
and anyway even if the relative rapidity of synaesthesia could be measured, it is not 
obvious that this would provide evidence in favour of either the MB thesis or the EM 
thesis . 
(v) &formation is encapsulated. We all suffer fiom perceptual illusions fiom time to 
time. One of the features of perceptual illusions is that, regardless of our beliefs about 
the world, we cannot change our perceptual experiences. This illustrates the property 
of informational encapsulation. Informational encapsulation is arguably the central 
defining property of Fodorian input systems. It is the property of a cognitive system 
whereby access to it by information fiom elsewhere in the individual’s cognitive 
33 Fodor 1983: 56. 
x Claviere 1897. 
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system, especially feedback mechanisms from central processing, is denied. The 
guiding principle of information encapsulation is that as much information should be 
ascertained fiom the bottom-up before top-down processing is invoked. The 
reasoning behind this is that, since input systems are required to tell us how the world 
is, the representation of unanticipated stimuli is of primary importance. 
Fodor discusses information encapsulation mainly with reference to language 
processing, although it can be vividly exemplified by processing of visual properties. 
The Muller-Lyer illusion is one example where information is encapsulated: we know 
that the two lines in the illusion are of the same length - that we have worked out by 
measuring them and comparing their measurements - however we cannot bring this to 
bear upon input processing. Another example: when we move our eyes the flow of 
images across the retinas is equivalent to what would occur if our eyes were 
stationary and the world were moving. The reason why we do not see the world 
moving back and forward before us, so the theory goes, is that neural centres which 
initiate movement feed information forward to the input systems, which interpret 
visual stimuli. The visual input system can thus discount alterations in the retinal flow. 
However, if you were to press the eyeball gently the world would appear to move. 
Although you know this, for you have yourself initiated the experiment, you can do 
nothing to compensate for the effect. The lesson, once again, is that such information 
is informationally encapsulated. 
Synaesthetic experiences, in this respect, are like illusions which we cannot but 
be subject to. Consider the following observation reported by one of Cytowic’ 
subjects: ‘It is not an hallucination but it is hard for me to describe. As I look at a 
page, I see the colors there even though I see the colour of the real ink that’s before 
me. I know it isn’t there for real, but I still can’t help seeing it. There is still a 
sensation that the colour is there’.2’ Although synaesthetes might reason that their 
experience is non-veridical’ this is insufficient to prevent input systems from 
processing words as coloured. The processes, which produce the content of 
synaesthetic experiences, are encapsulated fiom other cognitive processes. 
’> Qtowic 1989:43. 
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But again a direct, and seemingly unresolvable, disagreement between the 




synaesthetes are unable to mod@ their experiences because the module which enables 
them is encapsulated from the belief that letters of the alphabet are not intrinsically 
coloured; the MB theorist will argue that synaesthetes are unable to correct their 
experiences because the reason for them lies in a pathology of the neural system. 
It is worth briefly considering here, in the context of synaesthesia, the issue of 
the scope of modules. Are input modules divided into levels, or do putative levels of 
processing form component modules of input systems? One might think of the various 
representations in Marr’s model of visual input processing - the grey level description, 
primal sketch, 2.5D sketch and object description - as corresponding to processing 
interlevels or to the outputs of individual modules.26 If Fodor is right about the scope 
of the speech input module and the visual input module, CG synaesthesia could either 
constitute a breakdown between modules at an interlevel stage, more precisely, at the 
stage at which a representation of the graphemes of a word have just been generated, 
or constitute an extra module at the interlevel stage. If this is the generation of an 
extra module it might appear more plausible to postulate a number of smaller modules 
rather than one large Fodorian module as constitutive of input systems. Of course, if 
a number of small modules is the preferred option, CG synaesthesia could still be 
caused by the breakdown of barriers between them. 
(vi) Outputs are shallow. We commonly draw a distinction between appearance and 
reality. Most things have a depth that is not immediately available to our inspection. 
In philosophy of science the issue is ‘where to draw the line between observation and 
inference’, in psychology the issue is ‘where to draw the line between perception and 
~ogni t ion’ .~~ Fodor takes it that what are to be classed as appearances (‘observations’ 
in philosophy of science and ‘perception’ in psychology) are more than what are often 
taken to be the appearances of things by philosophers - the perceptible properties, 
such as the visible properties colour and shape. According to Fodor, since the visual 
See Marr 1982. 
7_7 Fodor 1983: 86. 
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input system is a module, which generates representations ready for use by the central 
cognitive system, these representations have to be representations of basic categories 
of objects. Rather than represent the world in terms of coloured shapes, which we 
then infer to belong to classes of  objects, we perceptually represent objects as 
belonging to types. We see cats and dogs as cats and dogs not as coloured shapes. 
The reason for this Fodor suggests is that it is the computational task of  the visual 
system to solve the question: ‘how far to the nearest pr~totype?’~~ Representations of  
basic categories of objects are the shallow outputs of the visual input systems, which 
deliver information to the central processing system.29 
In CG synaesthesia the output representations are of shape and colour. Here 
is how one synaesthete reported their experience: ‘When I listen to music, I see the 
shapes on an externalised area about twelve inches in fiont of my face and about one 
foot high onto which the music is visually projected. Sounds are most easily likened 
to oscilloscope configurations, lines vary in color, often metallic with height, width 
and most importantly, depth. My favorite music has lines that exist horizontally 
beyond the screen area’ .30 Cytowic claims that synaesthetic experience involves 
discrete and generic items. By this he means that they are ab~tract.~’ Synaesthetic 
representations are clearly shallower than the output representations Fodor argues for. 
This might be interpreted in a number of ways. Either there is an extra module 
which maps representations fi-om the language input system onto the visual processing 
module, the output of which is shallower than is suggested by Fodor. Or there is a 
breakdown in the barriers between modules, either at an inter-level stage, as 
suggested by the Fodorian model, or between the barriers of smaller modules. A 
’8 Fodor 1983: 95. 
’’ Relatedly for the language input system. Fodor claims it is a module which generates the type 
identification of sentences from their acoustic properties, via their phonetic constitution and the 
grammatical and logical structure of an utterance. The output of the language input module is to 
represent a token utterance as a type of utterance. 
3’ On this point compare the questionnaire response in Baron-Cohen et al. 1993: 423 to the question: 
‘when you hear a word. do you see the colour in a particular part of your visual field. and does it 
have a particular shape?’ ‘Five out of the seven experimental subjects replied that the colour was not 
in a particular part of the visual field. whilst two insisted that it was always just above the centre. 
Six out of seven said that it had the shape of the word. whlst one said it had no particular shape.’ 
Cytowic 1989: 24. 
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breakdown of barriers might explain the deliverance of representations, which are 
earlier in the overall processing order of the visual input system. Consideration of this 
property of modularity suggests either that Fodor was right about the type of output 
delivered by the visual input system, in which case synaesthesia is a breakdown of 
other properties of modularity. Or Fodor was wrong about the type of output 
delivered by the visual input system, in which case the question remains open as to 
whether synaesthesia is an extra module or a breakdown between modules. 32 
(vi;) Fixed neural architecture. Fixed neural architecture would contribute to the 
constitution of the barriers between modules. (The extent of the constitution would 
depend upon the upshot of the earlier considerations of domain-specificity .) Positron 
Emission Tomography (PET) scans have been used to determine the particular areas 
of the brain active in CG synaesthetic e~per ience .~~ The evidence suggests a 
dedicated link between language areas and visual association areas. 
The equation is often made between localisation and modularity. As Fodor 
notes, modules are to be individuated hnctionally rather than physiologically. 34 Input 
modules may be distributed about brain tissue. We know neurons make connections 
across areas of the brain, therefore localisation does not appear to be a necessary 
condition for modularity. But does it nevertheless support the notion of modularity? 
Segal points out that the evidence for localisation not only supports Fodor's 
claim that modules are realised in fixed neural architecture but this particular evidence 
for localisation supports the claim that there is an extra module at work. But once 
again the evidence is far from conclusive. The additional areas of activation are those 
which are believed to be already employed for the integration of colour with shape 
and in verbal tasks which require attention to the visual features of objects to which 
words refer. The inference is that the extra module would be realised in an 
independent area mediating the hnctional areas in use by both synaesthetes and 
controls (the language areas) and the functional areas in use by synaesthetes alone 
-'- For a dtscussion of the levels of processing at which associations might take place see 
Grossenbacher 1997: 160-3. 
33 The details are taken Erom Paulesu et al. 1995. 
'' Fodor 1983: 98. 
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(the visual areas). But the evidence we have is silent on this. The evidence is 
suggestive of modularity in so far as it is suggestive of fixed neural architecture, but it 
does not tell us whether this fixed neural architecture should be construed as an extra 
module or as a breakdown of the barriers between two modules. 
How can additional neural architecture be construed as other than additional 
cognitive architecture? Perhaps synaesthetes develop extra neural connections as 
infants. There is an alternative possibility. It has been suggested that synaesthesia is a 
stage of development all neonates undergo. Modularity develops when neural 
connections are The manifestations of synaesthesia would in fact be better 
understood not as breakdown of barriers between modules but as the failure to 
develop the barriers between modules in the first place. (If this is true the wider 
implications, which form the topic o f  this chapter, remain the same. The MB thesis 
might be reconstrued as the breakdown of what breaks down the connections between 
modules). So the presence of additional neural connections does not necessitate 
additional cognitive processes, in particular, it does not necessitate additional modular 
processes. The issue is precisely one of how we are to characterise psychologically 
extra neural  connection^.^^ 
(viii) Characteristic pattern of breakdown. Modules have traditionally been inferred 
fkom characteristic patterns of  cognitive breakdown. For example, Marr’s theory of 
visual processing stages has received some support fiom clinical cases in which one 
set of  subjects are unable to process shapes and another set of subjects are unable to 
recognise objects. 37 In considering whether CG synaesthesia is a cognitive breakdown 
or whether it can itself be subject to cognitive breakdown we come to the heart of the 
matt er. 
~~ 
See chapter one and Maurer 1993. 
It is questionable whether more careful study would help. Maybe further experiments, whch 
allowed the subtraction of the functional areas in use only by synaesthetes, could be addressed to this. 
Perhaps specific additional neurotransmitters could be found. But even if the evidence supported 
additional neural architecture or chemistry of a specific type this would not be conclusive e\idence 
for an extra module as opposed to a breakdown of barriers between moduies. 
37 See Ellis & Young 1988 and Shallice 1988. 
3 5  
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Each thesis can elicit support by means of negative criticisms of its rival. 
Consider the MB thesis fiom the point of view of the EM thesis. How can there be a 
breakdown of fbnction involving the spread of information to other modules if the 
information is also processed correctly by the module which is supposed to be 
undergoing that breakdown? This is not like cases of neuropathology arising from 
injury or stroke in which there is an absence of normal output. In such cases 
breakdowns occur because an interlevel of the modular input systems or a component 
module breaks down. Current evidence suggests that cognitive function is not 
negatively affected by synaesthesia. On that evidence CG synaesthesia should not be 
regarded as a cognitive breakdown. 
Now consider the EM thesis from the point of view of the MB thesis. It can 
firstly be argued that synaesthesia is not a breakdown of a particular module but a 
breakdown of those properties of modularity, which constitute the barriers between 
two modules. In that case the burden of proof can be returned to the EM theorist 
who needs to show what the characteristic pattern of breakdown would be. It is not 
clear just what would count as evidence of any characteristic pattern of evidence of 
breakdown in the CG module. Since it is not clear what the function of the CG 
synaesthesia mechanism is supposed to be, it is not clear what question it is seeking to 
answer (as it is for the language and speech input systems according to F ~ d o r ) . ~ '  One 
response the advocate of the EM thesis can make (unconvincing as it will be to the 
advocate of the MB thesis) is that it is not necessary that all the properties of 
modularity be instantiated. It might be argued that the EM thesis falls with this, and 
so Fodor' s characterisation of modularity stands. But actually a fbnctional module 
underlying synaesthesia probably can be construed, as the next section shows, and 
thus an analysis of its elements indicated. 
(ix) Fixed Pattern of DeveZopment Few would want to suggest that acquired 
synaesthesia (the occurrence of synaesthetic-like symptoms following neural damage 
or drug usage) indicates an extra module. Nevertheless, one cannot automatically 
38 As Segal admits 1997: 220. 
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infer from this that all synaesthetic symptoms are the result of  a breakdown of  
modularity. There are a number of important differences between acquired 
synaesthesia and endogenous forms o f  synaesthesia, in particular the occurrence of 
common patterns of development in the latter. Modules, according to Fodor, are to be 
characterised by their fixed pattern of development. Fixed patterns of  development 
are controlled at the genetic level. I f  synaesthesia is characterised by genetic 
differences then it seems plausible that it too have a distinctive fixed pattern of 
development. Evidence indicates that synaesthesia runs in families and thus does have 
such a genetic component .39 The genetic differences could explain the development 
of new processing capabilities. 
Again, the fact that synaesthesia has a genetic component does not decide 
between the EM thesis and the MB thesis. If it is true that synaesthesia arises in 
adults because neural connections are preserved this could be accounted for by the 
genetic differences between synaesthetes and non-synaesthetes. The fact that 
synaesthesia has a genetic basis, and thus a fixed pattern of development, does not 
confirm the existence o f  an extra module. Even i f  the gene or genes for the CG 
mechanism are discovered, the proteins these genes code for are determined and the 
development processes they mediate are clarified, we may not be any closer to an 
answer to the question of whether the EM thesis or the MB thesis is the correct 
thesis . 
As should be clear by now the presence of  an alternative shows that each 
thesis is underdetermined by the evidence of synaesthesia. Even i f  the nine properties 
which are distinctive of modularity are necessary for the individuation of cognitive 
modules they do not appear to be sufficient. Something hrther is required to 
adjudicate between the two rival theses. 
2.3 Function and the Extra MaiUle Thesis 
The concept of  fbnction operative in cognitive psychology is sometimes left 
39 Baron-Cohen et al. 19%. 
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unspecified. When considering some cases of purported dysfbnction - perhaps there 
has been damage to the brain through stroke or infection - there is little controversy 
over the attribution of dysfunction. The nature of fbnction and dyshnction becomes 
more significant when considering a case such as CG synaesthesia, where the question 
of neuropathology is more controversial. 
The EM thesis is originally a consequence of a computational, non- 
teleological concept of fbnction and hnctional organization. According to Fodor the 
functions of psychological systems can be understood by comparison with the 
organization of idealised computing machmes.40 Idealised computing machines are 
closed symbol-manipulating devices. Their hnctional architecture amounts to a small 
number of interacting subsystems (tape, scanner, printer and executive) and a small 
number of primitive machine operations (stop, start, move the tape, read the tape, 
change state and print). The system functions in the way it does because of the 
physical dispositions of its components. If the central cognitive system is no more 
than such a symbol manipulator then it can be fblly explained in local causal terms. In 
order to act as a relevant model of human cognitive processes such a computational 
machine has to be embedded within input systems which can allow the exchange of 
information between the machine and its environment. These input systems would 
model the modules of present interest. The way that input systems transform 
information from the environment into symbolic representations is not, in general, any 
different from the way the central system then operates on them. In particular, input 
systems are also solipsistic, in the sense that the internal mechanisms are all that 
count. Input systems thus function in a particular way because of the pattern of 
dispositional properties and causal relations which constitute them! Additional 
processes, which have the features Fodor notes, should consequently be regarded as 
extra modules. 
Segal grants that we often talk of computers as having goals, and that the 
But he havins of goals is related to the hnctions certain computations have. 
"' Fodor 1983: 3836.  
'' Rey 1991 has extended the Language of Thought model central to Fodor's thinking about 
psychological states to sensations and the states associated with them. 
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emphasises that this is only a way of talking which could be h l ly  understood in terms 
of local causal properties. For instance, when modular processing gives rise to visual 
illusions, according to Segal, the visual input system is not doing anything it should 
not be doing. It was not designed in such a way that it is now failing to hlfil the 
parameters of any design. The same can be said with respect to synaesthesia; when 
the CG synaesthesia module gives rise to illusions it is not doing anything it should 
not be doing for it was not designed in such a way that it is now failing to fblfil the 
parameters of its design. In short, Segal claims that cognitive systems in general and 
cognitive modules in particular, are what they are independently of their origins. 
Segal argues that we can see that evolutionary considerations need not be 
adverted to once we take account of the ‘parallel between physical and cognitive 
development’. His point is that ‘if we want to understand how the various tendons 
and ligaments hold the knee joint together, or how the kidneys regulate fluids in the 
body, evolutionary considerations are beside the point’.42 All we have to do is study 
their present capacities. It would make no difference ‘if it was discovered that our 
ancestors had been constructed in a laboratory 30,000 years ago [...I this would not 
lead to any revisions of the technical sections of physiological books concerned with 
its actual functioning’. He accepts that evolutionary considerations can be a useh1 aid 
to research into the actual workings of a system; and they can be interesting in 
themselves. But he stresses that ‘cognitive systems are what they are and do what 
they do independently of their origins, just as the actual workmgs of the knee joint or 
kidneys are as they are, whatever their historical origins’. In underlining his support 
for a Fodorian position he states: ‘Ultimately, whether a cognitive system is a 
computer is a factual question about its intrinsic and current features’.43 The trouble is 
that it is just not clear that cognitive systems are like such simple physical systems. 
Computational fbnctionalism can be related to a more general approach to 
functional explanation. Cummins has observed that Fodor made the connection 
between the analytical strategy in psychological theorising and fhctional 
characterisation without however extending it to a general account of functional 
~ ~- 
-E Segal 1997: 213. 
Segal 1997: 215. 
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explanation? Cummins has himself offered a general account. According to 
Cummins, functional ascription and functional explanation arise from an analysis of a 
complex system into its component parts. He also argues that the function of any 
characteristic or property should be understood without reference to ends: the 
function of a part of a complex system is just the causal contribution it makes to a 
specified activity of the system. What the specific properties are o f  a component 
part, x, of a system, s, or, alternatively speakmg what x hnctions as, 4, depends upon 
the analytic account, A, the theorist has of the activity, w, of the system of which x is 
a component part. The idea is that if one can make sense of a system by ascribing it 
goals this is enough to just;@ the ascription (which does not mean that the ascription 
cannot then be hl ly  understood in causal  term^).'^ Cummins defines function in the 
following way: 
s functions as a + in s (or: the function of x in s is to $) relative to an analytic account 
A of s’s capacity to \v just in case x is capable of +ing in s and A appropriately and 
adequately accounts for s‘s capacity to \v by, in part, appealing to the capacity of x to $ 
in s? 
Consider cognitive modules. Against the background of explaining (A) the 
processing of representations (w) of the visual system (s) we can analyse the causal 
contribution or knction of the neural system (x) as a scene surface analyser (9) 
because the capacity of the visual system (s) to process representations (w) requires 
the capacity of the neural system (x) to represent the surfaces of objects (+). So the 
Cummins explanation can be mimicked in the following way: 
neural system (x) functions as a scene surface analyser (4) in the visual system (s) (or: 
the function of the neural system (x) in the visual system (s) is to analyse scene surfaces 
(4)) relative to an analpc account (A) of the visual system’s (s’s) capacity to process 
representations (w) just in case the neural system (x) is capable of analysing scene 
surfaces (4-ing) in the visual system (s) and A appropriately and adequately accounts 
for the visual system’s 
appealing to the capacity 
visual system (s). 
(s’s) capacity to process representations (w) by, in part, 
of the neural system (x) to analyse scene surfaces (+) in the 
Cummins 1975: ft. 20. 
In thls respect Cummins offers a more interpretative account of function than Segal, who claims 
11 
that the function of a part of a system is just what it is disposed to do. 
36 Cummins 1975: 762. 
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It is clear why damage to the brain through stroke or infection would be dyshnctional 
on this account: if we assume that intact cognitive performance presupposes a system 
having a number of components all of which are required to operate in a well-defined 
way for the system as a whole to operate in a specified way then neuropathologies 
arise when components do not hnction appropriately within the system so specified. 
Of course, viewing neuropathologies as such depends upon viewing the systems to 
which they are related as cognitive systems which perform a determinate set of 
cognitive tasks. 
With respect to CG synaesthesia, all that ,is required for an account of hnction 
is that one be able to characterise a system whereby inputs to the speech processing 
module reliably cause representations as of colour. Synaesthetic experiences, in 
which the sound of particular words are experienced as having distinctive colours, can 
then be assumed to be subserved by modules which compute the functions which are 
determined by the dispositional properties o f  their components. Against the 
background of explaining (A) the processing of representations ([I!) of  the synaesthetic 
system (s) we can analyse the causal contribution or fbnction of the neural system (x) 
as a colour analyser (4) because the capacity of the synaesthetic system (s) to process 
representations (v) requires the capacity of  the neural system (x) to represent its 
inputs as coloured ($). So the Cummins explanation can be mimicked in the case of 
synaesthesia in the following way: 
neural system (x) fbnctions as a colour analyser (9) in the synaesthetic system (s) (or: 
the fbnction of the neural system (s) in the synaesthetic system (s) is to analyse the 
inputs as colours ($)) relative to an analytic account (A) of the synaesthetic system's 
(s's) capacity to process representations (v) just in case the neural system (x) is 
capable of analysing inputs as colours (Cing) in the synaesthetic system (s) and A 
appropriately and adequately accounts for the synaesthetic system's (s's) capacity to 
process representations (y) by, in part. appealing to the capacity of the neural system 
(x) to analyse inputs as colours (+) in the synaesthetic system (s). 
An initial uneasiness might be felt about this approach Cummins proposes 
that the effectiveness o f  such an analysis is proportional to the extent to which the 
capacities of the amZysans are less sophisticated than and different in type fiom the 
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capacities of the anaZysandurn. As the gap in sophistication and type between the 
capacities of the analysans and the capacities of the unaZysandum grows so there 
must be a related sophistication of the system. Since there is only any cogency in a 
fbnctional explanation of a sophsticated system having complex capacities there is 
no point in sophisticated hypotheses about simple capacities. CG synaesthesia would 
certainly not involve as complex a system as either the visual input system or the 
language input system. Since there is no clear cut-off point, it is open to dispute 
whether CG synaesthesia would, nevertheless, be sufficiently complex. 
A deeper difficulty with this view is that there is another possible explanation 
for synaesthesia. This is not just another background explanation, or analytical 
strategy, by which to characterise CG synaesthesia. This explanation does not fit in 
with the explanatory strategy because it denies that every causal property needs to 
have a fknction in a wider system. If a consideration of synaesthesia underlines the 
role of an analytical stance of a Cummins’ type approach, it becomes even clearer 
that Segal’s approach would also amount to one analytical strategy. Once the 
normativity of the analytical strategy is transparent principled reasons have to be 
7 canvassed for the application of the correct background explanation. 
2.4 Function and the Breakdown of Moddarity 
One reason for adopting the MB thesis is, arguably, that it fits better with Fodor’s 
own earlier suggestion about natural kinds. In an earlier paper discussing the unity o f  
science and the relation between the laws of the basic sciences and the special 
sciences, Fodor suggests that we should think of natural kinds in science in the 
context of laws for: ‘the kind predicates of a science are the ones whose terms are the 
bound variables in its proper laws’.47 The special sciences are such that their natural 
kinds are realised by an indefinite number of different physical natural kinds. A 
disjunction of natural kinds cannot, according to Fodor, figure in laws. Consequently 
nomic bridge laws will not hold between the physical and the special sciences. So 
” Fodor 1974, reprinted 1981: 87. 
psychological natural kinds for instance are irreducible to the laws and natural kinds 
of the basic sciences. The previous section adverted to generalisations but did not 
advert to wider law-like processes. Only this will provide us with the individuation 
conditions, which will allow us to distinguish genuine cognitive modules.4* 
This discussion can now be seen as belonging to a larger discussion about the 
relative merits of the computational and biological frameworks in psychology. Sober 
has argued with reference to psychological functionalism that ‘ hnction’ is ambiguous 
and the doctrine was developed with the wrong meaning in mind. He favours a 
teleohnctional as opposed to a computational view of hnction. 49 Exactly how one 
should think of functional explanation teleologically is a matter of current debate. 
Common to the debate is the view that hnctional explanation should be a non- 
reducible form of explanation, and this because the hnction of an item is determined 
by the contribution it has made or does make to individual fitness. 
Millikan argues for one version of proper hnctions (or teleohnctions): the 
aetiological theory. For Millikan, to describe the biological hnction of an item is not 
to describe its dispositional capacities, it is to describe the role that the ancestors of 
that item played in a historical process, including birth, development and reproduction 
over numerous generations. If individuals possessing a trait have been favoured by 
natural selection because their token traits have performed in a certain way, then that 
is the function of the trait. Thus hnction ascription involves saying what something is 
for by saying why it is there. Consideration of the biological context allows the 
selection of the relevant properties of a trait for proper hnction ascription among 
other of its properties, providing the opportunity for a distinction to be drawn 
between fbnction and accident, and hnction and malfunction. If the function of a trait 
This is not intended to provide mximally specific individuation conditions for cognitive modules. 
The suggestion is simply that these additional considerations are explanatorily useful. It is not that 
computational considerations are not interesting nor that they are not explanatorily useful; it is just 
that in the long run they are not sufficiently so. Of course, someone might maintain the 
computational account and yet be able to revise the nine jointly sufficicqt properties in some other 
way. It is hard to know what this would be. 
49 Sober 1985: 165. The argument to be endorsed here also has some parallels with the view that 
machine hnctionalism is ‘too liberal‘ (to adopt the terminology of Block) and requires 
teleofUnctionalism as a corrective. Lycan 1987 responds to Block’s charge by arguing for 
teleofhnctionalism . 
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is such because it has increased the fitness of individuals then any other property of 
the trait is accidental if it has not increased individual fitness. A property of a trait is a 
malfhction if it does not increase fitness and is different &om a related property of 
the trait, which has historically increased fitness. 
One issue that divides the parties to the debate is how one is to relate 
teleological function and causal explanation. It should be recalled that, Segal, 
following Fodor, argues that psychological processes, as causal processes, can be 
studied without reference to their history. Millikan argues that teleological 
explanation is quite different from causal explanation. But it is not true that a 
consideration of history alone can introduce teleofunctional considerations and it is 
not true that such a stark contrast between teleological fbnction and causal 
explanation must be preserved, as aetiologists maintain, in order to maintain the 
distinctiveness of teleological explanation. Walsh and Ariew have recently argued that 
the aetiological theory championed by Millikan amongst others is incomplete. I ts 
incompleteness is particularly evident when the present utility of a trait is different 
from its past utility. They argue that functional explanation in biology must be 
analysed with respect to relevant regimes of selection. The relational theory they 
advocate claims that: ‘the way a trait contributes to fitness may vary wildly according 
to the environment [...I one must specifi the contribution to fitness with respect to a 
selective regime? The relational theory explains both the persistence of traits and 
why we should expect a trait to persist into the future. In this way Walsh and Ariew 
are able to present the fbrther claim that functional explanation in biology can be 
viewed as a specific sub-category of functional explanation as characterised by 
Cummins - that category which is distinguished by the context of the contribution to 
average individual fitness: ‘the evolutionary fbnction of a trait token (with respect to 
a regime) is that Cummins fbnction which constitutes the (positive) contribution to 
average fitness for tokens of the trait’s type (with respect to that regime)’.’* By 
~~ ~ ~~ 
”’ Millikan 1984. 
’’ Walsh & Ariew 1996: 498. 
i3 Walsh & Anew 1996: 509. 
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reference to the external environment, teleohnctional explanation can both be viewed 
as an irreducible form of explanation and compatible with causal explanations. 
This would go some way to satisfling Fodor’s suggestion that the kind 
predicates of a science are the ones whose terms are the bound variables in its laws. 
The biological law-like explanation for the evolution of specific cognitive modules, 
simply put, would be that the ancestors of cognitive modules, as a means of 
processing information, would have caused a differential in average fitness between 
the individual organisms which possessed them and those which did not possess them, 
and thus an increase in the descendants of those ancestors of cognitive modules in the 
population. 
The evolutionary psychologists Tooby & Cosmides argue that ‘modules are 
kinds invented by natural selection during the species’ evolutionary history to produce 
adaptive ends in the species’ natural envir~nment’.~~ Fodor certainly agrees that some 
account along these lines is required. ‘Given the possibility that perceptual 
mechanisms could be continuous with the higher cognitive processes, one is tempted 
to ask what the point of the trichotomous fiinctional organisational architecture could 
be. What, teleologically speaking, might it buy for an organism that has transducers 
and central cognitive processes to have input analysers as well?’ 54 And he thinks that 
there probably is an answer to this question: ‘implicit in the trichotomous architecture 
is the isolation of perceptual analysis fi-om certain effects of background belief and 
set.. However he has his reservations about the details: ‘To suppose that the issue is 
Why, given that there are central processors, should there be input systems as well? 
is to take for granted that the former should be viewed as philogenetically prior to the 
latter. However, an equally plausible story might have it the other way round viz., that 
input analysers, with their relatively rigid domain specificity and automaticity of 
fbnctioning, are the aboriginal prototypes of inference-making psychological systems’. 
His conclusion fiom this is that the justification for postulating a hnctionally 
individuated class of input analysers distinct fiom central cognitive mechanisms should 
5 5  
~ ~- 
53 Tooby & CoSmides : 1995: xiii. 
’‘ Fodor 1983: 43. 
Fodor 1983: 43. 
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not rest on evolutionary considerations but ‘that there are interesting things that the 
input analysers have in comon’ in other words that modules are psychological 
natural kinds which are different from ‘cognitive processes at large’. This might 
support his view that psychological mechanisms can be understood by looking at the 
mechanisms inside the body. However ‘the interesting things that the input analysers 
have in common’ are, in the case of synaesthesia, clearly not enough to distinguish 
membership of a natural kind; evolutionary considerations du have to be brought to 
bear on the issue. The difficulty of articulating the f i l l  evolutionary story, contra 
Fodor, is not, as a consideration of synaesthesia shows, a reason for eschewing 
evolutionary considerations as determinants of the properties of cognitive modules. 
Whether synaesthesia is realised by a breakdown in modularity or by an extra 
module depends on how this purported module would contribute to the fitness of 
individuals. Baron-Cohen has argued that if the MB thesis is correct there has to be a 
clear cost to fitness produced by CG synaesthesia. The problem for the MB thesis is 
that CG synaesthesia does not appear to be maladaptive. Notable as a mark of its 
lack of cost to fitness is the fact that CG synaesthetes are surprised at finding that 
other people do not have the kinds of experience that they have? Baron-Cohen tries 
to save the MB thesis by discussing a case in which a synaesthetic subject not only 
experiences colours when she hears sounds, but experiences sounds when she sees 
colours. The dyshnctional nature of synaesthesia, according to Baron-Cohen, only 
becomes apparent when the condition is bi-directional. But the MB thesis is credible 
without ths line of reasoning for it is not the MB thesis which has to show a cost to 
individual fitness but the EM thesis which has to show a benefit to individual fitness. 
Some evidence that synaesthesia does not increase fitness derives from its 
relative scarcity in the p~pulation.~’ It may be that the novelty of synaesthesia is such 
Baron-Cohen 1996.The fact that a characteristic does not seem abnormal because it has always 
been there. clearly does not mean that it cannot have a cost to fitness. Equally, the fact that 
synaesthesia does seem to be a disadvantage in some cases does not mean that it confers an 
evolutionary -- &&vantage. 
’ It might here be pointed out that even if synaesthesia were frequent in the population this would 
not be enough evidence to show that it conferred an advantage. For it might be linked to genes 
which did confer benefit upon their possessors. Only if synaesthesia is at the focus of positive 
selection would it have an adaptive advantage and therefore a function. 
56 
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that selection has not yet had time to act on it. In that case, what could the utility of 
synaesthesia possibly be? Synaesthesia does not allow individuals to perceive more, or 
the same more quickly, since the experiences had are non-veridical, for instance a 
synaesthete may experience a word to be coloured when it is not. It is hard to see 
how hture selective regimes might allow synaesthesia to bestow a positive 
contribution to average fitness of an individual synaesthete. But it might be the case 
that synaesthesia does have a hnction, for teleohnctions are not always easy to 
discern. It is open empirical question. If synaesthesia does confer an advantage then 
we should say that there is an extra module here; the EM thesis would be vindicated? 
If the EM thesis is wrong then synaesthesia need not be considered malhnctional; it 
need only be considered accidental. Synaesthesia can be regarded as accidental rather 
than malfunctional because it does not involve a breakdown of modules, but a 
breakdown of certain properties of modularity. 59 
Since we are dealing with two concepts of hnction here, so we are dealing 
with two concepts of modularity. I have tried to show that an examination o f  
synaesthesia shows that the characterisation of modularity by computational 
considerations is insufficiently wide. It is the concept of teleohnction or proper 
function that allows us to pick out membership of a psychological natural kind such as 
Fodor suggests. Fodor claims that cognitive modules are members of a psychological 
natural kind because they possess nine distinctive properties. The preceding argument 
claims that we should consider cognitive modules as possessing a tenth property, 
which they share with other biological characteristics: input systems should be 
considered as teleohnctional kinds. One can accept the view that a consideration of 
cognitive modules contributes to the individuation of an irreducible level of enquiry 
without producing a radical discontinuity between it and other levels of enquiry. Much 
58 Grossenbacher 1997: 156 suggests that additional colour labelling might serve as a natural 
cognitive resource when stimulus conditions preclude colour sensations, e.g. under poor lighting 
conditions perceived shape might automatically evoke colour imagery in order to facilitate memory 
retrieval for object recognition. 
'' It may be that some forms of synaesthesia, as the breakdown of the barriers of modules, are to be 
considered accidental because they do not prevent proper functioning, whilst other forms of 
synaesthesia are to be considered malfunctional because the breakdown of the barriers of modules 
prevents the indule Erom doing what it was origmdly designed to do. 
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has been made recently of the use of evolutionary theory in cognitive psychology. 
The present discussion takes the view that considerations of teleological hnctions 
need not produce any radical departures for cognitive psychology; it is a fbrther tool, 
which can help us to understand cognition. However, if we accept the MB thesis of 
synaesthesia we may have to view some of the other properties of modularity, such as 
domain-specificity of modules, in a slightly modified way. 
2.5 Objections to Psychological Natural Kin& 
How does the notion of a psychological natural kind fit with standard philosophical 
theories of natural kinds? Fodor initially characterises the class of cognitive modules 
as constituting a natural kind in virtue of its members having many scientifically 
interesting properties in common over and above whatever properties initially define 
the class. This is, at least in one respect, consistent with the dominant account of 
natural kinds deriving from Kripke and Putnam. 
Central to their account is the view that a natural kind term can be fixed before 
the correct or full scientific account of the kind in question is known. It is nevertheless 
the essential properties, which a scientific account eventually delineates, which 
determine the reference of natural kmd terms. This situation arises because members 
of the linguistic community intend to refer to a natural kind even when they do not 
(or do not fully) know the properties of the alleged natural kind. Although Kripke 
does not give a detailed explanation of the process of reference fixing of natural kind 
terms he does outline the way it would proceed. He suggests that members of a 
linguistic community might come across several items all of which have the same 
appearance, infer that the items all belong to a natural kind and then introduce a term 
to refer to the supposed kind: ‘in general terms for natural kinds (e.g. animal, 
vegetable, and chemical kinds) get their reference fixed in this way; the substance is 
defined as the kind instantiated by (almost all of) a given sample’.60 But the meaning 
of the natural kind term, indeed whether we have been successfil in naming a natural 
‘IU Kripke 1980: 136. 
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kind, in fact depends on the underlying properties of  the items referred to. 
Relatedly, Putnam explains how a community is able to refer to natural kinds 
using the natural kind terms they already have. Speakers of linguistic communities are 
able to explain what they mean by a natural kind term, such as ‘water’, by pointing 
out samples o f  natural kinds and they are able to provide an explanation in this way 
because the sample ostensively so defined bears ‘a certain sameness relation (say, x is 
the same liquid as y, or x is the samq, as y) to most of the stuff [...I speakers in [the] 
linguistic community have on other occasions called ‘water . Whether some item or 
some stuff, superficially similar to items or stuff belonging to a natural kind, does 
9 )  61 
belong to a natural kind, depends upon whether it has the same essential properties as 
the items or stuff originally involved in the fixing of the natural kind term. 
One of the consequences of  this view is that the properties, which may first 
have been used to pick out a natural kind, are neither necessary nor sufficient for 
individuating natural kinds: some item may have all the superficial properties of a 
member of a natural kind - e.g. fool’s gold or mechanical cats - and still not be a 
member of  the kind and something may have few if any of those properties and still be 
a member o f  the natural kind. What is relevant is whether the item or stuff has certain 
essential properties. 
Cognitive modules were presumably first referred to on the basis of 
behavioural evidence, some evidence of crude differences in the brain and perhaps 
also the evidence of  introspection on psychological processes, but anyway without 
our having a hll scientific account of them. There are psychological processes such as 
synaesthesia, which appear to be explained by the presence of  underlying cognitive 
modules. If the argument of the earlier parts of this chapter is correct scientific 
investigation is required to tell us whether what is first thought to be a cognitive 
module is indeed such. Something will count as a cognitive module and thus a 
member of a psychological kind if it possesses certain essential properties. 
One objection to the notion of psychologid natural kinds has however been 
raised by McGinn who has argued that there is another respect in which psychological 
‘’ Putnam 1975: 225. 
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features and psychological predicates fit uneasily into the Kripkehtnam model of 
natural kinds and natural kind terms.62 The purpose of the present section is to offer a 
response to the argument and related arguments by considering what force they have 
if cognitive modules were taken to exempli@ membership of a psychological natural 
kind, and externalistic criteria were required for individuation of such a psychological 
natural kind. 
McGinn’s wider objective is to support Davidson’s argument for anomalous 
monism by denying that psychophysical laws are possible. He claims ‘the absence of 
psychophysical laws would have consequences for the question whether mental states 
should be conceived of as natural iunds; whose essence is specifiable in physical terms 
of the brain’? If there were no psychophysical laws then mental states could not be 
conceived as natural kinds because the ‘co-satisfaction of mental and physical 
predicates’ required by the standard model of physical natural kinds would be 
‘incompatible with the demonstrated lack of nomological tie between the two types of 
predicate’. In fact, he thinks the argument goes the other way around: ‘it is precisely 
because mental predicates can be shown not to denote natural kinds, but rather to 
express concepts of a findamentally different character that authentic psychophysical 
laws can be ruled out in advance’. 64 
For it to be true that a mental state \v (he gives as examples of mental states 
propositional attitudes and sensations) has a physical real essence cp it must be that a 
creature cannot instantiate without thereby instantiating cp and vice versa. If \v and (p 
do come apart then the cp cannot, ‘as a real essence must, determine the existence and 
identity conditions for y’ and therefore mental terms do not denote ‘physically 
circumscribable natural k~nds’.“~ If mental states do have physical real essences then it 
is plausible to assume that these will be discoverable aposteriori, just as the essences 
of other natural kinds (e.g. gold and water) are discoverable aposteriori. We can 
envisage inductively established correlations between mental and physical states, such 
McGinn 1978, republished in 199 1. References are made to the latter. 
h3 McGinn 1991: 127. 
McGinn 1991: 127. 
65 McGinn 1991: 128. 
as pain and C-fibre stimulation.66 But according to McGinn, who follows Kripke on 
this issue, it is conceivable that pain and C-fibre stimulation do come apart, in which 
case (p and y come apart, in which case ‘p cannot, ‘as a real essence must, determine 
the existence and identity conditions for y’ .
What is ‘chiefly remarkable’ about the conceivability argument is that we are 
supposed to know that no mental state has a particular type of brain state as its 
underlying essence by a priori reflection. As McGinn points out ‘it might well be 
thought that establishing a theoretical non-identity is just as empirical an exercise as 
establishing a theoretical identity’ .67 Elsewhere in the paper McGinn gives other 
related reasons to motivate the view that no physical real properties constitute the 
essences of psychological properties, chiefly that it only requires reflection on our 
common sense psychology to realise that reference to mental states is not constituted 
via implicit reference to intrinsic physical states but by reference to behaviour and 
introspection.68 Since there are no other grounds for attributing mental states, in 
other words mental states have no empirical depth, nothing science can tell us will 
overturn our attributions. We cannot be wrong about the nature of our mental states 
in the way that we may discover we are mistaken about something which we took to 
be a member of a natural kind (think of Kripke’s example of fool’s gold or Putnam’s 
example of mechanical cats) by finding out something about out physiology (which is 
not to say there are not other ways of finding out we were mistaken). These views are 
supposed to support the conceivability argument (‘the grounding claim [for the 
absence of psychophysical laws] come in two parts which are strictly inseparable’) and 
their persuasiveness is one with the persuasiveness of the conceivability argument. 
Indeed, McGinn claims more than that mental states have no real physical 
essence, he claims that they also do not have an essence which can be construed in 
terms of a hnctional role or a mental substance. McGinn has three objections to the 
view that mental states can be considered as natural kinds in virtue of their distinctive 
fiinctional roles. The first is the problem of holism: no mental state can be defined 
~ 
hhKripke: 1980: 116. 
67 McGinn 1991: 128. 
* See McGinn 199 1 : 146-52. 
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without defining the whole system to which it belongs. The second is that real 
essences ‘pertain to the constitution or internal structure of a kind, but fbnctional role 
is not like that’. The third is that functional states are specified in an n priori and 
definitional fashion, whereas essences are not. 69 
It might here be pointed that there are natural responses to the above 
objections if the psychological natural kind one is considering has cognitive modules 
as its members. Cognitive modules are fbnctional systems. Firstly, being modules 
entails that they are not holistic; they can be defined independently of other mental 
states as conditions (i), (iii) and (v) of Fodor’s modularity hypothesis emphasise. 
Secondly, we have seen that it is important that we do refer to the intrinsic properties 
of modules as conditions (vii), (viii) and (ix) of Fodor’s modularity hypothesis 
emphasise. Thirdly, cognitive modules are not individuated in a purely a priori 
fashion because we need to find out about the way they contribute to selection and 
this can only be done in an a posteriori fashion. To understand whether specific 
cognitive modules are realised by neural structures and zpso facto whether specific 
neural structures realise cognitive modules requires empirical investigation of the 
function of the supposed cognitive modules. This requires meeting all three of the 
above object ions. 
But these responses do not obviously touch on the conceivability argument. 
Could not cognitive modules and their physical realisations come apart? Amongst the 
modal intuitions Kripke discusses a pair are of most relevance here, namely that the 
mental state \v could exist without the physical state cp and that the physical state cp 
could exist without the mental state \Y .~ ’  McGinn agrees with the first but rejects the 
second. His reason for rejecting the second intuition is that if two creatures differ with 
respect to mental states then they will differ with respect to behavioural dispositions, 
and if they differ with respect to behavioural dispositions they will differ with respect 
to their dispositions to bodily movements, and if they differ with respect to their 
dispositions to bodily movements they will differ with respect to their internal physical 
states. Therefore two creatures cannot differ with respect to their mental states 
‘’ McGinn 1991: 134-6. 
’I’ Kripke 1980: 144-55. 
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without differing with respect to their physical states. A similar argument cannot be 
constructed against the first int~ition.’~ Nothing so far conceded to the conceivability 
argument precludes the contingent relation between the mental and physical states 
being a realisation relation, and the important thing about a realisation relation is that 
‘the range of physical states fit to realise a given mental state can be indefinitely 
various, subject perhaps to the fact that they preserve the causal powers and 
dispositions of the realised mental state’ .72 The multiple-realisation of mental states 
means that ‘no physical property could quali5 as the real essence of a mental state’. 
According to McGinn, ‘it is this feature of mental states [...I that lies behind Kripke’s 
intuition of contingency’. Moreover it is not just that tokens of particular types of 
mental state have been observed to be realised by different physical states but that 
tokens of particular types of mental state can be known to be so realised apriori. So 
the issue actually focuses not only on an empirical claim of multiple realisation but on 
a conceptual claim of multiple realisability. 
According to McGinn it is in virtue of the multiplicity of the realisation 
relation that the familiar model of reference fixing for natural kinds cannot be applied 
to psychological predicates. Even if a mental predicate is picked out by some feature 
or features, there will be no empirically discoverable essence which determines 
membership of the natural kind. (He uses this to buttress his objections to 
psychophysical laws.) Following fiom this MCGM argues that mental predicates do 
not involve other features of the KripkePutnam model of natural kinds: division of 
linguistic labour, significant regrouping and theoretical eli~nination.’~ 
One might think again of cognitive modules here. There seems good reason to 
think that our talk about them will depend on a certain division of linguistic labour 
between experts and non-experts. Only experts will be able to tell us what cognitive 
modules there really are. Indeed fbrther research might even indicate that the set of 
cognitive modules is an empty set. As a consequence of this significant regrouping 
and theoretical elimination of psychological terms might even result. So there seem to 
” McGinn 1991: 128. 
’’ McGinn 1991: 129. The multiple realisation of the mental on the physical derives from Putnam 
1%7. It has been elaborated in Fodor 1974 and More & Loewer 1989. 
73 McGinn 1991: 132-3. 
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be some psychological features, which are subject to other considerations of the 
KripkePutnam model of natural kind terms. 
But these responses do not obviously touch on the multiple realisability 
argument. One might think psychological properties are multiply realisable because 
they are in fact multiply realised. Putnam’s original argument supposes such. But that 
argument also supposes that we can characterise a psychological property with 
sufficient precision to then show that the psychological property is realised by 
different physical states. Functional states, or more precisely Turing machine states, 
were supposed to be such characterisations. When reasons to doubt the tenability of 
characterising fbnctional states in terms of Turing machine states arose Putnam 
suggested that fbnctional states should be characterised in terms of an ideal 
psychological ~cience.’~ A psychological theory does not ‘pretend to give a complete 
description of all of a human being’s psychological states’, nor does it ‘pretend to give 
all the causal relations between the psychological states’ .75 More recently Putnam has 
cast doubt on the plausibility of the ideal psychological theory that would be required 
to underpin finctionalism: ‘if there is an ideal psychological theory, that is, a theory 
that does everything that the functionalist wants a ‘description of human hnctional 
organisation’ to do (let alone a normal form for the description of the fbnctional 
organisation of an arbitrary organism) then there is no reason to believe that it would 
be within the capacity of human beings to discover The thought behind this is 
that any description of our capacities that we are able to formalise is a description of a 
set of capacities that we are able to go beyond. Indeed Putnam claims that ‘the 
property of being ‘a description of human fbnctional organisation’ is itself such an 
unclear property that the idea that there is such a description even if we cannot 
recognise it surely goes beyond the bounds of sense’. Those who advocate multiple 
realisability as a premise in their arguments still owe us an account of how 
psychological descriptions could be given such that it can be confirmed they are 
multiply realised (or multiply realisable). If Putnam is right then that debt not only has 
’‘ htnam 1975: chapter 14. 
’’ htnam 1994. 
7 6 ~ t n a m  1994. 
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not been repaid but cannot be repaid. To say pace McGinn that ‘mental concepts E...] 
obey their own distinctive principles of  application’ is not enough to show that the 
properties they are supposed to pick out are multiply realised or multiply realisable. In 
this case psychological natural kinds might have real physical essences. 
The present discussion arose originally from a modal intuition. It is worth 
looking at this modal intuition from another perspective, for this will help to 
understand the intuition behind multiple realisation. Levine has argued that the real 
upshot of Kripke’s modal intuitions is not a metaphysical consequence but an 
epistemological one.” With both a standard scientific identity statement and a 
mental-physical identity statement neither statement is known a priori. Therefore 
‘they are both imaginably false. Yet, if they are true, they are necessarily true - they 
are not even possibly false’. The issue as Levine points out is how we ‘reconcile the 
apparent contingency with the actual necessity’.78 Following Kripke this is easy to do 
in the case when ‘we think we are imagining a situation in which water is not H20, in 
fact we are imagining a situation in which some substance which behaves superficially 
like water - but is not water - is not H207. Thus the illusion of  contingency is 
explained. But a similar explanation cannot be given for the apparent contingency of 
the identity between a mental state and a brain state, ‘for to imagine a situation in 
which one is experiencing a state superficially like pain just is to imagine a situation in 
which one is experiencing pain’. ‘Conscious mental states are unlike external objects 
in that the standard distinction between how they appear and how they really are does 
not apply’. ’’ 
But all this establishes is the epistemological possibility that, for all we know, 
pain could exist without the underlying physical states it is in fact correlated with. 
But a hrther argument is still required to support the metaphysical thesis that pain 
does indeed exist in some possible world without the underlying physical states it is in 
the actual world correlated with. And, according to Levine, no good argument has 
been adduced to show this. Although the modal intuition does not bear the weight it 
-- 
Levine 1993. 
’* k i n e  1993: 122. 
19 Levine 1993: 122. 
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is supposed to it does nevertheless show us somethmg interesting. It shows us that we 
have no good explanation for a physicdmental identity in the way that we have for 
physical identities. As Levine observes: 'I see the disanalogy between the waterM20 
case and the paidC-fibre case in the fact that there is an apparent necessity that flows 
from the reduction of water to H20, a kind of necessity that is missing from the 
reduction of pain to the firing of C-fibres'. The reason for this is that 'if we consider 
the apparent contingency that attaches to [the physicaVmental identity J we notice that 
it works in both directions: it is equally conceivable that there should exist a pain 
without the firing of C-fibres, and the firing of C-fibres without pain. However the 
apparent contingency of [the physical identity] only works in one direction. [..I While 
it is conceivable that something other than H20 should manifest the superficial 
properties of water, as Kripke suggests, it is not conceivable that H20 should fail to 
manifest these properties (assuming, of course, that we keep the rest of chemistry 
constant)' .80 Whereas we have a chemical theory that explains the macro-properties 
of water, we have no such theory for the equivalent properties of mental states, such 
as the painfblness of pain. An explanatory gap exists between physical states and 
mental states.*' 
What gives rise to the modal intuition is not according to Levine the 
multiplicity of the realisation relation but our lack of understanding of the realisation 
relation.*' Indeed it is more plausible to think that the multiple realisability intuition 
arises from the modal intuition via the presence of an explanatory gap. However in 
order to substantiate the multiple realisability claim one actually needs an explanation. 
So once it again it appears that the multiple realisability claim relies on weak 
foundations. Closing the explanatory gap so defined would not necessarily resolve the 
multiple realisability question since all that would have been shown is how and why a 
psychological property is realised by one type of physical property. To resolve the 
"' Levine 1991: 128. 
*' The issue of the explanatory gap has received recent treatment from Tye 1999 and Block 1999. 
Tye argues that the initial plausibility of the explanatory gap arises from a conceptual confusion. 
Block argues for the plausibility of the gap but that no metaphysical consequences follow from it. 
" McGinn 1991 chapter one discusses the reasons for the explanatory gap. He argues that we are 
cognitively closed to the mechanism whereby consciousness is realised by the physical processes. 
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multiple realisability objection what needs to be shown in addition is how and why a 
psychological property can only be realised by one type o f  physical property 
Nevertheless it seems plausible to think that efforts to close the explanatory gap will 
also address the issue of multiple realisability. 
The presence of the explanatory gap indicates that the theories, in particular 
the hnctional theories, we have seem unable to mediate the physical and the 
psychological in such a way as to explain how the latter is realised by the former. One 
approach to closing the explanatory gap might be to show how we are mistaken in 
our intuitions about the explanatory gap. This would provide a general dissolution of  
the problem of the explanatory gap. Another approach is to consider solutions to 
particular problems of  the realisation of the psychological by the physical. Cognitive 
modules, if anything are, are the type of psychological entities which will be most 
amenable to explanation. If cognitive modules exist then there exist psychological 
entities the fbnction of which would be constrained in a way that central cognitive 
hnctions are not. 
Some suggestions were made in the previous sections in support of the view 
that modules could be characterised by a hnctional description. But if the hnction o f  
cognitive modules could be precisely characterised then why should cognitive 
modules not be multiply realised? There is an important respect in which the view of  
cognitive modules as members of a natural kind outlined in the previous section does 
not fit with KripkeButnam model. The essential properties of  cognitive modules yira 
psychological states are not only local physical properties as they are with other 
physical kinds; they include relational properties. The presence of  relational properties 
has two consequences. Firstly as an empirical matter these factors will provide firther 
constraints on what could realise a cognitive module. Only physical states which have 
been subject to evolution will constitute cognitive modules 4ua members of a natural 
kind. And not just anything will be able to evolve into a cognitive module: complex 
relations between genetic make-up and hence neural architecture and related factors in 
the environment are all required to constitute a member of a psychological natural 
kind. The properties, which individuate a psychological natural kind, will be much 
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more closely constrained than intuitions of multiple realisability suggest. But even if a 
given type of cognitive module were multiply realised, the second point is that this 
should not preclude one from thinking of its tokens members as members of a natural 
kind. The presence of local physical states coiitra McGinn though necessary are 
insufficient for membership of the psychological natural kind composed of all 
cognitive modules. Such is one way in which McGinn’s argument might be 
responded t 0. 
A second objection to psychological natural kinds has been developed by G m .  
Kim‘s argument forms a response to a line of thought developed by F ~ d o r . * ~  
Although Fodor comes to a conclusion similar to that of McGinn, namely that if one 
assumes multiple-realisation then there can be no psychophysical laws, Fodor 
maintains the existence of psychological natural lunds and laws of the special sciences, 
which admit of exceptions. Fodor’s argument is intended to explicate the purpose and 
thereby the unity of science: the purpose of science is not to ‘find some natural kind 
of physics coextensive with each kind predicate of the special science. It is, rather, to 
explicate the physical mechanisms whereby events conform to the laws of the special 
sciences’. 85 
83 
Fodor’s argument runs as follows. Consider a law of the special sciences: SIX 
+ S2x (all events which consist of x’s being SI bring about events which consist of 
x’s being S2). A science is constituted by its ‘typical [kind] predicates, hence if S is a 
special science, SI and S2 are not predicates of basic In order for this 
special science law to be reducible to a law of physics, Plx -+ P ~ x ,  the predicates that 
figure in the former have to be reducible to those predicates that figure in the latter, 
that is to say reduction requires, as a necessary and sufficient condition, that these 
predicates of the special sciences be related to the predicates of physics by bridge laws 
Slx +-+ Plx and S2x ++ P ~ x .  These bridge laws express event identitiesg7 The token- 
identity of psychological and physical events permits the reduction of psychological 
83 Kim 1992, republished 1993, references will be to the later. 
*‘ Fodor 1974 reprinted 198 1, references will be to the later. 
”Fodor 1981: 138. 
86Fodor 1981: 128. 
‘‘ Fodor 1981: 129-30. 
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laws to the laws of physics. The problem as Fodor conceives it is that the taxonomies 
and generalisations of the special sciences are deployed without reference to the 
physical properties they are related to and it is plausible on empirical grounds that the 
natural kinds which figure in the generalisations of the special science can be realised 
by different kinds of physical events. It is plausible to think that psychological kinds 
are realised by a disjunction of physical kinds: SIX ++ Plx v P ~ x  v P;x v P,x. A better 
model o f  the unity of science must accommodate the fact that psychological 
generalisations such as Slx -+ S ~ X  are realised by disjunctive antecedents and 
consequents. Because disjunctions o f  kind predicates do not themselves count as kind 
predicates the ‘bridge statements’ connecting the special sciences and the basic 
sciences will not express laws. This model allows for exceptions to the generalisations 
of the special sciences; exceptions occur when a property Plx to which the antecedent 
of a special science law can be reduced is not lawfully related to another property in 
P. The upshot for Fodor is that there need not be any single physical law underlymg 
psychological laws, thus no physical natural kinds underlying psychological natural 
kinds. Psychological natural kinds and physical natural kinds are evidence of the fact 
that the world is divided up in different ways: ‘not all the kinds (not all the classes of 
things and events about which there are important, counterfactual supporting 
generalizations to make) are, or correspond to, physical kinds . 3 88 
Kim claims that considerations of multiple realisation (which he assumes for 
the sake of argument) rather than imply the autonomy of psychology undermines it: 
‘the popular view that psychology constitutes an autonomous special science, a 
doctrine heavily promoted in the wake of the multiple realisation inspired 
antireductionist dialectic, may in fact be inconsistent with the real implications of 
multiple realisation’. *’ Psychological predicates, so the multiple realisation argument 
goes, refer to states that can be realised by different physical states. We cannot take 
Fodor 1981: 133. Churchland 1985 also argues that natural lunds are kinds that figure in laws; 
natural kinds are law-bound kinds. Tdentification of natural kinds is basic because identification of 
laws is basic to science. Churchland argues against Fodor that since there are only a few basic 
scientific laws. there are only a few basic natural kinds. the rest are pragmatic kinds. (Churchland 
would anyway resist the notion of cognitive modules. see Churchland 1988, and therefore such an 
explanation for synaesthesia as has been given here.) 
” a m  1993: 311. 
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the disjunction of different types of neural bases of, say pain, as the singular base of 
pain because the disjunction does not form a natural kind. The reason, as Kirn 
explains, is that each disjunct would have different causal powers and thus enter into 
diverse causal laws. Jade turns out not to be a kind because it is comprised of two 
distinct minerals, jadeite and nephrite, each having dissimilar molecular structures and 
thus different dispositional properties. Psychological kinds like pain would be the 
same. Two plausible principles then lead Kirn to the view that the irreducibility of 
psychology is not the right conclusion to draw. The first principle is the principle of 
the causal individuation of kinds: ‘objects and events fall under a kind, or share in a 
property, insofar as they have similar causal powers’.’’ According to this principle 
each predicate of the disjunction should be considered as a member of a distinct 
natural kind in virtue of its own distinctive causal properties. The second principle is 
the causal inheritance principle: ‘If mental property M is realised in a system at t in 
virtue of physical realisation base P, the causal powers of this instance of M are 
identical with the causal powers of P’. What Kirn takes to be the true consequence of 
multiple realisability follows: the laws of psychology may be locally reducible to 
divergent physical laws but this does not imply that psychological kinds are kinds 
because they have anythmg intrinsic in common. Either mental kinds are themselves 
disjunctive kinds or mental kinds are not real kinds at all (‘mental irrealism’). 
Kirn presupposes that casual properties determine kinds and that the relevant 
kind of causal properties are determined by properties of local physical states. 
Suppose we attributed the possession of cognitive modules to different species. If it 
turned out that each of these species realised cognitive modules via different physical 
states then according to Kirn we would in fact have species-specific psychological 
kinds not a ‘proper natural lund’. But cognitive modules, so it has been argued, are 
also to be individuated in terms of non-local causal properties. So even if cognitive 
modules are realised by different physical systems there is no reason to think that they 
cannot be members of the Same psychological kind if they knction in the same way 
with respect to their environments. And by the same reasoning two psychological 
~ 
”Kim 1993: 326. 
states which are realised by physical systems having the same local causal powers can 
differ with respect to their membership of a psychological natural kind. Consider the 
classic thought experiment refitted: synaesthetes in an environment in which their 
synaesthetic experiences conferred fitness and synaesthetes in an environment in 
which they did not. Only in the first case would synaesthesia be a process, which was 
mediated by a cognitive module, and thus mediated by a member of a psychological 
natural kind. 
One final thought. There might be an interesting parallel between the 
psychological natural kind discussed here and other natural kinds concerning the issue 
of higher-order natural kinds. At the focus of discussions of natural kinds are usually 
the underlying properties of an item. On such a view biological species would count 
as a natural kind in virtue of its underlying genotype; a chemical element would count 
as a natural kind in virtue of its underlying atomic number; and a hndamental physical 
particle would count as a basic natural kind. The difficulties with this view are well- 
known: members of biological species have different genotypes, chemical element s 
can have different isotopes and hndarnental physical particles can have opposite 
parities. It might be that we should look to the way these natural kinds belong to 
higher-order natural kmds. A biological species, such as panthem le0 or panthem 
tjgris, might be counted as a natural kind in virtue of the properties it has in common 
with other species, such as the propensity of its members to attempt reproduction; a 
chemical element, such as hydrogen or gold, might count as a natural kind in virtue of 
the properties it has in common with other chemical elements, such as the propensity 
to have a hll outer electron shell; and hndamental physical particles, such as 
electrons and positrons, might count as basic natural kinds in virtue of the properties 
they have in common with other hndamental physical particles, such as the propensity 
to combine according to the laws of quantum electrodynamics. 
This need not be in conflict with more traditional accounts of natural kinds; it 
may even be that these higher order properties are to be explained in terms of 
underlying properties. It seems likely that the propensity of the members of a species 
to attempt reproduction depends upon a commonality in their genotypes. One should 
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reckon underlying properties as constituting natural kinds in so far as they make sense 
of those scientifically interesting common properties of a natural kind. Relatedly, it 
might be that psychological natural kinds are so only because they belong to a higher- 
order natural kind, which is individuated by reference to the laws they instantiate. In 
this respect the language input system and the synaesthesia input system would both 
count as first-order natural kinds because they have properties in common which 
allow their membershp of a second-order natural kind. That property would be 




Character of Synaesthetic 
3.1 f i e  Composition of Phenomenal Character 
Suppose you hear a bell chime. Suppose you then turn and see the bell. You would, 
in each case, be the subject of a different h n d  of experience. For any such conscious 
perceptual experience it is generally accepted that there is something distinctive it is 
like for a percipient to undergo that perceptual experience: perceptual experiences 
have a phenomenal (or, alternatively speaking, a qualitative) character. Gesturing at a 
definition of the phenomenal character of experience is easy enough, explaining it has 
proved rather more difficult. 
Synaesthesia, as a distinctive type of cross-modal association, has already been 
defined. Chapter two has also given a provisional explanation for it as a breakdown in 
certain properties of modularity . However the phenomenal character of synaesthesia 
was only marginally discussed in the context of the shallow outputs of modules in 
section 2.2. If synaesthesia occurs when the stimulation of one sensory modality 
automatically triggers an additional character of experience that would normally be 
triggered by the stimulation o f  a second sensory modality how is the phenomenal 
character of such synaesthetic experience to be explained? How, for instance, is the 
experience of a particular colour which is produced on hearing a bell chiming to be 
explained? And is an answer to this question of any relevance to the issue of the 
phenomenal character of experience more generally? 
Gray et. ul argue that synaesthesia might inform us about consciousness.' 
More specifically their aim is to provide empirical evidence to help decide between a 
number of competing hypotheses about what underlies conscious experience: whether 
' Gray et. al. 1997. 
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specific neural properties, or specific information processing properties or both types 
o f  properties. They note two possible explanations for synaesthesia: ‘there are 
permanent neural connections between modalities which are not normally present’ or 
there are ‘learned associations between stimuli’ .* They suggest that information 
processing models might presuppose the formation of learnt associations between 
stimuli, and that these processes might be multiply realised, in contrast to models 
advocating the necessity o f  specific neural states. They hrther suggest an 
experimental design, which might either allow them to decide between these two 
potential explanations or show that they cannot be differentiated. Their thought is that 
if the phenomenal character of synaesthetic experience is shown to be dependent on 
hard-wiring, rather than on learnt associations, then it may be the case that the 
‘particular features that characterise specific conscious experiences depend upon 
neural events, not upon information processing. If correct, this inference would 
hrther imply that much current effort to explain consciousness by appeal to 
information transactions that go on in non-neural systems, such as computers is 
fbndamentally misdirected. ’3 
One might question the distinction they raise between neural properties and 
information processing properties. Explanations in terms o f  neural properties and 
information processing properties are not necessarily exclusive; the modularity 
hypothesis (which they even refer to) is an avowedly information processing model 
which also presupposes some sort of specific neural hard-wiring. Even if the results of  
their experiments were to indicate specific neural hard-wiring, it is not clear that this 
would tell us anything directly about the respective merits of the two theories o f  
conscious experience they see as in competition. The reasons for this lie with the 
conclusions of  the argument of  the previous chapter. If the EM thesis is correct then 
there would be extra neural hard-wiring which realises specific informational 
processes. Alternatively, if the BM thesis is right then there would just be extra neural 
hardwiring. But this would not tell us anything about the information processing 
capabilities of the rest of  the brain. The additional neural hard-wiring would only 
Gtav et nl. 1 997: 178-9. 
Gray et al. 1997: 17940. 3 
n e  Phenomenal Character of Synaesthetic Experience 109 
provide one causal factor in the explanation of the particular additional characters of 
experience synaesthetes enjoy. Significantly it would not include the other factors 
(arguably the relevant factors to be discussed in the present chapter) which would also 
be required to explain why the experiences of e.g. coloured hearing have the 
phenomenal characters they do. On the other hand, if synaesthesia were found to be 
realised by learnt associations rather than neural hard-wiring, this would not be 
sufficient to dispose of the necessity of specific neural states as realising states for 
those associations. The issue they may really want to broach is that of multiple- 
realisability . But this is not addressed by experiments however carefdly de~igned.~ 
None of this is to say that synaesthesia may not inform us about features of conscious 
experience. In the present section the focus is on what synaesthesia can tell us about 
the phenomenal character of experience. 
Most philosophers accept that some mental states involve representational 
contents; the preceding chapter was premised on such a view. Most philosophers also 
believe that perception represents the world to be a certain way: ‘Perceptual 
experience represents a particular environment of the perceiver. Normally, a perceiver 
uses this representation as his or her representation of the environment. [...I This 
representation is used as the perceiver’s belief about the environment’ Some 
philosophers claim, more contentiously, that all mental facts are representational facts, 
hence even perceptual experience is to be explained in terms of how it represents the 
properties of things to be. As Dretske puts it: ‘If, in accordance with the 
Representational Thesis, we think of all mental facts as representational facts, the 
quality of experience, how things seem to us at the sensory level, is constituted by the 
properties things are represented as having. My experience of an object is the totality 
of ways that object appears to me, and the way an object appears to me is the way my 
senses represent it. ’6 
Theories dealing with the phenomenal character of experience have tended to 
Even if experiments could show that specific neural states were required for conscious experiences 
it is implausible to think that the brute correlation would do much to explain how those states 
actually caused conscious experience. 
’ Harman 1990, reprinted 1999: 258. 
Dretske 1995: 1 .  
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polarise about two positions. Ned Block claims that ‘the greatest chasm in the 
philosophy of mind - maybe even all of philosophy - divides two perspectives on 
consciousness’.’ The two perspectives are divided on one central issue. They differ 
on ‘whether there is anything in the phenomenal character of experience that goes 
beyond the intentional, the cognitive and the hnctional’. One can appreciate the 
importance of the issue by seeing how it connects with the issue of consciousness, 
which has itself occupied much attention in recent philosophy of mind. Progress on 
the issue of consciousness, specifically on the issue of why and how we have 
conscious experience, depends on the resolution of the issue of how the content of 
conscious experience is itself constituted. (It makes little sense to think there could be 
conscious experience without there being a content to the conscious experience.) If 
conscious experience is constituted by some property, which goes beyond ‘the 
intentional, the cognitive and the hnctional’, then any theory of  why and how we 
have conscious experience must accommodate that fact. 
Block adopts the term ‘qualia’ as a convenient terminological handle on the 
dispute: ‘Those who think that the phenomenal character of  conscious experience go 
beyond the intentional, the cognitive and the hnctional are said to believe in 
qualitative properties of conscious experience, or qualia for short’. This is a distinct 
usage; some philosophers use the term ‘qualia’ in a more general way to talk of the 
phenomenal character of experience. Few philosophers deny that experience has a 
phenomenal character. On that usage few philosophers deny that there are qualia? 
Many more philosophers deny that experience involves qualia in the way Block 
defines the term. Block’s specific usage o f  the term ‘qualia’ is the one to be followed 
here. Block himself accepts the existence of qualia and therefore denies that 
representational content is all there is to the phenomenal character of experience. 
Following Block I shall sometimes refer to those who hold a similar view 
‘ phenomenists’ .’ 
1 Block forthcoming. 
* If one construes the term ‘qualia’ this way then one would want to distingursh between qualia 
realists and qualia irrealists. 
Some philosophers might postulate sensedata when relatedly defined as subjective objects of 
experience (particulars). I shall focus on subjective properties (universals) rather than subjective 
9 
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The previous chapter argued for broadly externalist considerations about the 
nature of synaesthesia by arguing that the modularity hypothesis should be construed 
in terms of teleofbnctional properties. Many phlosophers opt for a related externalist 
explanation for the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. Such externalists 
argue that the local physical states of the subject’s perceptual systems are the vehicles 
of perceptual experience they are because they have evolved to represent properties of 
objects external to them. Furthermore, such externalists argue that, although the local 
physical states of the subject’s perceptual systems are the vehicles of perceptual 
experience, the distinctive phenomenal characters of perceptual experiences are 
dependent for their constitution upon states beyond the local physical states of the 
subject’s perceptual systems. The local physical states of our perceptual systems may 
represent certain external properties of objects, but it is nevertheless the properties 
represented that detennine the phenomenal character of experience. I shall refer to the 
view that the phenomenal character of experience is constituted (and exhaustively 
explained) in this way by the properties objects are represented as having ‘externalist 
representationism’ (ER for short). For advocates of ER or (ER-ists for short) the 
phenomenal character of experience of the bell chiming is exhaustively explained by 
the properties the bell is represented as having. 
ER is not the only possible explanation of the phenomenal character of 
experience, which adverts to the phenomenal properties of objects. Some 
philosophers argue that the distinctive phenomenal characters of perceptual 
experiences are to be exhaustively accounted for by the properties objects present to 
percipients. I shall call this view ‘presentationism’ or ‘EP’ for short. For the EP-ist the 
phenomenal character of experience of the bell chiming is constituted by properties of 
the object, which the object presents when it is heard. The difference between ER 
and EP is most clearly seen, as will become apparent in 3.6, in their treatment of non- 
veridical experience. 
For phenomenists, ia contrast with ER-ists, there is a need to postulate 
objects here. If the subjective property theory can be challenged then it makes it all the more likely 
that the subjective sensedata theory be challenged. The differences are largely domestic issues for an 
anti-representationist point of view. The sensedata view will be further touched on later in relation 
to synaesthesia and adverbialism. 
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intrinsic properties of experience, which supervene on local physical states of the 
percipient, so-called ‘qualia’, to account for the individuation of the character of 
perceptual experience. It is for this reason that phenomenists can be classified as 
‘internaiists’ with respect to the issue of the constitutive properties of the phenomenal 
character of experience. It is because of certain qualia that our experiences of the 
sounds of  bells are like they are and it is because of other qualia that our visual 
experiences of bells are like they are. 
One way, which is typically used to explain qualia, is by analogy, but this 
might not be the best way.” We might compare our visual experience of the world 
with a photograph. A photograph represents the world in virtue of the causal 
relationship between some of its properties and the properties of the world it is 
representing. Presumably our visual experience of the world also represents the world 
in virtue of the causal relationship between some of the properties of our visual 
systems and the properties of the world our visual systems are representing. Suppose 
we compare our visual experience of a bell with a photograph of the bell. There are 
properties of the photograph, which are clearly distinct from the properties of the bell, 
in particular, there are the coloured pigments o f  the photographic paper. In order to 
reproduce the phenomenal properties of the bell the photograph utilises its own 
phenomenal properties. The phenomenist argues that mental representations are like 
non-mental representations in this respect; they too require local vehicles of 
representation, which themselves have qualitative properties, in order to represent the 
properties of distal objects of perception. In Ned Block’s terminology, there is nierital 
ink. As such, for phenomenists, the medium of mental representation is opaque. By 
contrast, according to ER-ists, the medium of mental representation is transparent. 
What would be a related representation of our auditory experience of the original 
sound of the bell? Perhaps a digital recording of the sound of the bell. A digital 
recording represents the world in virtue of the causal relationship between some of its 
properties and the properties of the world it is representing. It is not nearly so clear 
(and I take it that we are considering the highest quality of digital replication) that 
’(’ See for example Wager 1999, and Martin forthcoming. 
The Phenomenal Character of Synaesthetic Experience 1 13 
there is an opaque local vehicle of representation for the representation of the 
phenomenal properties of the original sound of the bell: the replicated sound is better 
construed as the same type of sound as the original sound. But if this is so then why 
not also construe the photograph as having the same type of visible properties as the 
bell? Since any intrinsic properties our visual experiences might have (i.e. qualia) are 
surely not also visible properties the analogy collapses. One might try to press the 
difference between a photograph and a recording thus: properties of a metal disk can 
constitute a representation of properties of sound, but a photograph has phenomenal 
properties similar to those it represents. The thought would be that we can only know 
that a metal disk is a representation of a sound when we have the facilities to play it, 
but a photograph displays its representational properties openly. In response it might 
be pointed out that we only appreciate that a photograph is a representation because 
most of us have the requisite optical equipment. The different ways photographs and 
recordings become representations for us neither help motivate nor help explain the 
existence of qualia. Qualia can only be introduced on more substantial grounds. 
Dretske above presents an identity claim: ‘My experience of an object is the 
totality of ways that object appears to me, and the way an object appears to me is the 
way my senses represent it’. Tye also advocates an identity claim. His own 
representationist theory of phenomenal character has the acronym PANIC. The 
acronym and the implications of the identity claim are summarised in the following 
passage: 
The PANIC theory of phenomenal character: phenomenal character is one and the same 
as Poised Abstract Nonconceptual Intentional Content [...I It follows that 
representations that lffer in their PANICS differ in their phenomenal character, and 
representations that are aldse with respect to their PANICS are alike in their phenomenal 
character. ’ ’ 
According to Tye phenomenal character is representational content, which is 
appropriately ‘poised’ to make an impact on the belieodesire system. Cognitive 
processes can be broadly diwded into two: modular processes which generate 
representational contents ‘in a mechanical fashion by computational processes’ and 
Tye 1995: 137-8. 
processes of  the beliefldesire system which operate on the contents provided by 
modular processes by using concepts. Conscious perceptual experience requires both: 
the output of  modular processes must be subsumed under concepts for conscious 
perceptual experience. Tye and other ER-ists acknowledge the difference between 
experiences and other mental states. The difference is not to be explained by rejecting 
the representational nature o f  experiential states but by explaining what makes 
experiential states distinct: the states underlying central processes are digital, whereas 
the states underlying perceptual experiences are analogue. l2 Poised content is also 
‘abstract’ in so far as no particular concrete objects enter into the representation; 
different objects can appear exactly sirnilar.l3 It is ‘nonconceptual’ in that the subject 
does not require matching concepts; we can discriminate more shades of  colour than 
we have concepts for in our higher processing cognitive systems.14 
In order to challenge the identity claim it has to be shown either that the one 
phenomenal character of experience can be related to distinct representational 
contents or the one representational content can be related to distinct phenomenal 
characters. The relationship between representational content and phenomenal 
character is sometimes characterised by a weaker supervenience claim. 
Supervenience claims permit multiple-realisation: one type of character o f  experience 
can be realised by different types of  representational states. What is prohibited by a 
supervenience claim is that different types o f  phenomenal characters of experience are 
realised by the same type o f  representational state. Since it only takes a single 
counterexample in which representational states are relevantly alike with respect to 
their representational content but unlike with respect to their phenomenal character to 
undermine the representationist position (and at the same time show that there are 
qualia), phenomenists have invested considerable effort in looking for that 
” Tye 1995: 100-5. Dretske 1995: 22 says: ‘sensory systems have phylogenetic functions and are 
therefore comparatively modular in Fodor’s sense’. These are to be contrasted with conceptual 
representations. 5xh as thoughts, judgements and beliefs which are indicator functions acquired by 
the individual that can further group nonconceptual representations according to different uses. 
l 3  This view can be compared with what Fodor says of the depth of the shallow outputs of modules. 
In this respect EP-ists will disagree with ER-ists: there are no nonconceptual representations. EP- 
ists might explain the discriininations perceivers nlake between shades of colours in terms of 
demonstrative concepts. 
I4 
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count erexample. 
The next section clarifies the rationale behind ER by describing some of the 
counterexamples to the theories, which preceded it. It will also outline how ER can 
respond to the thought experiments, which have been devised to cast doubt on its 
own credibility. The question of what it is like to be a synaesthete is considered in 
section 3.3. I discuss the motivation behind the extra qualia argument suggested by 
synaesthesia, and also its development by Wager, in section 3.4. A response to the 
claim that the extra phenomenal character of synaesthetic experience cannot be 
explained in ways consistent with the responses outlined in the next section is given in 
3.5. Section 3.6 discusses an alternative response, that given by EP. 
3.2 A Real Test for neories of Phenomenal Character 
As Block notes although the debates about qualia have recently become more focused 
‘on the notion of representation E...] issues about hnctionalism [are] always in the 
background’. It used to be granted by many that types of psychological states should 
be identified with fbnctional state types. These hnctional state types would be realised 
by neural states in human beings, but they could be realised by other kinds of physical 
states in other kinds of beings. One particular difficulty with the type identification of 
psychological states with fbnctional state types is that it does not seem able to explain 
the phenomenal character of experience. In particular it is prone to the challenges 
raised by two thought experiments: the absent qualia argument and the inverted 
spectrum argument. 
The absent qualia argument is driven by the following thought experiment. 
Consider the possibility of two subjects, SI and Sz, who are by hypothesis in exactly 
the same type of fbnctional states (defined as the states relating input stimuli and 
behavioural output) but SI is a human being and S2 is a robot. According to some 
phenomenists it is possible for SI to undergo normal perceptual experiences whereas 
Sz has no such experiences. In this case it is possible for SI and S2 to be in the same 
hnctional states and yet have different phenomenal characters of experience: 
fbnctionalistn does not provide an adequate explanation for the phenomenal character 
o f  experience. 
Although the inference is valid the soundness o f  the argument is contestable. 
Shoemaker, for instance, argues that an account of  what it is for mental states to 
have phenomenal character will require an account of  what it is for one mental state 
to be in greater or lesser degrees similar in qualitative character to another mental 
state: ‘A creature fbnctionally just like a creature having qualitative states would 
itself have to have qualitative states, for it would have to have states standing in 
relations of qualitative similarity and difference to one another that are isomorphic 
with the relations of qualitative similarity and difference holding between the states of 
the creature that is its fimctional duplicate’. l5 
According to Shoemaker an account of qualia in terms of local fbnctional 
states can be given which responds to the absent qualia hypothesis, but, as he also 
claims, this does not require that individual qualia are fbnctionally definable. For such 
a fbnctional duplicate could be in the same relations of  qualitative similarity and 
difference even if her qualia were inverted. So one might still have to countenance 
qualia in virtue of the possibility of inverted spectra. Shoemaker endorses a fbnctional 
account of the phenomenal character of experience, although this would not 
constitute an exhaustive account o f  the phenomenal character of experience, for he 
maintains that we must postulate qualia to accommodate the possibility o f  inverted 
spectra. l 6  
The inverted spectrum hypothesis if valid would refbte the type identification 
fbnctionalism seeks in so far as two subjects the same with respect to their fbnctional 
states would be different with respect to the phenomenal characters of  their 
experiences. Hannan states the challenge provided by the inverted spectra argument 
’ Shoemaker 1991. reprinted 1996: 12 1-2. 
See also Shoemaker 1982 and 1994. Discussion of the absent qualia argument can be found in 
Block 1980. a r k  1991 and Tye 1995. The absent qualia argument should be distinguished from the 
zombie argument. such as is discussed in Kirk 1973, 1994 and 1999 and Chalmers 1996. The latter 
claims that SI and S2 can be in similar microphysical states and yet SI can have experiences whilst S2 
does not. The absent qualia argument is usually taken to constitute a challenge to functionalism, the 
zombie argument is usually taken to constitute a challenge to physicalism. Whereas the absent 
qualia argument need not be a challenge to physicalism, the zombie argument would also constitute 
a challenge to functionalism. 
16 
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thus. ’It is conceivable that two people should have similarly fbnctioning visual 
systems despite the fact that things that look red to one person look green to the 
other, and things that look yellow to the first person look blue to the second, and so 
forth’.’’ If this is true then ‘an important aspect of a person’s mental life cannot be 
explicated in purely functional terms’. It is difficult to set the argument up in a way 
which does not beg the question, but the supposition phenomenists make (and 
hnctionalists should grant) is that how things look depend on local brain states and 
the two individuals under consideration are inverted with respect to the local brain 
states which are causally related to red and green things upstream and to speech 
outputs about red and green things downstream. Consider Tilly and Annie. For Tilly 
red things cause neurons of type x to fire and green things cause neurons of type y to 
fire. When type x neurons fire they in turn bring about neural states which cause Tilly 
to talk about red things and when type y neurons fire they in turn bring about neural 
states which cause Tilly to talk about green thngs. However for Annie red things 
cause neurons of type y to fire and green things cause neurons of type x to fire. But 
when type y neurons fire they in turn bring about neural states, which cause Annie to 
talk about red things, and when type x neurons fire they in turn bring about neural 
states which cause Annie to talk about green things. Thus Tilly and Annie seem to 
have the same finctional states when these are construed as relating input stimuli and 
behavioural output, but by hypothesis they are inverted with respect to the 
phenomenal character of their experiences. Harman deals with the challenge by 
reminding us that perceptual experiences naturally give rise to beliefs, which in turn 
guide our actions. Since by hypothesis everything is functioning in Tilly and Annie ‘in 
the normal way’, in particular how things look to them gives rise to beliefs about how 
things look to them, they must have different beliefs about how things look to them. 
This would be enough to constitute a hnctional difference between them. 
Furthermore Tilly and Annie must mean something different when they express their 
beliefs about the colour of objects: when they both express their beliefs about a 
strawberry by saying ‘it is red’ and their beliefs about grass by saying ‘it is green’ they 
Harman 1990. reprinted 1999: 257-8. 
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must ‘mean something different by their colour words’. For functionalists this too 
would constitute a hnctional difference. The upshot is that if two people could be 
inverted with respect to the phenomenal character of their experiences owing to 
differences in brain wiring they would also have to be in different hnctional states.” 
In order to evade the problems raised against the intersubjective inversion 
argument some philosophers have advocated the possibility of intrasubjective 
inversion. l9  The intrasubjective spectrum inversion argument supposes that someone, 
let us say Simon, has experiences having a certain phenomenal character at tl. At t 2  
Simon’s nerves are so altered that the phenomenal character of his experience is 
inverted. At t 3  Simon comes to hnction in the same way as he did at t l  before his 
nerves were altered. By t4 he has forgotten that the phenomenal character of his 
experiences are inverted. Therefore Simon could be in a similar hnctional state at t j  
as he was at tl and yet the phenomenal character of his experience at t4 would be 
inverted with respect to the phenomenal character of his experiences at tl. Objections 
have been made to each of these steps: it is not clear that nerves could be so altered 
that the experiences would be inverted; it is not clear that Simon could come to 
hnction in the way that he did at tl unless the phenomenal character of his 
experiences reverted to how they were; and it is not clear that he could forget that 
these experiences were inverted. 
The hnctionalist explains differences in phenomenal Character of experience in 
terms of differences in functional states which are themselves construed in terms of 
the causal relations between other mental states (beliefs, desires etc.). The difference 
between the phenomenal characters enabled in seeing red and seeing green objects 
may be explained, for instance, in terms of the different beliefs and desires of the 
perceiver. Such a view could also be considered a representationist view. Someone 
could reject the view that the phenomenal 
to resist the inverted spectra argument by pointing 
who held such a view of fbnctionalism 
’* This is one standard tactic for functionalists. 
out some functional difference between subjects which had not been considered in the argument. 
Recent incarnations of the inverted spectrum argument can be found in Block & Fodor 1972. Block 
1980. Shoemaker 1982, 1990 & 1991, Kirk 1995, Tye 1995 and Dretske 1995. 
l 9  Lycan 1973 introduces nerve switching intrasubjective inversion and Shoemaker 1982 develops 
the idea. 
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character of experience is constituted by phenomenal properties of objects. All they 
would have to hold is that the phenomenal character of experience is its narrow 
intentional content, that is to say intentional content that is ‘in the head’. Creatures, 
which were the same with respect to their local brain states, would be in the same 
representational states. We could call such representationism ‘internalist 
representationism’. Such representationists would also resist the view that the 
phenomenal character of experience is constituted by qualia. The problem with 
identiGing the phenomenal character of experience with narrow intentional content is 
that one is committed to finding a difference in function whenever there is a difference 
in phenomenal character of experience. Block has argued that it is not difficult to 
come up with a case in which there is no difference with respect to function but there 
is plausibly some difference with respect to phenomenal character. He asks us to 
consider a child named ‘Eliza’ raised in a room in which all coloured surfaces are 
changed every few minutes. She will have ‘no associations or behavioural inclinations 
or dispositions towards red that are any different fi-om her associations or inclinations 
or dispositions towards blue’ but will still plausibly experience different colours. 2o He 
admits that whether the child has any functional differences (e.g. she responds innately 
to red and blue in different ways) is actually an open empirical questions, but that 
there are possible scenarios where these asymmetries could be ‘ironed out’. 
This objection and all of the above objections could be accounted for if one 
were to postulate qualia. That is the point of the thought experiments. But they can 
also be explained by ER. The view has been labelled ‘wide hnctionalism’.21 ER-ists 
accept the view that the brain realises fbnctional states. But they are not committed to 
the view that differences in phenomenal character have to be exhaustively explained in 
terms of local hnctional differences; they must at least partly be explained by 
differences in the properties of objects represented. The ER& will respond to the 
thought experiment in the preceding paragraph by saying that the phenomenal 
character of Eliza’s experience is cnnstituted not only by the functional states 
(construed as relations between local states) but by the changing colours of the 
”’ Block forthcoming. 
” Harman 1988. 
objects which it is the function of the brain to represent. 
One spur to the development of ER has been the objections raised by the 
thought experiments outlined in the preceding paragraphs. Although the fbnctionalist 
can in many cases provide responses to the objections ER, so it is claimed, can 
provide responses to all of them. It can provide an answer to the most recent thought 
experiment outlined above which troubled the fbnctionalist . The distinction between 
ER and fbnctionalism can also be seen in the way the former responds to the other 
thought experiments. Functionalism presupposes that physical duplicates are 
hnctional duplicates and, both fbnctional duplicates and physical duplicates have the 
same type of characters of experiences. ER by contrast claims that it is possible for 
physical duplicates to instantiate different representational states and therefore to 
enjoy different types of characters of experiences. Two creatures having identical 
physical states could be in different representational states if their fbnctional states are 
construed ‘widely’. To see how this response works, consider Dretske’s reply to the 
absent qualia argument. Dretske claims that absent qualia are possible; we only 
believe that a physical duplicate constituted by a freak accident would have the same 
type of characters of experiences as we do because we ignore the fact that ‘the 
resemblance in both appearance and placement is (by hypothesis) completely 
fortuitous’. He calls this the ‘Paley Syndrome’, for the reason that we sometimes 
illicitly infer fbnction from superficial resemblances. But according to Dretske we 
should only attribute sameness of hnction when we know there is a sameness in 
design or purpose. Whether physical duplicates have the same type of characters of 
experience depends on whether they have the same evolutionary histories.” 
Tye also argues that whilst absent qualia would be a threat to fbnctionalism 
they would be one of the consequences of ER. He responds in a similar way to 
Dretske; ‘if the thesis that the phenomenal supervenes on the neural is false: it is 
metaphysically possible for microphysical duplicates to differ phenomenally’ ? The 
example Tye offers-is of physical duplicates (primitive creatures) living on different 
planets. The first has sensory organs, which could respond to a variety of types of 
?-’ Dretske 1995: 141-51. 
13 Tye 1995: 194. 
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stimuli if they were present in the environment, but happens to respond to only one 
type of stimuli because that is the only appropriate stimulus available in the 
environment. These other possible stimuli are present in the environment of its 
physical duplicate, and it does respond to them. But the second creature will not enjoy 
phenomenal characters of experience because the brain states it is in will not be 
causally related to a single type of feature in the environment. The idea is that causal 
covariations between states of creatures and properties of objects will constitute 
states of the creature having determinate phenomenal characters only if optimal 
conditions obtain. Optimal conditions will obtain if the causal covariation is one-one; 
they will not obtain if the causal covkation is one-many. Although ‘zombies are 
possible [. . .] zombie replicas with identical causal histories and identical environments 
are not’.24 
ER responds to the inverted spectra argument in a related way: it is possible 
for physical duplicates to realise different characters of experience.*’ Note in this 
scenario the possibility of inverted spectra is explained without presupposing the 
supervenience of character on local brain states. Inverted spectra are possible if ‘the 
evolutionary histories and natural habitats of the two creatures are different, and the 
brain states that realise sensations in the first creature are causally correlated with 
different features from those the same brain states are causally correlated with in the 
second creature’. Here ‘maximal hnctional identity’ is lacking. 26 Dretske also believes 
that two creatures might be indistinguishable with respect to their discriminatory 
behaviour, and thus their hnctional states, and yet things might appear differently to 
the two creatures. The differences are explained by reference to the different 
properties of objects both creatures represent. 
Block accepts that the inverted spectrum argument may not provide the 
required motivation for the phenomenist position. Therefore he has extended the 
argument in the form of the Inverted Earth argument.27 Inverted Earth is a place 
where the colours of things are exactly reversed; the sky is yellow and grass is red. It 
~ 
” Tye 1995: 195. 
’’ Tye 1995: 201-6. 
‘‘ Tye 1995: 205. 
‘’ See Block 1990. 
is also a place where the names of things are reversed; the yellow sky is called ‘blue’ 
and the red grass is called ‘green’. The consequence of this is that people on Inverted 
Earth will call the yellow sky ‘blue’ and the red grass ‘green’. Interesting physical 
duplicates can be generated if we take one of a pair of twins on Earth, fit them with 
inverters (and change his body pigments) and transport him to Inverted Earth. He 
would experience the yellow sky on Inverted Earth as he would were he looking at 
the blue sky on Earth and call it ‘blue’ and he would experience the red grass as he 
would were he looking at the green grass on Earth and call it ‘green’. In having such 
experiences, so the argument goes, the twins would be in the same microphysical 
states, enjoy qualitatively identical characters of experience, and be disposed to utter 
the same words. In other words the duplicates would have the same holistic brain 
states, but they would be functionally different. Put to the test they would pick out 
different colour samples: one would pick out a blue colour sample and the other 
would pick out a yellow colour sample. And they would have different 
representational states in virtue of the difference in colour of the sky and the grass on 
the two planets, which is assumed to individuate representational content. 
The upshot is the converse of the inverted spectrum argument: in the inverted 
spectrum argument we are supposed to have the same hnctional state accompanied 
by different phenomenal characters, in the inverted Earth argument we are supposed 
to have the same phenomenal characters accompanied by different fbnctional and 
representational states. But this would be no problem for ER-ists, such as Tye, who 
admits that it is possible to have two states different with respect to wide fbnctional 
role and yet qualitatively identical with respect to the phenomenal character of 
experience. The physical or narrow functional state of the transported twin, which is 
associated with the phenomenal character of blue, may track yellow but it does not 
represent yellowness on Inverted Earth because the presence of inverting lenses 
precludes the constitutive causal covariation between the relevant brain state and the 
appropriate enviromgntal features. 
In each of these cases the representationist has a response. Thought 
experiments trade on differing intuitions about supervenience. Indeed the arguments 
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are built around these intuitions: ‘I confess to myself feeling the pull of the Internalist 
Intuition. Indeed, I would not have thought to question it but for the fact that unless it 
is challenged, an even more (for me) obvious fact must be rejected - the idea, namely, 
that what goes on in the mind [...] are nowhere to be found in the head’.28 We may 
well be better off considering real examples. But these seem equally contentious. 
Peacocke has argued that if two trees of the same size are viewed when one is 
twice as close as the other the visual experience will represent the trees as the same 
size although one will occupy more of the viewer’s visual field. As Tye has pointed 
out, it is not obvious that phenomenal character does outrun representational content 
because in this case (and others like it), although the two objects are being 
represented as being of the same size they are also being represented as being of 
different apparent sizes because they are also represented with respect to their 
positions relative to the per~eiver.’~ 
This is the point at which synaesthesia reappears. Wager has recently claimed 
that synaesthesia offers a different type of argument against ER.30 Synaesthesia is of 
interest because it offers a test to theories of the phenomenal mind by means of a real 
case, yet it is, at the same time, more akin to the thought experiments concerning 
unusual phenomenal character. 
3.3 m a t  Is It Like to Be a Synaesthete? 
Before outlining the way in which the test synaesthesia offers theories of phenomenal 
character might be turned into an argument for qualia, a preliminary question should 
be addressed: what is it like to--be a synaesthete? In other words, before considering 
the metaphysical aspects of what it is like to be a synaesthete, the epistemological 
issue of knowing what it is like to be synaesthetic needs to be broached. Two 
problems immediately arise. 
The first problem is that there are many forms of synaesthesia; even coloured 
’’ Dretske 1995: 151. 
39 Peacocke 1983: chapter 1 an& in response, Tye 1995: 155-9. 
3c’ Wager 1999. 
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hearing, the most common form of synaesthesia, has a number of varieties and there 
are fbrther variations within these varieties. So there is not a single answer to the 
question of  knowing what it is like to be a synaesthete. Despite this problem some 
general questions, which have a bearing on the metaphysical issue of the phenomenal 
character of  synaesthetic experience, can be isolated. 
The second problem is a particular instance of a general problem: one cannot 
know what it is like to undergo an experience unless one has undergone a similar 
experience. No doubt for reasons made familiar by Nagel there are limits to the 
knowledge non-synaesthetes can have of  what it is like to be a ~ynaesthete.~~ The
point is that only fellow synaesthetes who have undergone similar experiences, and 
perhaps their experiences are not that similar anyway, can understand what it is like to 
be synaesthetic. Nevertheless, even if this problem remains, the general questions 
alluded to in the previous paragraph can be used to try to reach some understanding 
of what it is like be a synaesthete. 
Let us start with a third-hand account o f  the phenomenal character of  
synaesthetic experience. It is drawn from a celebrated study conducted by Luria on 
subject S: 
Presented with a tone pitched at 30 hertz and having an amplitude of 100 decibels, S 
stated that at first he saw a strip of 12-15 centimetres in width the colour of old, 
tarnished silver. Gradually this strip narrowed and seemed to recede; then it was 
converted into an object that glistened like steel. Then the tone took on a colour one 
associates with twilight, the sound continuing to dazzle because of the silven gleam it 
shed. 
Presented with a tone pitched at 50 hertz and an amplitude of 100 decibels, S saw a 
brown strip against a dark background that had red, tongue-like edges. The sense of 
taste he experienced was llke that of sweet and sour borscht, a sensation that gripped 
hs entire tongue. 
Presented with a tone pitched at 100 hertz and having an amplitude of 86 decibels, he 
saw a wide strip that appeared to have a reddish- orange hue in the centre; from the 
centre outwards the brightness faded with light gradations so that the edges of the strip 
appeared pink. 
Nagel 1974 argues that we can only know what it is like to be another subject of experience if we 
have undergone relevantly similar experiences. But for reasons given in response to Jackson 1982 it 
is arguable whether this has any metaphysical consequences. See Lewis 1986, Loar 1990, Tye 1995 
and Sturgeon 1997. 
31 
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Presented with a tone pitched at 250 hertz and having an amplitude of 64 decibels, S 
saw a velvet chord with fibres jumng out on all sides. The chord was tinged with a 
delicate, pleasant pmk-orange hue. 
Presented with a tone pitched at 500 hertz and having an amplitude of 100 decibels. he 
saw a streak of lightning splitting the heavens in two. When the intensity of the sound 
was lowered to 74 decibels. he saw a dense orange colour which made him feel as 
though a needle had been thrust into his spine. Gradually this sensation diminished. 
Presented with a tone pitched at 2000 hertz and having an amplitude of  113 decibels, S 
said: ‘It looks something llke fireworks tinged with a pink-red hue. The strip of colour 
feels rough and unpleasant, and it has an ugly taste - rather like that of briny pickle ... 
You could put your hand on this.’ 
Presented with a tone pitched at 3000 hertz and having an amplitude of 128 decibels, he 
saw a whsk broom that was of a fiery colour, whle the rod attached to the whisks 
seemed to be scattering off into fiery points. 
The experiments were repeated during several days and invariably the same stimuli 
produced identical experiences. 32 
It might be argued that synaesthetes’ do not really experience that which they 
ascribe to themselves. Synaesthetes’ experiences not only clash with those of the 
majority of other perceivers, they also clash with each other’s experiences: whereas a 
sound is reported as evoking a red colour for one synaesthete it might evoke a silver 
colour for another synaesthete. (It is not as if synaesthetes might all have access to 
the same reality - a reality which normal subjects do not have access to.) Why should 
their testimony be believed? 
As discussed in the first chapter there are three things, which support the 
truthfblness of synaesthetes’ testimony. Firstly, the evidence from brain scans shows 
that additional brain areas are activated in synaesthetic experience. The areas of the 
brain additionally activated in coloured hearing synaesthesia are typically those that 
are normally activated when subjects are processing representations of visible 
properties, supporting the view that the synaesthetic experiences produced by 
auditory stimuli are indeed of colour.33 Secondly, experiments camed out by Baron- 
Cohen et d. show that synaesthetes’ reports of the colours different sounds of words 
enable are significantly more consistent over time than those of non-synaesthetes who 
are asked to associate the soulld of words with particular And thirdly, 
33 Luria 1968: 24. 
’’ See Paulesu et al. 1995, also chapters one and two. 
See Baron-Cohen et al. 1993, also chapter one and two. 31 
genetics studies indicate a genetic component for synaesthesia. Although this does not 
directly corroborate the reports of synaesthetes (the genetic component might be 
responsible in another way for their reports; it might make them all inveterate liars in 
this respect), given the two other sources of evidence there is good reason to think 
that synaesthesia is a genuine and distinctive phen~menon.’~ 
Even if we take this report at face value it does not tell us exactly what it is 
like to be a synaesthete. Johnston in a discussion of Scriabin who, it is sometimes 
claimed, was synaesthetic suggests two possibilities concerning what it was like to be 
Scriabin. Scriabin supposedly experienced colours in response to hearing sounds. 
According to Johnston one might consider: ‘whether the visual experiences he had 
when he heard B-flat presented themselves as revelations of the nature of B-flat, a 
nature missed by all great musicians except Scriabin, or whether these experiences 
simply seemed to Scriabin to be the ‘visual signatures’ of B-flat’ .36 
It might be that the difference between these two possibilities will have 
depended upon what Scriabin thought about his experiences. If he thought that these 
experiences simply seemed to be additional experiences enabled by B-flat then he 
would have perceived them as presenting themselves such. That is to say what it is 
like to be synaesthetic would to some extent be determined by the way synaesthetic 
experiences are understood. No one, least of all ER-ists, deny the role of concepts in 
determining the appearance of the character of experience. 
But this does not answer the question: which way would a synaesthete regard 
their experiences? A different, and perhaps better, way of putting the previous 
question is to ask whether these experiences would have seemed veridical to S.  We 
can use the evidence of one sense to corroborate what is perceived through another 
sense. We can look to see if something we think we hear is really there. Such cross- 
modal checking is one way in which we might believe what we perceive. Such 
processes might make one’s experiences seem veridical (i.e. have the character of 
veridicality). Could synaesthetic experiences seem veridical in a related way? 
Synaesthetic experiences might seem veridical in virtue of the consistent relation 
35 See Baron-Cohen et d. 1996 and Bailey & Johnson 1997. 
Johnston 1997: footnote 33. 36 
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between enabling stimulus and secondary character of experience. An auditory 
experience could be related to and checked against the synaesthetic experience it 
enables and vice versa. The duration and intensity of inducing and induced character 
of experience usually coincide, although sometimes there is not a correlation between 
enabling stimulus and secondary character of experience with respect to apparent 
location; for some synaesthetes their secondary characters of experience always 
appear in the same part, e.g. top left part of their visual fields. Despite these 
correlations, we might think that synaesthetes would come to suspect the veridicality 
of their experiences in virtue of the differences between them and their fellow 
synaesthetes and, more especially, between them and non-synaesthetes. Their 
experiences might also seem non-veridical because they seem to be derivative; they 
seem to be derived from the phenomenal character of experience usually enabled via a 
different sensory modality. This phenomenal character of experience does seem 
veridical because it seems to be agreed on by all, synaesthetes and non-synaesthetes 
alike. But, in contrast to the preceding, there is a way in which the apparent 
veridicality of synaesthetic experience can be supported. Since the character of 
synaesthetic experience is the same in the relevant respects as the veridical character 
of visual experience, which cannot be corroborated cross-modally, it might seem just 
as veridical. In other words, coloured hearing might seem veridical because it involves 
additional experiences of colour and experiences of colour may seem veridical 
independently of cross-modal checking, unlike for instance experiences of shape 
which may seem veridical in virtue of cross-modal checking. Non-synaesthetes might 
think that synaesthetes’ experience would be sure to appear non-veridical to 
synaesthetes, but non-synaesthetes might be wrong in this.37 
Of the one aspect of the phenomenal character of synaesthetic experience, the 
presence of additional characters of experience, synaesthetes are usually clear: ‘I 
enjoy electronic music because it evokes such wondehl shapes and colours in my 
3’ Grossenbacher 1997: 155 points out that colour is the only dimension of vision which is not 
normally related to the other senses. Interestingly he suggests that ‘the very lack of universal 
correspondence behven colour and other modalities may make colour phenomena readily available 
for concurrent synaesthetic experience (by Virtue of underdetermined intermodal neural 
connectivity)’. 
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visual perception area’.38 It is seems clear that the synaesthetic subject experiences a 
colour when sounds are heard in addition to hearing the sound. Similarly in the 
following: ‘When I listen to music I see colored shapes. If I am tired at the end of the 
day the shapes seem very near. They are always in color. Shiny white isosceles 
triangles, like long sharp pieces of broken glass. Blue is a sharp color and has lines 
and angles, green has curves, soft balls, and discs. [. . .] I feel the space above my eyes 
is a big screen where this scene is ~laying’.~’ It is important that there are two 
elements of experience. If the two discriminable elements of experience enabled by a 
sound (the experience of the sound and an experience of a colour) were combined 
into one auditory experience ER would have difficulty explaining this in terms of the 
properties of objects represented by the percipient. Equally if there were more than 
two discriminable elements of experience enabled by a sound, perhaps the experience 
of the sound and of a colour were hsed to form a third character of experience, ER 
would also have difficulty explaining this in terms of the properties of objects 
represented by the percipient. But neither of these options are described by 
synaesthetes. In the context of the present discussion it should be easy for non- 
synaesthetes to understand what it is like to undergo synaesthetic experiences, for all 
sighted non-synaesthetes know what it is like to see colours and shapes? 
Synaesthetes are often less clear when it comes to incorporating the modality 
of their experience. It is surely this aspect of synaesthetic experience, which puzzles 
non-synaesthetes. Some remarks recorded by Cytowic describe the difficulty 
synaesthetes have describing this aspect of their experience. ‘It’s definitely colors, but 
I’m not sure that ‘seeing’ is the most accurate description. I am seeing, but not with 
my eyes, if that makes sense’.4’ And again: ‘It is not a hallucination but it is hard for 
me to describe. As I look at a page, I see the colors there even though I see the color 
of the REAL ink that’s before me. I know it isn’t there for real, but I still can’t help 
38 Cytowic 1989: 32, subject MM. 
39 Cytowic 1989: 25. subject MML. 
“’ The way the term experience is used is often confusing. Does synaesthesia involve one experience 
or two experiences? The confusion would be relieved if the focus was on the phenomenal character of 
experience: does synaesthesia involve one phenomenal character of experience or two? Judgng by 
most reports the answer to this question is that they have additional characters of experience. 
‘* Cytowic 1989: 23. subject RT. 
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seeing it. There is a sensation that the color is there’.42 And finally and perhaps most 
interesting: ‘The shapes are not distinct from hearing - they are part of what hearing is 
... That’s what the sound is; it couldn’t possibly be anything else’.”” Does part of the 
reason that synaesthetes have difficulty in reporting some aspects of their experience 
lie in the fact that there is a distinctive phenomenal character which seems to be 
related to the unusual mode of perception via which the additional character of 
experience is evoked? One reason for thinking of a synaesthetic experience of colour 
as being a visual experience would be if it interfered with the synaesthete’s visual 
perception of the world. There is no evidence of this. It is perhaps this lack of 
interaction with visual experience, combined with the fact that the character of 
experience seems to be enabled by an auditory stimulus, which gives the subject the 
impression that their additional synaesthetic experience is not a visual experience and 
therefore has to be an auditory Is it possible that it seems to synaesthetes as 
though there is also an additional distinctive phenomenal character related to the 
unusual mode of perception via which the additional character of experience is 
evoked? 
In some respect this is akin to another problem: the problem of the 
phenomenal character of experience of common sensibles. Is there anything more to 
the character of experience which arises when touching shapes and seeing shapes than 
is given by the properties of objects? Mciver Lopes has recently claimed that it is just 
obvious that ‘tactile and visual experiences have distinctive properties through and 
through. What it is like to see the shape of a cube is different from what it is like to 
touch the same shape.’45 Nevertheless he goes on to argue that in order to bolster 
such intuitions one needs to consider senses other than those used to gather redundant 
information; we simultaneously use the eyes and the hands to discern the shapes of 
42 Cytowic 1989: 43, subject MT. 
‘’ Cytowic 1989: 65, subject DS. 
Paulesu 1995 et al. claim to kisve adduced the physiological basis of synaesthetic colour 
eqeriences. They believe the functioning of distinct areas of the brain underlying synaesthetic colour 
experiences explains certain features of those experiences e.g. the ambiguous spatial distribution of 
colour experiences is explained by the engagement of visual areas where the neurons have a much 
looser representation of the visual field than in the primary visual cortex. 
44 
Mciver Lopes 2000: 346. 
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objects and ‘the sharing of information that takes place between the senses in cases 
such as this weaves a tangled phenomenological web’. The case he comes up with is 
a form of echolocation (it is also known as facial vision). Echolocation is used by the 
blind to navigate the environment, but there is some evidence that the sighted also use 
it to‘discern the shape and distance of things. In other words people hear shapes. 
The trouble is that Lopes gives us no substantial reasons for thinking that this 
is a clear case in which the phenomenal character of hearing shapes is different from 
that of seeing shapes, apart from the agreed one that the latter involves colours and 
the former involves sounds. It is supposed to be obvious: ‘what it is like to hear a 
round velvety object three meters away is not what it is like to (dimly) see a round, 
velvety object three meters away’? And he adds, ‘Nor, for that matter, is the 
phenomenal character of an experience of hearing a triangular shape the same as that 
of touching a triangular shape’. 
But there might actually be good reason to think that what it is like to hear 
shapes is no different from what it is like to see shapes (if one ignores the colours 
perceived only by vision and the sounds perceived only by hearing). Consider again 
what it is like to be a bat.47 Bat echolocation is enabled by mechanical vibrations, 
which are generated by the bat itself, reflected off the surfaces of objects and then 
perceived by the bat. In a manner of speaking, a bat hears itself, but it also uses the 
sounds it makes to detect size, relative velocity and the distance of external objects. 
The echo that is reflected back by the target carries information, which allows the bat 
to detect the flutter of a target. The relative velocity of a target is given by the 
Doppler sh& calculated by subtracting the velocity of the pulse and the echo. The 
distance is calculated from the delay between original pulse and echo. The size and 
direction of the target is calculated from the amplitude and direction of the returning 
echoes. In this latter respect echolocation hlfils typical representational finctions of 
visual systems; when the distance, relative velocity and size of external objects are 
seen it is the-!ight reflected off the surfaces of objects which enables the visual 
perception of those properties. Of course, this requires that some objects make 
46 Mciver Lopes 2000: 348. 
Compare also &ins 1993 on the phenomenal character of bat experience as of colours. 41 
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themselves and other objects visible by virtue of the light they radiate. Perception of 
such objects by virtue of the energy they themselves emit more resemble standard 
cases of hearing. In consideration of the above, echolocation may seem more like a 
hybrid between the way creatures hear and see. The moral of the story is that the 
stimulus information of perceptual systems may be equivalent. Different physical 
intermediaries (lightwaves and soundwaves) are used by different creatures to 
perceive the same properties of objects (size, distance and movement). There is no 
reason to think that the phenomenal character of shape when seen and heard is 
different in the relevant respect. 
The reason that there would be no difference in phenomenal character in the 
relevant sense is that hearing and vision are both distal senses, which overlap in the 
relevant respects. Touch is a proximal sense (although the blind might use sticks to 
sense distal objects). The suggestion that the phenomenal character of an experience 
of hearing a triangular shape is not the same as that enabled by touching a triangular 
shape seems much more appropriate. But then this is just the same as the suggestion 
that seeing shapes and touching shapes have characters of experience that cannot be 
understood with respect to the representational properties of objects. 
One might claim that hearing and touch do have different phenomenal 
characters without endorsing qualia by reference to the way the body, in particular, 
the different modes of perception, process what is perceived. The mechanics of touch 
make the perception of shape seem different from the auditory or visual perception of 
shape.48 Suppose that there is a difference, which cannot be accounted for in terms of 
the properties of objects. The difference between seeing shapes and hearing shapes is 
generated by the different means of perception: on the one hand the use of the visual 
organs and on the other hand the use of auditory organs. These different kinds of 
sensory organs represent the world in different ways in virtue of the different ways 
they fhction. The representationist who tries to understand differences in the 
characters of experience in terms of properties objects are represented as having 
should have no difficulty with this. One reason the senses can be discriminated by 
'* See Martin 1992. See also Campbell 1995 who argues that there is no Werence in phenomenal 
character which cannot be explained in terms of the properties of objects. 
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those who have them is because of the way the sensory organs operate: the way we 
move our eyes about is reflected in the phenomenal character of our visual 
e~pe r i ence .~~  We experience our visual perception in the way we perceive the world 
from a point of view. One way we can tell the difference between vision and hearing 
is that we cannot see out of the back of our heads, whereas we can hear things behind 
us. The difference is one of how the sensory organs function. ER-ists can hold that 
creatures represent how they represent the world by representing the way their 
sensory organs work in perceiving properties of objects. The senses themselves have 
properties, which are represented by perceivers. The difference between seeing shapes 
and hearing shapes would be given by the mode in which shapes are perceived: we 
can only see shapes in front of us, presumably we could hear shapes behind us. Of 
course these differences between seeing and hearing are only contingent. The 
differences between touch and the distal perceptual modalities are necessary. But 
there seems no reason why the representationist should not adopt an explanation of 
the necessary differences of phenomenal character between distal and proximal senses 
similar to the explanation they might adopt of the contingent differences of 
phenomenal character between distal senses. 
How does synaesthesia fit into this discussion? What if a colour experience 
that is enabled by a sound has a phenomenal character that cannot be had by an 
experience of colour as enabled by light? Suppose an experience of red enabled by the 
sound of a bell ringing were unlike any possible experience of red that could be 
enabled by a red object. The thought is that there would then be a character of 
experience peculiar to colour experiences enabled by sounds, which is not 
exhaustively accounted for in terms of the properties of objects being represented. 
Perhaps what it is like to be a synaesthete does involve an extra character of 
experience given by a particular mode of perception. But if it does this will provide no 
more of a problem to ER than do properties, which are veridically perceived by 
different senses: If coloured hearing synaesthesia is to provide a challenge to ER it 
must be in virtue of the extra colour experience. 
Of course there are probably other cues, such as the feedback from the ocular muscles. 49 
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3.4 The Extra Oualia - Argument 
A preliminary consideration of synaesthesia certainly suggests a counterexample to 
representationism. To see why it is helpfbl to consider again how ER explains the 
phenomenal character of experience. ER-ists can agree that distinct areas of the brain 
are responsible for processing distinctive types of stimuli. After all, the evidence 
seems overwhelming that our visual experiences are dependent upon distinct areas of 
the occipital cortex, our auditory experiences are dependent upon areas of the 
temporal cortex, our tactile experiences are dependent upon the somato-sensory 
cortex and so on. (In the sense that these brain areas may be differently constituted, 
distinctive perceptual experiences depend upon particular types of brain states.) ER is 
nevertheless able to explain the distinctive phenomenal character of such experiences 
by reference to states of &airs external to the percipient. For example, the difference 
between the phenomenal character of experience of the blind and the sighted may well 
depend on the difference between local brain states, but, according to the E R A ,  the 
distinctive phenomenal character of the visual experiences of the sighted can 
nevertheless only be explained by reference to states of affairs external to the 
percipient. 
In order to press this point ER-ists advert to the so-called transparency 
objection. When we reflect upon our experience the objects that we perceive are not 
replaced by entities belonging to an inner realm. We are only aware of the properties 
objects are represented by us as having, not the vehicles of experience. When you 
look at an object in front of you and then try to introspect on your experience all you 
do is focus on the visible properties of the object. Or when you listen to something 
and then try to introspect on your experience all you do is focus on the audible 
properties of the object.” 
The original point was made by Moore: 1922. See Harman 1990, Tye 1995: 134-6 and Dretske 
1995: 34-8 for statements of the representationist objection. See Martin forthcoming for use of the 
transparency objection on behalf of the presentationist 
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Phenomenists typically argue that phenomenal transparency cannot be used to 
reject qualia. Some phenomenists claim that introspection alone cannot be used to 
show that there are no intrinsic properties of experience. Shoemaker claims this much, 
but also claims that thought experiments can be employed to make us realise the 
existence of intrinsic qualitative properties of experience. Some phenomenists argue 
that introspection can actually be used to show that there are qualia. Block argues 
that the diaphanousness of perceptual experience fades; when we close our eyes in 
daylight our experiences will not clearly and uncontroversially be about anything. For 
such experiences there would be nothing which would be transparent to experience. 52 
Synaesthesia seems to offer another challenge to the phenomenal transparency 
objection. One thought might be that the vehicles of experience, which phenomenists 
advert to, are apparent to introspection in synaesthetic experiences. When the sound 
of a bell also produces the experience of a colour it is mental ink which colours the 
synaesthete’ s experience. 
The challenge of synaesthesia to ER should now be more evident. In normal 
perception, although different types of experience may be dependent upon distinct 
types of brain states, the distinctive phenomenal character of such experiences can still 
be explained by reference to states of affairs external to the percipient. Similarly, 
when comparing the sighted and the blind, although the difference in experience 
between them may be dependent upon distinct types of brain states, the phenomenal 
character of experience of the sighted can nevertheless be explained by reference to 
states of affairs external to the percipient. But, when comparing the normal percipient 
and the synaesthete, where the difference in experience between them also seems to 
depend upon distinct types of brain states, the additional phenomenal character of 
experience cannot be so obviously explained in terms of external states of affairs. 
Indeed, there seems nothing there for synaesthetes to represent: the colour produced 
by the sound of a bell does not represent anything, in particular it does not represent 
’’ See Shoemaker 1994. ’’ Block does not say why our eyelids are not the object of such representations. See also Peacocke 
1984 and Boghossian & Velleman 1989, who argue that the intrinsic properties of sensory fields are 
evident in certain experiences. Whereas Peacocke argues for a dispositionalist account Boghossian & 
Velleman argue that intrinsic properties of sensory fields support a projectivist account. 
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the sound of the bell. If the phenomenal character of experience could be additional 
where external states remain the same then it becomes easier to explain the additional 
phenomenal character of experience in terms of local physical states and thus extra 
qualia. If synaesthesia suggests extra qualia then, so the phenomenist might contend, 
the character of veridical perception is more likely to be constituted by qualia. 
Qualia are sometimes denied because it seems incomprehensible how they 
should come to appear to be properties of objects: how do we explain the way that 
the colour and the sound of the bell appear to be properties of the bell? Synaesthesia 
does not provide an answer but it does suggest that there is a projective mechanism. 
Different forms of synaesthesia show different projections. Some synaesthetes say that 
their colours are experienced to be ‘in the head’. Other synaesthetes say that their 
colours are experienced to be ‘in the world’. This would seem to suggest that there 
are mental mechanisms for transforming qualitative aspects of experience into 
representations of objects. This is not to say that ER would not be able to incorporate 
this feature into their own approach, it is only to say that the notion of intrinsic 
properties of experience supervenient upon local states is not as implausible as some 
ER-ists suggest who make the obvious point that you find no qualia in the brain when 
you look there. One should not expect to 
But the preceding is only suggestive of extra qualia. The suggestion is that the 
additional non-veridical phenomenal character of experience, which is revealed 
through introspection and correlated with the additional activity of local brain areas 
shows that the phenomenal character of synaesthetic experience is wholly dependent 
on local brain states. In order to turn it into a sound argument it has to be shown that 
the extra character of experience cannot be explained in terms of representational 
content, which, in turn, can only be explained by reference to individuating relations 
with external properties. 
Wager claims it can be shown that there are cases in which the extra 
phenomenal character of experience cannot be explained by reference to 
representational content. Wager, in common with others, takes the essence o f  the ER 
view to be the thought, as expressed previously, that the phenomenal character of 
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perceptual experience can be l i l y  explained in terms of representational properties, 
and in particular those experiences that are alike in their representational contents will 
be alike in their phenomenal characters. Wager claims that synaesthesia provides the 
counterexample to ER whereby the representational contents of two experiences are 
the same but the phenomenal characters of the experiences are different. 
Wager summarizes the argument in the following way: 
In schematic form, the problem of  extra qualia is that it is possible for there to be two 
people, A and B, alike in all respects relevant to theory of representational content T 
such that experiences via sensory modality M1 produce qualia associated with M1 in 
both A and B, but produce adhtional qualia associated with another modality M2 only 
in B. A and B thus have partially different phenomenal contents without any difference 
relevant to T. i3 
Wager describes three cases. The first case is that of the average perceiver and 
a synaesthete; it is supposed to exemplify the way he sets up the extra qualia argument 
in the above quotation. It concerns two sisters. Cynthia has a form of coloured- 
hearing synaesthesia; she experiences colour when she hears music: ‘as a particular 
example, suppose that whenever the note Middle C is played, she experiences a six 
inch high by one inch wide bar of some determinate shade of red in addition to the 
experience that a non-synaesthete has upon hearing Middle N o m a  has average 
perceptual capacities. Since Cynthia and Noma have different experiences (or 
experiences having different phenomenal characters) the representationist is required 
to argue that Cynthia and Noma have different representational contents. Wager 
notes that, if a simple causal covariation version of representationism is assumed, then 
it appears that Cynthia and Noma do have the same representational contents, for the 
experiences o f  both sisters covary with the same external state. 
Tye, who endorses a causal covariation theory, is Wager’s intended target 
here. But the theory of representational content Tye endorses is not a simple causal 
s3 Wager 1999: 268-9. Wager entitles his paper the ‘Extra Qualla Problem’. By ‘qualia’ he seems 
to mean phenomenal character of experience. We can agree that there is extra phenomenal character 
of experience in synaesthesia and thus extra qualia in thls sense. The issue is whether this involves 
extra qualia as the term is usually construed by phenomenists, that is intrinsic properties of 
experience that outrun representational content. If it does not there are no extra qualia and no 
argument for any qualia here in the yhenomenist’s sense of the term. 
Wager 1999: 269. 
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covariation theory. He claims of a veridical perceptual experience that it represents 
because the following equation holds: 
S (a state of percipient x) represents that P = df If optimal conditions obtain, S is 
tokened in x iff P and because P.” 
If optimal conditions were to obtain, it is both necessary and sufficient for P (a state 
of affairs) to occur for an experience having a distinctive phenomenal character S to 
be tokened in a percipient x. This shows how the representational state causally 
covaries with what is being represented, which also enables that representation. It 
also suggests how the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is constituted 
by the phenomenal properties of objects P being represented. If the phenomenal 
character of experience is constituted by a subject-independent item, then the 
phenomenal character of experience will be exhausted by its representational content. 
Whenever the percipient is in state P and optimal conditions do not obtain then 
misrepresentation occurs. In causal theories of whatever kind it has always been a 
problem characterising precisely the causal link. Tye leaves the precise specification 
open. However he does claim that even if a general definition of optimal conditions 
cannot be give whether optimal condition are operating can, in practise be decided in 
particular cases. 56 
Wager himself acknowledges that the claim that the case of Cynthia and 
Noma rehtes Tye’s account of representationism is too quick (even without asking 
whether optimal conditions are met). The longer answer must respond to two issues 
in particular, which arise in determining the representational content of Cynthia’s 
experience. The first issue is whether the auditory and the additional synaesthetic 
characters of experience be treated together. If they are not to be treated together 
then the second issue arises as to whether Cynthia has visually interacted with 
anythmg that produced experiences with the same phenomenal character as the 
secondary synaesthetic experience. If she has then, according to the causal covariation 
definition of representational content above, this would also contribute to the 
~~ 
55 Tye 1995: 101. 
’‘ Tye 1995: 226 ft.16. 
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representational content of the additional character of experience, which is produced 
in synaesthesia. 
But do we need to consider this second issue? That is to say, do the auditory 
and the additional synaesthetic characters of experience need to be treated separately? 
If the auditory and the additional synaesthetic characters of experience are to be 
treated together then it would seem that the ER-ist is indeed stymied, for then we 
should regard Cynthia and Norma in the above example as both having auditory 
experiences which are individuated in terms of representational properties by what 
they causally covary with but which have different phenomenal characters. Whereas 
Norma will have normal auditory experiences Cynthia’s auditory experience will have 
a different phenomenal character. So we have a case in which the representational 
content is the same but the phenomenal character is different. Wager adverts to the 
coloured hearing synaesthete’s own reports of the phenomenology of their 
synaesthetic experiences being inseparable from hearing to argue that the elements 
should not be treated as separate: ‘The shapes are not distinct from hearing - they are 
part of what hearing is ... That’s what the sound is; it couldn’t possibly be anything 
else’.’’ But in a sense just raising the problem of the extra phenomenal character of 
experience in the way that it has been raised indicates that we do need to treat the 
auditory and additional synaesthetic characters of experience separately. Synaesthetes 
are still perfectly able to discriminate the colours they experience from the 
phenomenal character of the sounds they experience. It is, after all, for this reason that 
synaesthetes think they are having unusual experiences: no one else seems to 
experience colours when they hear sounds. The experiences of colour can still be 
discriminated fiom the experiences of sounds in presumably the same way that 
veridical experiences of Middle C and of a red bar can be discriminated (that is to say, 
regardless of whether one were aware of the causal connections which were or were 
no enabling them). And one would want to think of the veridical experiences of 
Middle C and 9 red bar as having separate elements. If the case is to run Cynthia’s 
synaesthetic experience would have to be an auditory experience the character of 
-- 
” Subject DS from Cytowic 1989: 65 quoted in Wager 1999: 265. 
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which was different fiom Noma’s, but at the same time the content of which could 
not be separated into elements. Only in this way would the synaesthetic experience 
covary with Middle C but have different phenomenal character. It can be denied in 
this case? 
Of course, the claim is not that the experience of colour in synaesthesia is 
exactly like any experience of colour the synaesthete has already had. But then it need 
not be. One claim Wager wants to press is that the unique character of synaesthetic 
experience (it is unlike the visual experience of red) is damaging to ER: ‘If the 
synaesthetic component of Cynthia’s experience has Middle C as its unique trigger, 
then this only adds additional support to the claim that her experience causally 
covaries with and therefore represents Middle C’?’ There is no obvious problem 
raised for ER in the fact that someone could see a colour they have never experienced 
before as long as they have the capacity to see it. Similarly there is no obvious 
problem if the synaesthete experienced colour in a way she has never experienced 
colour before (or even never could do so visually) as long as she has the additional 
capacity to do so via extra neural connections. The only difference is that in the first 
case a causal relation has not yet been instantiated between a state S and a particular 
colour and in the second case a causal relation has not yet been instantiated between a 
state S (which covaries with a particular colour) and a sound. 
The issue then focuses on how we are to regard the representational content 
of Cynthia’ s experience if the auditory and the additional synaesthetic experiences are 
to be regarded as separate elements. For this we need to advert to the causal 
covariation which is required to exist between S (a state of percipient x) and P such 
that S represents that P iff (if optimal conditions obtain), S is tokened in x iff P and 
because P. As Wager has to acknowledge the counterexample will fail if Cynthia has 
previously visually experienced red bars. For then whereas Cynthia’s auditory 
experience represents Middle C, her synaesthetic experience represents ‘the 
disjunction red bar or Middle C’, since this element of her experience causally 
According to Wager, even if Cynthia had experienced red, the synaesthetic experience would 
covary with the disjunction Middle C or w d d l e  C and red). and therefore covary with Middle C 
alone. 
j 9  Wager 1999: 271 
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covaries with Middle C and red bars?’ In this case although Cynthia and Noma have 
different characters of experience on hearing Middle C they also have different 
representational contents. 
Wager resorts to the stipulation that Cynthia has never experienced a red bar 
(and, moreover, never could experience a red bar since she is congenitally blind). This 
gives Wager his desired counterexample on the simplest causal covariation model. 
Indeed, as he remarks, if content is assigned in this way then both the simple auditory 
and the complex synaesthetic experiences will represent Middle C and yet have 
different phenomenal characters. 
But even Tye does not want to recommend the simplest causal covariation 
Even though afterimages may be enabled by just the same, and only the 
same, stimuli as enable certain veridical experiences of bright lights Tye does not 
suggest that they represent the properties of lights in the same way. Afterimages are 
representational, only they systematically misrepresent. This can be explained in that 
optimal conditions are not met: ‘An afterimage is a sensory experience [...I that 
represents that something is present with a certain two-dimensional shape and colour 
E...] Since there really is no such item, an afterimage is a misrepresentation: the subject 
of such an experience is undergoing a sort of illusion. The illusion is created by the 
abnormal state of the person’s sensory apparatus which is induced by the bright light’. 
62 
crjr, Wager says that her synaesthetic experience represents the disjunction Middle C or red. This 
seems wrong if one is assuming a simple cawl covariation model. It should be the conjunction 
Middle C and red. 
A causal covariation theory of representational content such as is advocated by Fodor 1990 has to 
answer the problem of misrepresentation. He claims that there is an asymmetrical causal covariation. 
It is hard to see how an asymmetrical causal covariation theory would be able to explain such a case 
of synaesthesia. The covariation of sounds and states representing colours would have to depend 
asymmetrically on the wariation of colours and states representing colours. But a blind synaesthete 
seems a possibility, in which case the covariation of sounds and states representing colours would not 
depend asymnietrically on the causal covariation of colours and states representing colours. 
of charges Tye is responding to here have been presented by Boghossian 
& Velleman 1989. Boghossian & Velleman 1989 seem to be arguing that where afterimages might 
have some representational content when the eyes are open they would not when the eyes are closed. 
But if our eyelids are represented when we are awake and our eyelids are closed, it is not clear to me 
that, since we would still be representing the world in such a case, the closing of the eyelids makes 
little difference in the account one gives of afterimages. 
61 
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Synaesthesia is surely another occasion where optimal conditions are lacking. 
Optimal conditions may be difficult to determine in general but it is clear that there is 
a particular account about the lack of optimal conditions available in the case of 
synaesthesia. (It should be emphasised that this account is a different one from that 
which might have to be told about Cynthia’s blindness.) The account available for 
synaesthesia is related to an account Tye has already given. Just as causal covariation 
does not have accompanying optimal conditions when different types of stimuli 
causally covary with one type of state S (see Tye’s discussion of the absent qualia 
argument), causal covariation does not have accompanying optimal conditions when 
one type of stimulus causally covaries 1 with different types of representational states. 
One-many causal covariation is not causal covariation with optimal conditions 
whichever way it goes. 
There is another related way of responding to Wager’s move of stipulating 
that Cynthia never could experience a red bar. It does refer to Cynthia’s blindness. 
This response claims that Wager’s move will not work because the phenomenal 
characters of experiences, including synaesthetic experience, should be understood in 
terms of the fbnctions of the states underlying them: it is not the fbnction of the states 
underlying the synaesthetic experience to represent Middle C. The next section 
summarises the teleological premises of ER and Wager’s attempts to challenge them. 
3.5 Synaesthesia: Representation and Misrepresentation 
Dret ske has developed a teleological theory of perceptual experience. Perceptual 
experiences can only be explained in terms of the evolutionary history of perceptual 
systems. Dretske advocates that: ‘a system, S, represents a property, F, if and only if 
S has the function of indicating (providing information about) the F of a certain 
domain of objects. The way S performs its function (when it performs it) is by 
occupying different states SI, si, ... s, corresponding to the different determinate 
values fi, f2, . . . fn of F’ .63 The visual and auditory input systems are two such systems. 
63 Dretske 1995: 2. 
Both evolved to represent specific ranges of properties of objects. This version of the 
representational theory of perceptual experience presupposes causal covariation 
between the states of the perceptual system and the properties of objects. But whether 
these causal covariations constitute representational systems depends upon whether 
they have been selected over evolutionary time. 
The view that sensory systems have evolved to represent specific ranges of 
properties of objects has the following consequence: ‘Representations have a sense 
(the properties they have the hnction of indicating) and oRen enough a reference (an 
object whose properties they represent), but the sense does not determine the 
reference’. It is for this reason that ‘two representations with the same sense can have 
different referents’ .64 It is also for this reason that sensory systems can misrepresent. 
Misrepresentation according to Dretske can come about in a number of ways. Each of 
these ways requires that the system be in a state it was not designed to be in. The state 
of a perceptual system may constitute a representation of the properties of an object 
when the object represented has different properties from those it is represented as 
having: a red object may be misrepresented as orange. And the state of a perceptual 
system may constitute a representation of the properties of an object when there is no 
object. If one were to follow Dretske’s version of ER it would be the case that, when 
a sound enables an experience of colour, states of the visual system constitute 
representations of the properties of a possible object, even though there is no object. 
It is like the second type of misrepresentation described above. But there is also a 
difference. In the second type of misrepresentation there is a representation of an 
object being a certain way even though there is no object. In synaesthesia there is no 
representation of an object being a certain way, only a representation of certain 
properties of a domain of objects. But this is not a problem: according to ER it is not 
the task of sensory systems to represent what any particular object represented is, 
only to represent properties of a domain of objects and thereby represent or 
misrepresent the way of the world. 
According to evidence from modem imaging techniques, the extra 
Dretske 1995: 23. 64 
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phenomenal character of synaesthetic experience occurs when the visual system 
occupies a state, which it is meant to occupy when it represents a visible property. 
Therefore the representation should straightforwardly be regarded as a 
misrepresentation. Blind C ynt hia’ s synaesthetic experience, although reliably enabled 
by Middle C, does not represent Middle C but red. The auditory and synaesthetic 
experiences have different phenomenal characters, but then they also have different 
representational contents. 
If the representationist is right about the phenomenal character of experience, 
then there should be no extra difficulty about the additional phenomenal character of 
experience. Indeed synaesthesia is a plausible consequence of ER: if there are neural 
connections between sensory systems (either a breakdown of the barriers between 
sensory systems or an extra module) there will be extra phenomenal character of 
experience. It is in fact the actuality of synaesthetic experience - as the admixture of 
phenomenal character - which indicates that the representationist is on the right track 
about the phenomenal character of veridical experience. 
What has seemed problematic about ER with respect to perceptual 
experiences is whether it can explain the phenomenal character of experience and, 
more especially, whether it really can explain false perception. There is a strong 
intuition that one cannot have an experience of something red, when there is no red 
object, without there being something red that one experiences. ER-ists argue that 
this is a false dilemma: representational states do not possess sensible properties, they 
represent them. Once the representational content of phenomenal character is fixed by 
properties of domains of objects what constitutes the misrepresentation may be fixed 
locally. By claiming that the distinctive phenomenal characters of perceptual 
experiences are dependent for their constitution on states beyond the local physical 
states of the percipient ER-ists do not claim that the percipient has to be in direct 
contact with those external states. All that matters is the necessity of those external 
states at some point in time fnr the constitution of the phenomenal character of 
experience. Indeed, according to the teleological theory of representation, it will be 
the subjects ancestors which would have been in direct contact with those external 
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states. 
In order to sustain the challenge to ER one would have to argue that a 
synaesthetic experience is a veridical representation. When a sound produces an 
experience as of red, it is clearly not the case that an object is being represented as 
red. For then the object might be coloured all over in two different ways. We cannot 
represent this sensorily. 
It makes slightly more sense to say that the sound that the object makes is 
being represented as red. Perhaps a sound is represented as being coloured? But as 
Wager notes this tactic would offer the possibility that the phenomenal character of 
synaesthetic experience might represent the true colour of sounds and another way 
out for the He likens this to the way that the ER-ist typically explains the 
difference between seeing shapes and touching shapes: by reference to properties 
picked out by the different senses, ‘colours in the one case and textures in the other 
case’. Might synaesthesia pick out different properties of Middle C than are picked 
out by auditory experiences? We can agree that it does not, partly because the 
majority of people do not purport to hear colours in this way, but more importantly, 
because, if one advocated ER, the property which constituted the colour of the 
sounds would turn out to be exactly the same property that constituted the normal 
auditory experience of Middle C. But this does not mean that another way out is 
blocked to ER, as Wager suggests, it is another reason to think that what we have in 
synaesthesia is misrepresentation. Coloured hearing is not hearing colours and not 
thereby related to seeing colours in the way that seeing and touching shapes are 
related by the shape of things. 
Wager tries to press hs challenge to ER by devising two other cases. Case 
two is designed to challenge the teleological addition to the causal covariation version 
of ER. Tye acknowledges evolutionary considerations but he also he maintains that 
creatures with no evolutionary history, like Davidson’ s Swampman, have perceptual 
experiences because the right sort of causal covariation is in operation? Wager 
claims all that is required to sustain the challenge against Tye is to consider Cynthia as 
‘’ Wager 1999: 273-3. 
h6 Davidson 1987 and Tye 1995: 153-4. 
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a Strmipcreature (call her ‘Blind Swamp Cynthia’). Since the representational content 
of her experience will not be determined by evolutionary considerations, only by 
causal covariation, the response cannot be made that she is misrepresenting. 
Therefore, in case two, there are two individuals, Norma and Blind Swamp Cynthia 
who have partially different phenomenal contents without any difference relevant to 
representational content. 
Since Wager departs from the spirit of his argument (initially he was looking 
for a real rather than imaginary counterexample) one might argue that it is 
significantly weakened. For all that, it seems to me, that Wager’s thought experiment 
does not even work on its own terms. Tye insists that the constitution of phenomenal 
character by causal covariation with properties of the environment presupposes 
optimal fitting. Although there might be causal covariation between areas of the brain 
associated with synaesthetic experiences in the actual world and external properties it 
is implausible that these covariations would constitute optimal fitting. Remember that 
causal covariation should not be a one-many relation. There are other areas of the 
brain (auditory areas in our world) that also causally covary with the auditory signals. 
Therefore in the case of Blind Swap Cynthia where there is a one-many causal relation 
optimal conditions are lacking. If one follows the response Tye provides to the absent 
qualia argument Blind Swamp Cynthia, like the creature whose state S is enabled by a 
variety of types of stimuli, would not have conscious perceptual experiences after all. 
If there is no reason to think that Blind Swamp Cynthia would have conscious 
perceptual experiences there is no reason to think that she would have synaesthetic 
experiences. So we have no reason to think that there is synaesthetic experience 
having a representational content given simply by causal covariation. 
One might be unsatisfied by this response: surely Blind Swamp Cynthia has 
conscious perceptual experiences. It is implausible to think that just because she has 
additional neural connections she cannot be conscious. But even if the constraints on 
one-many causal relations are Felaxed why should Blind Swamp Cynthia have both 
normal auditory experiences and additional synaesthetic experiences? We might 
explain the normal auditory experiences by reference to the causal covariation 
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between states of the auditory cortex and audible properties. (Presumably these are 
fine-grained causal covariations. ) But why should the additional causal connections to 
other areas of the brain enable experiences of colour? (Ignore the fact that these are 
probably not so fine-grained causal covariations and therefore do not correlate in a 
one to one fashion with audible properties.) Because these areas of the brain do 
enable experiences of colour in the actual world? Or perhaps because these areas of 
the brain would enable experiences of colour if Blind Swamp Cynthia were sighted? 
But the phenomenist cannot allude to what would be the case if Swamp Cynthia were 
sighted because then ER-ists can make the response that Blind Swamp Cynthia’s 
synaesthetic experience has to be understood- by reference to her sighted fellow 
Swamp creatures. And Sighted Swamp Cynthia would not offer a counterexample to 
ER because her synaesthetic experiences would be constituted by different causal 
relations fkom those constituting Norms's auditory experiences. That is precisely why 
we needed to advert to Blind Swamp Cynthia in the first place. And we cannot allude 
to the similar visual areas of the brain’s of actual synaesthetes because these have to 
be understood in their own terms, namely in terms of evolutionary hnctions. ER-ists 
can then make the response that Blind Swamp Cynthia’s synaesthetic experience is 
illicitly understood by reference to actual blind synaesthetes. So even if Blind Swamp 
Cynthia has auditory experiences there is no reason that the extra connections in her 
brain should enable experiences of colours. The only reason we think that they do is 
because we smuggle in illicit references to sighted Swamp Creatures or normal blind 
synaesthetes. As a last resort one might advert to the supervenience of phenomenal 
character on local neural states. But that claim is just what is under discussion here; it 
would beg the question. 67 
A final challenge might be raised against the teleological version of 
representationism: could synaesthesia actually have an evolutionary function which 
We might be able to apply evolutionary considerations without having to talk in terms of 
evolutionary hist<~ which by hypothesis we are not allowed to do. We can consider the immediate 
contest of the creature of Blind Swamp Cynthia to determine whether synaesthesia has a function in 
that contest. It seems plausible to think that it is the veridical auditory experiences which confer 
fitness; synaesthetic experiences confer no additional fitness. Therefore we have no reason to think 
that synaesthetic exqeriences would have any function. 
67 
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then allows two subjects to have partially different phenomenal contents without any 
difference relevant to representational content? Wager’s case three explores this 
possibility? The imagined world is one in which auditory information is vastly 
more important than visual information for the purposes of survival. (It might be that 
we have to suppose that the visual system has been selected for in the past and 
conditions have since changed.) In this world there is a predator which is practically 
invisible but makes distinct sounds. Wager suggests that in such a world coloured- 
hearing synaesthetes would be more likely to take account of auditory stimuli. This is 
not to deny that non-synaesthetes hear just as well (remember that auditory and 
synaesthetic components are reliably related), it is only to suggest that synaesthetes 
will have a more forceful experience. Owing to the forcefulness of their synaesthetic 
experiences Wager claims that synaesthetes will be fitter than non-synaesthetes and 
therefore synaesthesia will be selected. A lot is riding on the idea of the forcefblness 
of the synaesthetic experience, its demand on attentional resources and the diminished 
likelihood of its being overshadowed by information from other sensory modalities. It 
might be argued that since auditory experience is now supposed to carry the most 
information anyway that it is just as likely, that synaesthesia will distract attention 
from the primary stimulus and thus confer a selective disadvantage. Of course, 
whether synaesthesia could convey a selectional advantage is an empirical matter. 
For the sake of argument let us grant that it does. In time the visual system loses any 
adaptive advantage it has and members of the species gradually lose the power of 
sight, although they retain the brain mechanisms that process colour representations. 
Wager maintains that the representational content of synaesthetic experience enabled 
by Middle C of a member of this species will now be determined by Middle C, but the 
Is a selectional advantage needed to construe representation teleologically? Could synaesthesia be 
linked to some characteristic that does have a selectional advantage? Wager argues that a selectional 
advantage is not needed. His argument is that the sense of smell could have been selected without 
bestowing a adaptive advantage, it being linked to the sense of taste which did, and yet we would not 
want to deny smell representational content. It is hard to imagine the sense of smell having lacked a 
adaptive advantage. Indeed, it is by a consideration of the evolution of the senses of smell and taste 
that one thinks of them as indeed separate senses. So there is no good reason to think that the 
linkage with a characteristic that does bestow a selectional benefit gives the right kind of explanation 
for the phenomenal character of synaesthesia to be considered representational (rather than 
misrepresentational). 
hX 
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phenomenal character of this experience will be different from the experience of the 
average human percipient listening to Middle C. Therefore ER is false. 
But ER will be false only if ER-ists do not have an equally good explanation. 
If we are to regard the extra character of experience as representing the distal 
stimulus there seems little reason why ER-ists should not still regard the former as 
misrepresenting the latter. Just because a misrepresentation is (or has been) 
advantageous is not sufficient for turning it into a veridical representation. Consider a 
blind synaesthete who experiences colours when they touch things. They might be 
able to turn this to their advantage when trying to read Braille!' Even if were it 
agreed that synaesthesia has been selected for in'some way this does not mean that we 
should regard it as representing the distal stimulus. After all, auditory experiences 
were selected to do that, have always done that and still do that. So it is still not clear 
that we should regard the representational content of synaesthetic experience any 
differently from that of the original case of Cynthia. 
The discussion of this chapter relates to that of the previous chapter. If one 
were to follow the suggestion outlined in the previous chapter the constitution of an 
extra cognitive module would be independent of the constitution of the phenomenal 
character of experience. It may even be that what presumably is a breakdown in 
certain properties of modularity should come to subserve an extra module. Suppose it 
were found that synaesthesia bestowed significant advantages on those who had 
synaesthetic experiences and for the reason that they had those experiences. 
Synaesthesia should firstly be construed as an extra module. We have no reason to 
reconstrue the way the phenomenal character of experience is constituted. If 
teleological factors were to select synaesthesia they would not redetermine 
representational contents, they would select a new module. The phenomenal character 
of synaesthetic experience should still be construed as involving misrepresentation. 
This is just to be expected if what realises synaesthesia is the connection of existing 
modules which were selected to represent a certain range of determinable properties. 
&- 
Wheeler & Cutsforth 1921a argued that the colours produced on sensing objects by touch could 
represent properties of objects for a blind person because they were used in an appropriate way. But 
because Cutsforth's synaesthetic experience had a use did not turn it into a veridical representation. 
69 
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There are thus already mechanisms? which can allow misrepresentations to contribute 
to fitness. Selection does not necessarily turn misrepresentations into 
representations. 70 
If we have to regard the extra character of experience as a veridical 
representation in order to maintain the challenge to ER, perhaps we might do better 
construing it as representing not distal stimuli but local brain states? It might be 
argued that afterimages do not represent properties of possible objects but states of 
the visual system. M e r  all they are not much like visual experiences; for one thing, it 
is hard to see what they could be representing, and for another thing, they move with 
the eye rather than independently of it as other representations do. (Just as ringing in 
the ear seems to be located in the ear.) This move might then allow us to say 
something of a similar sort in the case of synaesthetic states. Maybe synaesthetic 
states should be seen as representing other states of the brain? Wager objects to this 
way out by arguing that we would then have to construe normal experiences as 
representing brain states rather than distal stimuli. But there is a crucial difference; 
whereas normal perceptual systems were selected for because they represented 
external objects, synaesthesia was originally selected for not because it represented 
external objects but because it drew the attention of its ancestors to their predators via 
drawing their attention to their auditory experiences via misrepresentations. What 
remains of the visual system might better be construed in the way that pain centres 
might be construed as representing states of the organism. The trouble is that, for 
reasons given in the preceding paragraph, such representations would still not 
constitute veridical represent at ions. 
In summary, Wager’s tripartite argument against the claim that the 
phenomenal character of experience can be hl ly  explained by representational 
properties has been met. Contrary to first intuitions synaesthesia does not show that 
the phenomenal character of synaesthetic experience involves intrinsic qualitative 
properties of experience. Indeed there is a theory available, the representational theory 
of the phenomenal mind, which explains the phenomenal character of synaesthetic 
For case three to work an extra module must be constituted which already presupposes intrinsic 71 I 
properties of experience, which is clearly to beg the question against ER. 
experience. But is it the only one? For ER the phenomenal character of experience is 
provided by the representation of phenomenal properties. Therefore experience is not 
hlly relational, but q~asi-relational.~~ The other way of meeting the extra qualia 
argument is to treat the phenomenal character of experience as fully relational. 
3.6 C Q K Q ~ O ~  Featirres and Synaesthetic Disjunctions 
For the presentationist the phenomenal character of experience is provided by the 
phenomenal properties objects present to the percipient. Presentationism is firstly a 
theory of how veridical perception is constituted. According to the presentationist the 
phenomenal character of our perceptual experience is determined by the phenomenal 
properties objects have: ‘the actual objects of perception, the external things such as 
trees, tables and rainbows, which one can perceive, and the properties which they 
manifest to one when perceived, partly constitute one’ s conscious experience, and 
hence determine the phenomenal character of one’s experience’.72 Martin goes on to 
point out the way ths  view differs from ER: ‘This talk of constitution and 
determination should be taken literally; and a consequence of it is that one could not 
be having the very experience one has, were the objects perceived not to exist, or 
were they to lack the features they are perceived to have’. Dretske claims the 
opposite: two representations with the same sense could have different referents (each 
having different features) or no referent at all. This view does not deny that two 
representations with the same sense can constitute two different states, the one might 
be a veridical perceptual experience and the other might be a hallucination. Which 
state one were in would depend on the relations which the representational states had 
to the world. But with respect to what constitutes the phenomenal character of 
experience the two representations belong to the one type of representational ~tate . ’~ 
For EP ‘it is of the essence of such states of mind that they are partly constituted by 
Intentional content is not an intermediary; it explains how objects come to be objects of awareness 
consistent with the view that experiential states form a highest common factor between veridical and 
non-veridical states. See Martm forthcoming. 
’’ Martin 1997: 83-4. 
71 
In this respect representationism aligns with phenomenism. 73 
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such objects, and their phenomenal characters are determined by those objects and 
their qualities. So one could not have such a type of state of mind were one not 
perceiving some object and correctly perceiving it to have the features it manifests 
itself as ha~ing’.’~ With respect to what constitutes the phenomenal character of 
experience, according to EP, veridical experiences and non-veridical experiences do 
not belong to the same type of state. 
ER can agree with EP about what is usually before the mind, namely the 
external objects of perception, but they disagree about how these external objects are 
before the mind. For ER external objects of perception are objects of representational 
states; their existence is not entailed by those intentional states. For EP if objects are 
the objects of a perceptual state then their existence is entailed by those perceptual 
states. One consequence of EP, as opposed to ER, is that the experiential state one is 
in is sufficient to guarantee a way the world is. Of course, one may not be aware of 
the state one is in, for being in a perceptual state, which is sufficient to guarantee a 
way the world is, does not discount one being in a non-veridical state which is 
indiscriminable fiom such a veridical state. This may be an epistemological difficulty 
for the presentationist, but it is not a metaphysical one. Even though there is a 
possible situation in which a subject is deluded and in which it may be just like it is for 
a subject who is presently veridically perceiving, this does not mean that one could be 
in the same type of state of mind in the two possible situations. In the one situation 
the subject is perceiving veridically and the character of perception is constituted by 
perceptible properties of objects; there is a state of perception. In the other situation 
it is as if the subject is perceiving veridically; there is a state of hallucination. 
The presentationist denies that there is any type of state common to a veridical 
experience and non-veridical experiences indiscriminable fi-om it. Veridical perception 
is not a conjunction of a type of state common to it and non-veridical experiences 
indiscriminable fiom it plus states of affajrs in the world. Rather the relationship 
between a veridical experience and non-veridical experiences indiscriminable it is 
characterised by a certain reading of a disjunctive claim. McDowell has expressed 
”Martin 1997: 8 3 3 .  
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this reading of the disjunctive claim in the following way: ‘an appearance that such- 
and-such is the case can be either a mere appearance or the fact made manifest to 
someone [. . .] the object of experience in the deceptive case is a mere appearance. But 
we are not to accept that in the non-deceptive cases too the object of experience is a 
mere appearance, and hence something that falls short of the fact itself. 75 When it 
looks to S that there is a church bell before her either: 
[PI There is a church bell before S 
or 
[Q] It merely looks to S that there is a church bell before her. 
S is unable to tell whether [PI or [Q] is the case. According to ER the inability of S 
to distinguish which of the disjuncts is the case can be explained by the fact that S is in 
a representational state which she would be in were either [PI or [Q] the case. 
According to EP the only reason for putting these states of affairs together is that S is 
unable to distinguish them. 
But as Martin has argued, the presentationist should not think of the 
disjunction of [PI and [Q] as involving two radically different states of affairs.76 The 
one way one might try to distinguish the class including all instances of [Q] is by their 
being indiscriminable from veridical perceptions. But this clearly will not work 
because indiscriminability cannot be the distinguishing characteristic, ‘for veridical 
perceptions, are, simply in virtue of their identity, indistinguishable fiom veridical 
perceptions, so all seemings and not just mere appearances meet the 
indistinguishability criterion’.’’ One way of denying that mere appearance is a 
common element after all is to argue that some mental states are hndamental. Martin 
claims that perception cannot be factored into components (an internal factor and 
external factors). So he argues that veridical experience has a hndamental 
explanatory role. I.__ It may be that veridical and non-veridical experiences cannot be 
’’ McDowell: 1982: 21 1 .  See also Snowdon 1980 and Martin 1997 for defences of disjunctivism With 
respect to perceptual experience. 
’6 Here Martin 1997: 87 follows Williamson 1995: 560. 
’’ Martin 1997: 83-8. 
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distinguished, but this is not in virtue of a class of appearances, which should be 
considered to have an autonomous status within the subject's mental economy. The 
phenomenal characters of hallucinations, which are indistinguishable from veridical 
perception, are only explained by reference to the phenomenal character of veridical 
perception; 'one can only characterise the delusive case relationally by what it is 
indistinguishable from'. EP would appear to have a limited explanation of non- 
veridical experience. Their response is that non-veridical experiences are not only 
deceptive about the world but also deceptive about themselves: one should not expect 
any inore explanation of them in virtue of their appearance. 
The disjunctivist view builds on a notion o f  discrimination. Our perception 
of objects and their properties requires our ability to distinguish objects from each 
other. In a sense, the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is also 
dependent upon the ability to discriminate (although this is not to suggest that 
phenomenal character is wholly so d e ~ e n d e n t ) . ~ ~  So a perceptual state is the particular 
result of such abilities to discriminate. Sometimes, however, a subject of perception is 
not able to distinguish between two objects of perception; they may be indiscriminable 
without being identical. The disjunctivist argument concerns the ability, or lack 
thereof, then to discriminate such a perceptual state from a different state. EP applies 
to the discrimination of mental states the natural thought that our powers of 
discrimination in perception are outstripped by features of the world. So there seems 
reason to think that we may be unable to discriminate between mental states, which 
might be of very different underlying natures. Although hallucinations may be 
explained by reference to the same local states as are referred to in explanation of 
veridical perceptual states according to EP those types of local physical states realise 
different, but indiscriminable states. In neither case is the local physical state sufficient 
for a mental state. It is not sufficient to explain hallucinatory experience because that 
requires reference to veridical perception and veridical perception is constituted by 
reference to properties of objects. 
79 
If what has been said in the previous chapter is correct, the capacity to discriminate is actuallj a 
part of the constitution of cognitive modules. 
For a full treatment see Williamson 1990. 
'8 
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How does EP explain the phenomenal character of synaesthetic experience? 
Synaesthetic experiences are not indiscriminable from veridical experiences; there are 
no veridical experiences from which synaesthetic experiences are indiscriminable. 
Nevertheless in synaesthesia experiences are had which are in the relevant respects 
just like veridical experiences: there is an experience of colour in the relevant respects 
indiscriminable from perceptual experiences of colour. *’ Although the phenomenal 
character of synaesthetic experiences may be explained by reference to the same local 
states as are referred to in explanation of veridical perceptual states according to EP 
those types of local physical states realise different, but indiscriminable states. In 
neither case is the local physical state sufficient for a mental state, in particular a 
common representational state. The local physical state is not sufficient to explain the 
phenomenal character of synaesthetic experience because that requires reference to 
veridical perception and veridical perception is constituted by reference to properties 
of objects. The fact that the character of synaesthetic experience of red is 
indiscriminable fi-om character of the veridical experience of red in the relevant 
respect is not to be explained by a representational state held in common. 
Synaesthesia requires the development of aspects of both ER and EP, but it 
does not require a development such that one of the views stands obviously above the 
other. 
The phenomenal character of experience of synaesthesia is often described as ‘vivid’. This 
suggests that it is unlike forms of experience like imagning or recalling which can be clearly 
distinguished fioin perceptual experiences. 
80 
Chapter 4 
Hearing Colours and Coloured Hearing 
4.1 The Individuation of Modes of Perception 
Two locutions can be found in explanation of the meaning of the term ‘synaesthesia’. 
One locution - ‘hearing colours’ (‘seeing sounds’, ‘tasting shapes’ etc.) - might be 
derived fiom the testimony of some synaesthetes. It has certainly been developed by 
popular accounts of synaesthesia. As for the derivation, consider the different ways in 
which synaesthetes talk about their similar experiences: ‘I am a sighthound 
synesthete, most oRen seeing sound as colors [...I It’s definitely colors, but I’m not 
sure that ‘seeing’ is the most accurate description. I am seeing, but not with my eyes, 
if that makes sense’.’ The shapes are not distinct from hearing - they are part of what 
hearing is ... That’s what the sound is; it couldn’t possibly be anything else’.2 ‘I see 
shapes and colours in response to sounds. [. . .] I have trouble putting into words some 
of the things I experience. It is like explaining red to a blind person or Middle C to a 
deaf person. These connections have been with me essentially since birth and are so 
natural that they are hard to put down on paper’.3 We might expect some difficulty in 
talking about something which, just because it is non-standard or is not in the public 
domain, is not commonly talked about. As for the development, one need oniy 
mention the title of Cytowic’s popular treatment of synaesthesia, 7he Man who 
Tasted Shapes. But consider also what he says in his later review of synaesthesia: 
‘ [. . .] the word ‘ synesthesia’, meaning ‘joined sensation’, [. . .] denotes the rare capacity 
to hear colors, taste shapes, or experience other equally startling sensory blendings 
whose quality seems difficult for most of us to imagine’.‘ The other locution - 
‘coloured hearing’ - derives fiom psychologists. In explaining synaesthesia Baron- 
Cytowic 1989: 27, subject RP. 
‘ Cytowic 1989: 65, subject DS 
Cytowic 1989: 32, subject MM. 
‘ Cytowic 1996. 
1 
156 Synaesthesia 
Cohen and Harrison write: ‘[ ...I he may well have experienced coloured-hearing 
synaesthesia, a condition in which a sensation in one modality gives rise to sensations 
in another’.’ In the previous chapters the second locution, that of coloured hearing, 
has been adopted. It is a technical term. But it might be neither an obvious nor a 
natural way of talking of synaesthesia, as the synaesthetes themselves suggest? 
We are clearly able to use terms to represent modes of perception, that is to 
say, we have a command of concepts of modes of perception. We are generally able 
to accept certain states as states of seeing and other states as states of hearing. But it 
is one thing to possess a concept of a mode of perception and it is another thing to 
have an explicit understanding of what is involved in that conceptualisation. It may be 
that some people possess the concept of a mode of perception without thinking about 
the grounds they have for using that concept; that is one way in which someone might 
not have an explicit understanding of the concept of a mode of perception. Perhaps 
that is why some people refer to the relevant type of synaesthesia as ‘hearing colours7. 
It might be that other people, such as philosophers, consider the grounds they have 
for using the concept of a mode of perception but they disagree about what grounds 
constitute such a concept. It might be for this reason that the locution of ‘hearing 
colours’ is rejected for different reasons. 
Suppose words express the concepts we use to represent the world. Let us 
hrther suppose that concepts stand to properties in the way that modes of 
presentation stand to objects. The locutions ‘hearing colours’ and ‘coloured hearing‘ 
might express two different ways of thinlung about the one property of undergoing 
synaesthetic experiences; both ways of speaking would relate existing concepts of 
ours in different ways in order to represent the same property. However we would 
have to reject one way of speaking in favour of the other if it could be shown that one 
of the two locutions made no sense, or if it could be shown that the two locutions had 
different references and that we were actually talking about one of those possible 
5 
- Baron-Cohen & Harrison 1995. As outlined in chapter one, this is in keeping with a tradition 
dating from the late nineteenth century. 
It might be argued by synaesthetes themselves that they do not seem to be undergoing coloured 
hearing. But then how would synaesthetes know what it was like to undergo coloured-hearing? It 
might be just how it is to undergo synaesthesia. 
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referents rather than the other. Deciding between the two locutions requires deeper 
consideration of the semantics of perception terms. 
This chapter examines how and why we might think (and talk) about 
synaesthesia given the context of other standard perceptual processes. In so doing it 
focuses the attention on how and why we think (and talk) about modes of perception. 
It is uncontentious that sensory modalities are individuated by a combination of 
criteria: the diverse objects of perception, the distinct characters of perceptual 
experience, the diverse media of perception and different types of perceptual organ 
(and perhaps neural processing). It is a plausible suggestion that we can 
distinguish a sensory modality p a  sensory modality only if we can distinguish it from 
other sensory modalities. It is not clear that perceptual modalities can be distinguished 
if one were only acquainted with the distinct characters of a particular perceptual 
modality for reasons given in section 4.2. For reasons given in section 4.3 there are 
difficulties with the view that a perceptual modality could be distinguished ifwe were 
only to be acquainted with the objects of that perceptual modality. It seems 
implausible that perceptual modalities can be individuated by reference only to 
perceptual organs, independently of how they fbnction. Would we be able to tell that 
an object we had never seen before were a new kind of sensory organ unless we also 
knew what it was causally related to? Perceptual modalities are individuated, and 
known to be so individuated, by reference to a number of criteria. If none of these 
criteria are sufficient are they all necessary? And how are these criteria related to 
each other? Are some criteria more basic than others in the individuation of perceptual 
modalities? On what evidence do we distinguish one perceptual modality from another 
one? The considerations of this chapter, which arise fiom an analysis of synaesthesia, 
are intended to shed some light on these issues. 
The first question to ask is: how should we represent synaesthesia given the 
concepts of modes of perception we have and thus how should we express this 
representation in language? Such would lead to a response to the problem posed by 
the presence of the two different locutions described in the first paragraph of this 
chapter. It would at the same time lead to a clearer understanding of what is involved 
in our conceptualisation of modes of perception. Concepts are one way of 
158 Synaesthesia 
representing the world. According to some of the theories of perceptual experience 
discussed in the previous chapter some properties objects possess are also represented 
by us nonconceptually; this is supposed to contribute to an explanation of the 
phenomenal character of perceptual experience. Some properties of objects are 
represented via specific sensory modalities: the colours objects have are represented 
via seeing, the sounds objects make are represented via hearing, the smells objects 
have are represented via smell and the taste objects have are represented via taste. 
We clearly have concepts of modes of perception. But are modes of perception 
represented non-conceptually? This issue relates to the issue of how we represent 
modes of perception conceptually: in so far as we represent nonconceptually 
properties as being of a particular modality, we might be constrained in the 
conceptualisations could make (and thus the locutions we could employ). 
The following discussion of the way we represent modes of perception is 
arranged as follows. The rejection of the first way of thinking (that synaesthetes hear 
colours, see sounds, taste shapes) and thus the form of locution (‘hearing colours’ 
(‘seeing sounds’, ‘tasting shapes’ etc.) occupies section 4.2. The section includes a 
discussion of an example and a line of argument concerning our concepts of modes of 
perception (and perceptibilia) proposed by Johnston. Although Johnston rejects the 
first way of talking about synaesthesia on the grounds that it is meaningless, the 
interpretation he gives of a case of synaesthesia, and of why this does not support the 
first locution, is open to certain objections. Consequently a different route to the 
rejection of the notion of hearing colours is required. This route suggests a priority of 
some individuating conditions for modes of perception over others, specifically the 
presupposition of the relation between determinate kinds of perceptual organs and the 
diverse objects of perception above determinate kinds of characters of experience. If 
we do think of modes of perception in this way it might be that the notion of ‘hearing 
colours’ is not meaningless but false. 
In section 4.3 a related issue is considered: whether it is even metaphysically 
possible to hear colours. It may be that it is not possible to hear colours in the actual 
world given our concepts of modes of perception and perceptibilia and the way the 
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actual world is constituted; it is a further question whether it is metaphysically 
impossible to hear colours, given our concepts of modes of perception and 
perceptibilia and the way the world could be constituted. A possible world is 
discussed in which our experience was qualitatively similar to how it actually is and 
yet we were perceiving via a different perceptual modality. Of such a world it would 
make sense to talk of ‘hearing coJours’ if it were stipulated that a perceptual modality 
is primarily individuated by a perceptual organ and it were also held that colours 
supervened on properties that sensory organ was related to. Of course the 
supervenience claim may not be attractive, that is not the point, if it were rejected it 
would have to be rejected on grounds Other than conceptual grounds or grounds of 
acquaintance, the usual grounds for rejecting the notion of hearing colours. 
In section 4.4 the adoption of the second form of locution is considered. This 
involves an examination and extension of the adverbial approach to perception. The 
adverbial approach is used to show that our talk of phenomenal objects can be 
rejected in favour of adverbial modifications. In the present case the adverbialism can 
be firther rendered by the term ‘coloured’, now however having an extended sense. 
There is no reason for employing an adverbial analysis to justi@ the usage of the 
locution ‘coloured hearing’ unless one can explicate the content of the underlying 
concept expressed by the extended sense of the term ‘coloured’. The extended sense 
of the term ‘coloured’ introduced through an adverbial analysis is compatible with a 
version of nonconceptual representational content. In section 4.5 I elaborate on the 
relative importance of the different criteria of distinctive sensory modalities. 
4.2 Revelofion and Explanation: A Case Study 
Some people claim it to be an empirical fact, perhaps even an important empirical fact, 
that colours can be heard and sounds can be seen: ‘Are there really people who can 
hear colors, taste shapes, see pain, and have their various senses filled with color? 
m e r  collecting cases over a number of years, I conc;iude that the answer is 
unequivocally yes’. Reconsider what Merleau-Ponty said about synaesthesia: ‘For 
’ Cytowic 1989: 1-2. Cytowic gives as a reason for synaesthesia being a perceptual process the fact 
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the subject does not say only that he has the sensation both of a sound and a colour: it 
is the sound itself that he sees where colours are formed’.’ Synaesthesia, no doubt, 
provides psychologists with a hrther set of data, which calls for explanation. The 
suggestion, in some quarters, seems to be that this set of data shows us, perhaps for 
the first time, that what is usually sensed via one modality can also be sensed via 
another modality: colours are usually seen, but synaesthesia shows us that they can 
actually be heard too; sounds are usually heard, but synaesthesia shows us that they 
can actually be seen too. On this view, the locutions ‘hearing colours’ and ‘seeing 
sounds’ and so on not only make sense, they turn out to have items, or states of 
affairs, to which they apply. 
Some people, probably most people, would reject this view. It might be 
observed that, although the data cannot plausibly be denied, they have still to be 
related to an existing conceptual fiamework. What makes language meaninghl 
depends both on the world and on us. Claiming synaesthesia as proof that colours can 
be heard neglects this latter element. On this second view, to describe a case of 
synaesthesia as a process either of hearing colours or of seeing sounds is just to 
misdescribe it; it is to misapply our  concept^.^ But it may not be immediately clear 
why concepts have been misapplied. Or objections might be found in different places. 
Is it because those who misapply their concepts in this way use the terms ‘hearing’ 
and ‘seeing’ when they should not? Or because they use the terms ‘colour’ and 
‘sound’ when they should not? Or because they use combinations of the terms, as in 
‘hearing colours’ or ‘seeing sounds’, when they should not? The view to be endorsed 
here is that to talk of the processes underlying synaesthesia as, for instance, ones of 
‘hearing colours’ or ‘seeing sounds’, is indeed to misdescribe them. Exactly how 
this is so will become clearer by comparison with another argument, due to Johnston, 
which endorses a similar conclusion by different means. l0 
Johnston suggests that: ‘the philosophy of color is one of those genial areas of 
that it is a product of the brain rather than the mind. This is an invalid inference; hallucinations are 
brain processes. but we do not think o f  them as perceptual processes. 
’ Merleau-Ponty 1962: 229. 
The use of scare quotes - ‘hearing’ colours and ‘seeing’ sounds - is meant to endorse this view. 9 
1 Cl Johnston 1992, republished 1997. references will be made to the latter. 
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inquiry in which the main competing positions are each in their own way perfectly 
true. For example, as between those who say that the external world is colored and 
those who say that the external world is not colored, the judicious choice is to agree 
with both’.” This suggestion derives from a view about the beliefs we have about 
colour from our experience of colour. Of the beliefs about colour to which we are 
susceptible given our visual experience and the way we take that experience, some are 
‘core’ and some are ‘peripheral’. Beliefs are ‘core’ in the sense that if they turned out 
to be untrue ‘we would have trouble saying what they were false of;  in the process 
we would have been deprived of a subject matter. They are ‘peripheral’ in the sense 
that we can reject them without changing a stable subject matter. The former might 
involve what would be called analytic or conceptual truths (truths in virtue of the 
content of the concepts involved); the latter might involve what would be called 
synthetic truths (truths in virtue of both the content of the concepts involved and the 
world). According to Johnston the lack of any sharp analytic/synthetic distinction 
allows one to draw the boundary between the core and periphery beliefs at different 
points. One can agree with the view that the world is coloured and with the view that 
the world is not coloured by drawing the boundary between the core and peripheral 
beliefs at different places. 
But what makes us draw the boundary at a specific point? Johnston claims that 
one can agree with the view that the world is not coloured in that one draws the 
boundary in one place: one agrees with the view that ‘ever so inclusively speaking the 
external world is not colored’. To speak ‘ever so inclusively’ of colour is to employ a 
conception of colour which ‘underwrites’ every belief included in the core; if we 
include all such beliefs we will have to agree with the view that the world is not 
coloured. But Johnston also claims that such a conception of colour is ‘internally 
inconsistent’. This being so however we should not consider revision of our talk of 
colour but consider ‘how inclusively we have to speak’. Johnston’s view is that we 
should not revise our core beliefs but employ a conception of colour which 
underwrites most but not all of those core beliefs. One agrees with the view that the 
world is coloured if one draws the boundary in another place: one agrees with the 
~~ ~ 
Johnston 1997: 137. 
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view that ‘more or less inclusively speaking the external world is colored’.12 
Johnston develops this view by reference to five beliefs about colour, which he 
claims can be regarded as core beliefs. Consider canary yellow as a typical colour the 
five core beliefs concern: paradigms (some paradigm examples of canary yellow 
things (e.g. some canaries) are canary yellow); explanation (something being canary 
yellow sometimes explains our experience of canary yellow things); unity (colours like 
canary yellow have their own place in the network of similarity, difference and 
exclusion relations of the whole family of shades); availability (justified beliefs about 
the canary yellowness of things are available simply on the basis of visual experience); 
and revelation (the intrinsic nature of canary yellow is ‘fblly revealed by a standard 
visual experience as of a canary yellow thing’). These five beliefs, are at times in 
tension with each other. For instance, revelation and explanation seem in tension; a 
visual experience is supposed to kl ly  reveal the intrinsic nature of colour, yet it does 
not reveal the underlying properties of colour, which sometimes explain the 
experience of colour. According to Johnston, to include all the beliefs in the core we 
would have to assume that the external world is not coloured. Johnston believes that 
we should not consider elimination or revision of talk but should consider 
compromise, of speaking of colour less inclusively, that is to say, having a conception 
of colour which includes as many of the beliefs as possible. That turns out to be a 
secondary quality view. 
This seems a puzzling premise for an argument. Surely if explanation and 
revelation conflict in the way Johnston says they do in order to motivate hs view that 
ever so inclusively speaking the world is not coloured then there is in fact no ever so 
inclusively way of speaking of colour. Then the question arises as to why we should 
relegate our belief about explanation rather than revelation? He favours the view that 
ordinarily we are inclined towards the pull of revelation (hence it is a core belief) but 
in so doing we are malung a cognitive error. The present discussion can also be seen 
as raising hrther questions about the notion of revelation, specifically whether we are 
indeed inclined towards its pull (and therefore whether it is core belief). And therefore 
”Johnston 1997: 137. 
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indirectly it questions the view that the best tactic to take towards our talk of colour is 
to accommodate the notion of revelation and thus the claim that a secondary quality 
view should be adopted. But the following discussion will focus on perceptual 
modaliti es. 
Matters will be made easier by takmg a concrete example. Johnston considers 
the case of the composer Alexander Scriabin (1872-1915) of whom it has been 
suggested, probably wrongly, that he was synaesthetic. l3 Johnston says that although 
what it was like to be Scriabin is an interesting question whatever it was it would not 
have made him think he was seeing sounds. Even if ‘the visual experiences Scriabin 
had when he heard B-flat presented themselves as revelations of the nature of B-flat 
[...I it is hard not to imagine Scriabin then going on to think of B-flat as a sensible 
complex with two sides to its nature, the one which all people with perfect pitch 
knew, and the other reserved for him and a few other select souls’.’4 What he could 
not have ‘coherently thought’ according to Johnston was that B-flat was a ‘simple 
quality whose nature was as much revealed by vision as by hearing’. In opposition to 
those who might say that synaesthesia is the rare capacity to see sounds, Johnston 
claims that cases of synaesthesia, like the one exemplified by Scriabin, are cases in 
which it simply makes no sense to say that synaesthetes ‘saw the sound B-flat’. What 
might presumably be said is that Scriabin heard B-flat along with everyone else and in 
some other way knew the other side of the sensible complex B-flat. Most importantly 
the locution ‘seeing sounds’ here makes no sense, it expresses an ‘absurd thought’, 
for the reason that it is ‘ruled out by our intuitive condition on vzsibilid. 
The intuitive condition on visibilia Johnston is referring to here is explicated in 
a preceding passage with respect to the faculty of vision: 
The faculty of vision either represents itself as (or is spontaneously taken by its 
possessors as) a mode of revelation of the natures of certain properties of visible thugs, 
viz. their colours and Euclidean shapes. A particular counts as visible only if it has 
visible properties and it has visible properties only if it has properties with whose nature 
l 3  See Myers 1915. It is questionable whether Scriabin was truly synaesthetic. Myers records a 
conversation with Scriabin in which the latter admitted that when listening to music he just had a 
feeling of colour, only when the feeling was very intense &d it pass over into an image of colour. 
But the question of the genuiness or otherwise of Scriabin’s synaesthesia is not important for 
present purposes. 
Johnston 1997: 164. I ?  
vision acquaints us. ’ 
This intuitive condition on visibilia, as things which have properties ‘with whose 
nature vision acquaints us’ allows Johnston to rule out Scriabin’s experience as one of 
‘seeing sounds’ or, in other words, to endorse the use of scare quotes in the locution 
“seeing sounds”. One might think of the necessary and sufficient conditions of a 
property being visible. Although ‘it is a necessary condition of a property F being 
visible that something’s having F at some time explains a visual experience, this is not 
sufficient’; a sound property may explain a visual experience without being a ‘visible 
property’ because ‘vision does not acquaint us yith the nature o f  [this property] but 
only with [its] effects’. l6 
As Johnston reiterates with respect to the thought that the ‘physical properties 
associated with sound could also have been the dominant cause of our visual 
experiences, ‘this would not have been a case in which we would have ‘seen sound in 
the relevant sense’. His conclusion is that: ‘the trouble with the idea that we could 
have seen the sound properties is that vision could tell us nothing about the natures of 
such properties, it could not acquaint us with the way these properties intrinsically 
are, it could only acquaint us with their  effect^'.'^ Even in the bizarre possible world 
in which ‘similar physical processes are causally responsible for both the appearance 
of canary yellow and the sound of B-flat (Johnston presumably means soundwaves) it 
would be wrong to say that we see B-flat as we see canary yellow’. What goes for the 
possible world goes for the actual world: ‘It would have been equally wrong to say 
this if the actual world had turned out to be bizarre in just this way’. The reason for 
this is that we would not then have perceived the intrinsic properties of sound by 
means of vision. Presumably as hard as we look in the direction fi-om which a sound is 
coming from we would not see its intrinsic properties.18 
I s  Johnston 1997: 164. 
l 6  Johnston 1997: 164. 
Johnston 1997: 164. 
For reasons to be explained in the next section I take it that in a possible world in which the 
physical processes responsible for the appearance of canary yellow might be those that are 
responsible for the appearance of B-flat in the actual world (soundwaves). In such a case it might 
make sense to say that colours were heard (rather than that sounds were seen). 
18 
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Johnston’s line of reasoning can also be directed against the view that some 
people hear colours. We can repeat his  definition, mutatis mutandzs, for hearing: 
The faculty of hearing either represents itself as (or is spontaneously taken by its 
possessors as) a mode o f  revelation o f  the natures of certam properties of audble 
thmgs (or events), viz. their sounds. A particular counts as audble only if it has 
audible properties and it has auchble properbes only if it has properties with whose 
nature hearing acquaints us. 
One might think of the necessary and sufficient conditions of a property being audible. 
Although it is a necessary condition of a property F being audible that something’s 
having F at some time explains an auditory experience, this is not sufficient; a colour 
property may explain an auditory experience without being an audible property 
because hearing does not acquaint us with the nature of this property but only with its 
effects. 
The locution of ‘hearing colours’ would make no sense for reasons parallel to 
those employed to show the senselessness of ‘seeing sounds’. Consider the reverse 
form of synaesthesia. Suppose that every time a bright red light was turned on a 
synaesthete (of the relevant variety) in the vicinity experienced a tone of a certain 
frequency. Johnston, according to his definition, would have to say that this would 
not be a case of hearing colours because hearing does not reveal the intrinsic nature of 
the bright red light, only its effects. Even in the bizarre possible world in which similar 
physical processes (i.e. lightwaves) are causally responsible for both the appearance of 
B-flat and the appearance of canary yellow it would be wrong to say that we hear 
canary yellow as we hear B-flat. The reason for this is that we would not in such a 
world have perceived the intrinsic properties of colour by means of hearing. 
Presumably as hard as we listen in the direction of a coloured object we do not hear 
its intrinsic visible properties. l9 
The proposal is thus that there is some sort of essential relation, revealed to us 
in perception, which holds between vision and colour and Euclidean shape (namely, 
visibilia) and between hearing and sounds. So to think or talk of a case of 
And equivalently in a possible world in which the physical processes responsible for the 
appearance of B-flat might be those that are responsible for the appearance of canary yellow in the 
actual world (lightwaves). In such a case it might make sense to say that sounds were Seen (rather 
than colours were heard). 
19 
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synaesthesia as a case of seeing sounds would be to ignore the essential relation 
between vision and visibilia. And to thmk or talk of a case o f  synaesthesia as a case of 
hearing colours would be to ignore the essential relation between audition and 
audibilia. It is perhaps curious that one of our core beliefs should not be immediately 
acknowledged by everyone. Merleau-Ponty for one did not think it was obvious: ‘For 
the subject does not say only that he has the sensation both of a sound and a colour: it 
is the sound itself that he sees where colours are formed’.20 Neither do synaesthetes 
seem to think that it is obvious. More than a little thought is required either to reveal 
o exclude synaesthetic 
it is not immediately 
to us any essential relation between vision and visibilia or 
experiences from counting as instances of seeing sounds; 
‘revealed’ in vision and in hearing. 
According to Johnston’s view we are forced to reject the claim that 
synaesthesia shows it to be an empirical fact that some people see sounds and hear 
colours as incoherent. It is a necessary falsehood. But why should we believe this 
necessary falsehood on the basis of revelation? Although Johnston’s thesis seems to 
be a conceptual or analytic thesis (‘seeing sounds’ expresses an ‘absurd thought’), it 
seems also to be based on the evidence of the senses. Colours are revealed in vision as 
visible properties and sounds are revealed in audition as audible properties. But this is 
surely a posteriori evidence. It might of course be an a posteriori necessity that we 
can neither see sounds nor hear colours. But it is not clear that revelation can deliver 
this truth. For one thing it seems to be derived from the belief of normal perceivers 
that as hard as they look they cannot perceive the intrinsic properties of sounds, and 
therefore sounds cannot be seen, and as hard as they listen they cannot perceive the 
intrinsic properties of colours, and therefore colours cannot be heard. But this does 
not tell us about what other perceivers can possibly perceive. So the notion of 
revelation has a considerable load to bear in the argument. And since this is based on 
the notion that the ‘faculty of vision either represents itself as (or is spontaneously 
taken by its possessors as) a mode of revelation of the natures of certain properties of 
”’ Merleau-Ponty 1962: 228. Psychologists would probably dispute Merleau-Ponty ’ s description of 
what synaesthetes’ experience, in particular the replacement of one phenomenal character by 
another. The point is that Merleau-Ponty thought that it is possible to see sounds. 
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visible things, viz. their colours and Euclidean shapes’ this notion has just as much a 
load to bear. 
The notion that the faculty of vision represents itself as a mode of revelation of 
the natures of certain properties of visible things thus involves a circularity: vision is 
that which reveals vkible properties and visible properties are what are revealed by 
vision. It is informative in so far as vision reveals the intrinsic properties of visibilia. It 
does not represent itself as (and presumably therefore it represents itself as not) 
revealing the intrinsic properties of sounds and other non-visible perceptible 
properties, only, in the case of synaesthetes, their non-intrinsic properties. But why 
are we to believe this? Why are we to believe that modes of perception reveal 
different intrinsic properties of objects and, in the case of synaesthetes, only reveal 
non-intrinsic properties, on the basis of revelation alone? To differentiate between 
intrinsic and non-intrinsic properties in this way might we not think it obvious to look 
for a different kind of evidence? Rather than rely on revelation might we not try to 
find out whether there were any causal features common to the synaesthetic 
experiences of colour and veridical experiences of colour and sound? This thought 
becomes more pressing if Johnston got things the wrong way round: it was not that 
Scriabin rnight have been seeing sounds, it was that he might have been hearing 
colours. The sound B-flat might have colour properties that only synaesthetes can be 
acquainted with and they are acquainted with them via hearing. The only way we can 
tell this is via evidence other than that which is revealed in perceptual acquaintance. 
We should rely on more than the deliverances of revelation. This does not 
automatically show that we might nevertheless normally be subject to the ‘pull of 
revelation’. How might th is  be? 
The claim of revelation might be understood in another way: the nature of 
vision, as a mode of revelation, is revealed by the fact that certain properties of the 
external world, such as colours and Euclidean shapes, are represented to us as being 
perceived visually; whether something is visible is given in the content of experience. 
Similarly the nature of audition, as a mode of revelation, is revealed by the fact that 
certain properties of the external world, properties of sound, are represented to us as 




experience. The character of an experience of colour is given as a visual experience 
and the character of an experience of sound is given as an auditory experience; these 
would be intrinsic properties of the respective experiences. Some support for this 
reading comes fiom Johnston’s usage of the terminology ‘visual experience’ to 
describe the anomalous features of Scriabin’ s synaesthetic experience. The best reason 
for considering these to be visual experiences might be that whether an experience is a 
visual experience or not is given in the character of the experience. If this is so then 
it makes no sense to say that sounds can be seen, nor that colours can be heard. 
Colours and Euclidean shapes are perceived as visible properties and properties of 
sounds are perceived as audible properties. Visible properties cannot be perceived as 
visible properties unless they are perceived by vision, and audible properties cannot be 
perceived as audible properties unless they are perceived by hearing. 21 
The trouble is that this begs the question in a similar way to the first 
characterisation of revelation. What reason have we to think that Scriabin’s 
synaesthetic experiences were visual experiences? And what reason have we for 
thinlung that the characters of experience distinctive of other sensory modalities are 
represented by their subjects as being o f  a specific modality? Presumably only the 
deliverances of revelation. Ryle warns o f  the dif’riculty here: 
What then of the other, sophsticated sense of ‘sensation’, the sense in which it is said 
that seeing involves having visual sensations or impressions? Sensations or impressions 
in this sense are not things that people mention. until they have at least a hearsay 
knowledge of physiological, psychological or epistemological theories. Yet long before 
they reach this level of edrfication, they know how to use verbs of perception, lrke ‘see’, 
’hear’, ‘taste., ’sniell‘, and ‘feel’, and they use them then just as they continue to use 
them &er edrfication. So the sophisticated concept of sensations or impressions is not a 
component of their concepts of perception. 22 
“ In the contest of the current discussion consider also a related remark by Peacocke (1984: 371) 
about why his theory of vision does not make it: ’a mysterious inexplicable necessary truth that one 
cannot experience objects as red in modalities other than the visual: the impossibility is rather a 
simple consequence of an account of what it is for an object to be red which mentions speclfically a 
feature special to visual appearance (viz. a red quale)’. Searle (1983: 48) also argues that contents 
visually entertained are contents whch essentially involve the concept of vision. They are complex 
self-referential contents: being visually aware of something is a way of being aware of oneself in a 
certain way. ’’ Ryle 1949: 229. 
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Perhaps it would be better to remain neutral about whether the anomalous features of 
the synaesthetic experience should be characterised as ‘visual experiences’. Or we 
might think of anomalous features of the synaesthetic experience as ‘visual 
experiences’ for another quite different reason. Namely, that they are experiences as 
of colour and shape and experiences of colour and shape do partly constitute visual 
experiences. But normal experiences of colour and Euclidean shape need not be 
visual experiences because they are revealed to us as such, but because they involve 
the mediation of specific external stimuli by our visual organs. So it may be better if 
we do not consider the type of synaesthetic experiences supposedly undergone by 
Scriabin as visual experiences just because they are revealed as such but because they 
are as of colour and Euclidean shape. 
There is another way of thinking of this reading of Johnston’s thesis: by way 
of relating the character of experience to the notion of acquaintance (recall that the 
metaphysical issue of the individuation of perceptual modalities is closely related to 
the epistemic issue of how we know perceptual modalities to be distinct). We would 
know that we were perceiving via a particular sensory modality through the character 
of the experience if the character of experience were self-intimating in some way. 
According to Johnston, a mode of perception reveals certain properties. But the 
mode of perception is not to be distinguished by those properties, for the properties 
are distinctive only because revealed by a sort of acquaintance and acquaintance (a 
certain kind of knowledge) is determined by the kind of experience we have. In the 
case of vision, that we are visually acquainted with features would be indicated by 
having a certain sort of experience which reveals the nature of visible properties. 
The problem with this way of thinking is that Johnston then states that 
synaesthetes do not see sounds because the (visual) experiences (which would seem 
to indicate visual acquaintance) do not actually acquaint synaesthetes with the nature 
of sounds. Rejection of the possibility that Scriabin sees sounds however will only 
work if the sensory modality is actually being distinguished by the nature of the 
intrinsic properties of what is perceived, rather than by the nature OF the experience, 
which is supposed to reveal those properties. 
There are other difficulties for this view. If acquaintance were self-intimating 
in this way, synaesthetes would naturally be deceived, they would take themselves to 
have had a visual experience. But it seems that it is not clearly the case for 
synaesthetes; they are not obviously deceived. As the quotations of the opening 
section show, some may say they are having a visual experience and seeing sounds, 
others may think they are hearing. The question of appearance is often subordinated 
to other criteria. Synaesthetes may even revise their view that they see sound or hear 
colours. 
The suggestion that we could always individuate seeing and hearing solely by 
acquaintance with the colours and the sounds might be flawed in another way. 
Underlying the suggestion is the view that the sensory modalities could be 
individuated by the distinctive phenomenal characters of the experiences of colours 
and sounds alone. As things stand, we are indeed able to discriminate colours from 
each other in seeing things, discriminate sounds fiom each other in hearing things, and 
discriminate colours and sounds from each other in seeing and hearing things. In line 
with one way of understanding the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences 
of particular perceptual modalities such characters would belong to distinct classes 
because they belong to distinct quality spaces. A creature, which can see, possesses a 
visual quality space. A creature, which can hear, possesses an auditory quality space. 
Although these quality spaces are actualised by external stimuli, the possession of a 
quality space involves the possession of discriminatory abilities. 
Whereas the visual quality space and the auditory quality spaces are each 
constituted by processes of discrimination and the presence of indiscriminability (see 
section L4), the two quality spaces can be individuated because we can always 
discriminate between a colour character and a sound character. There is no 
indiscriminability present here. It would be for this reason that we have two quality 
spaces and thus that we have two distinct sensory modalities. But can we assume, 
just because we do discriminate between tokens of the two types of character, that 
this is necessarily so? Perhaps a creature could be so constituted as to fail to 
discriminate between the two types of character of experience. Suppose it was not 
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designed to discriminate between them. In this case both quality spaces would turn 
out to be subspaces of the same quality space. In other words we have no reason for 
thinking that visual quality space and auditory quality space are distinct quality spaces 
in virtue of anything intrinsic to particular experiences. The way those experiences 
are had has to be adverted to in order to distinguish a sensory modality. 
There is another comment of Johnston’s, which supports the present reading. 
Johnston claims that vision could acquaint us with the effects of audible properties. 
Presumably the thought is that these effects of sounds are experiences of colour and 
shape which vision reveals to us. But it might, at this point, be wondered whether it 
makes sense to say that vision could acquaint us with the effects of audible properties. 
It might be true that vision acquaints us with visible properties. It might be true that 
vision acquaints us with the effects of audible properties, as when audible properties 
also affect visible properties; such as when sounds of sufficient energy affect physical 
objects visibly. In the case of synaesthesia though, if one said anything, one would 
surely say that part of their visual system acquaints a synaesthete with the effects of 
audible properties. But the hnctioning of part of the visual system is not the same as 
vision. To see this one only needs to consider the following kmd of example. A blind 
person, if they were synaesthetic, might still be acquainted with the effects of audible 
properties. Yet it would not be by means of vision for by hypothesis they would be 
blind; they only have part of their visual system hnctioning properly. 
It might even be argued that in this case the intrinsic properties of colours 
could be revealed by hearing in some sense of the notion of revelation intended by 
Johnston. If a synaesthete were blind they might still have experiences of colour 
enabled by sounds. According to revelation the intrinsic nature of e.g. canary yellow is 
h l l y  revealed by a standard visual experience as of a canary yellow thing. Surely what 
is important is that what it is like to be a particular colour (e.g. canary yellow) is fblly 
revealed in such an experience. But this central feature, what it is like to be the colour 
canary yellow, might be fblfilled by a synaesthetic experience of canary yellow enabled 
. *by B-flat. So it would not even be that colours could only be revealed by vision. Yet 
another reason to be wary of the notion of revelation. 
There is a final point. Johnston asks whether the visual experiences Scriabin 
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had when he heard B-flat presented themselves as revelations of the nature of B-flat. 
If they did does this not also cast doubt on the deliverances of revelation? The only 
way we can confirm the nature of B-flat is if we have other ways of showing that the 
synaesthetic revelations should not be considered a property of the sound but of 
something going on in Scriabin. And we do have independent grounds for thinking 
that what is going on is not that B-flat is a sensible complex with two sides to its 
nature, the one which all people with perfect pitch know, and the other reserved for 
him and a ‘few other select souls’. Although some indication that synaesthesia is not 
a process of revealing the intrinsic nature of perceptible properties comes from the 
fact that different synaesthetes experience different colours in response to the same 
sounds, the best evidence comes fiom fact that there is no suggestion that 
soundwaves are complex in the relevant way. Science has shown us that synaesthesia 
was not actually a process of perceiving a sensible complex. If there could be 
something qualitatively the same as revelation in this case, why not in the case of 
normal perceptual processes? But by now I hope that enough problems have been 
raised with the notion of revelation to challenge the idea that we do even feel its pull. 
In the next section I shall question whether it makes sense to think that 
sounds could be seen and colours could be heard (i.e. whether there is a possible 
world in which creatures relevantly like us could see sounds and hear colours). But 
before this, it still has to be argued that it is not true that synaesthetes see sounds. 
There is another way to motivate the view that this case of synaesthesia should not be 
considered a case of seeing sounds. A necessary condition of what we take to be 
cases of seeing (and therefore constitutive of our concept of vision) is the mediation 
of a specific type of stimuli external to our bodies by our visual organs, namely our 
eyes. Consider how we typically teach the use of the term ‘seeing’ by reference to 
visual organs. Of course, one has to understand the notion of vision in such a way as 
not to rely upon a prior notion derived from our introspection upon vision. The way 
we grasp the concept of vision by reference to parzdigm visual organs and their 
fbnctions (although we may not put it quite like that if we are teaching someone the 
concept of vision) arguably does not rely upon a prior notion derived from our 
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introspection upon vision. There is reason to think that the blind have such a grasp of 
the concept of vision without having the resources of introspection the sighted have at 
their disposal. 
In Scriabin’s case of synaesthesia there is no such mediation by a visual organ; 
it is just false to say that this is a case of seeing, therefore a fortiori it could not be a 
case of seeing sounds. A little fbrther reflection should quickly confirm that 
Scriabin’s case should not be considered a case of seeing sounds. He would not see 
better by looking closer at the sound and he would perceive the sound in just the same 
way if he were to close his eyes. An analogous account can be given for hearing, 
which can be used to respond to the reverse example. It should not be thought of as a 
case of hearing colours because our subject was not undergoing an auditory process 
at all when stimulated by the bright red light; this requires the mediation of external 
stimuli by auditory organs. 
If anything the mode of perception involved in the Scriabin example is that of 
hearing, It might be the case that the colours were clearer if Scriabin listened more 
carehlly and he might fail to experience the colours if he stopped his ears. Perhaps it 
is a case of hearing colours after all? We need not admit that these are cases of 
hearing colours, but for different reasons. For there is another necessary condition for 
what we take to be cases of perceiving generally. It is a necessary condition of 
perception having occurred that the objects and properties of the world, which are 
perceived, exist independently of the perceptual processes involved. That is to say, it 
is a core belief about hearing that it is existence-entailing of objects or properties or 
events independent of the process of hearing and, similarly, it is a core belief about 
vision that it is existence-entailing of objects or properties or events independent of 
the visual process. Once we realise the preceding condition on the individuation of 
sensory modalities, all we need to accept is that in the examples the ‘colour’ in the 
experience as of colour produced in the first case and the ‘sound’ in the experience as 
of sound produced in the second case do not exist independently of the respective acts 
of perception. The reason we believe this, as already noted, is that we have good 
scientific reason to believe our distinctive sensory organs each only mediate 
characteristic types of physical stimuli. 
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The upshot of the present discussion of synaesthesia is that there is a less 
controversial way of explaining away the claim that Scriabin saw sounds or heard 
colours. This way suggests that some features are logically prior to the determination 
of (and speaking of) our perceptual modalities and even to the determination of 
anomalous perceptual processes. Nevertheless, one point should be made about the 
significance of character. The character of experience is special in the sense that if it 
is not sufficient to individuate a sensory modality in the first place, it is normally (but 
not always) what we use to individuate a sensory experience once we know that 
modes of perception are normally distinguished by a particular character. After all, is 
not the phenomenology of perception stressed as the means of access we have (and 
sometimes the means of denying access) to the things themselves?u 
4.3 Perceiving and Possibility 
To say that one sees with one’s eyes is, according to at least one reliable source, to 
present a pleonasm. According to a recent edition of The Oxford English Dictionury, 
to say that one ‘sees with one’s eyes’ requires ‘the use of more words than are needed 
to give the sense’ of a thought. Earlier editions of The OED give as an example of a 
pleonasm ‘to hear with one’s own ears’. Presumably the thought is not only that one 
can perceive only by using one’s own perceptual apparatus, but also that one can only 
perceive via a particular perceptual modality by using a distinctive type of perceptual 
apparatus of one’s own. Perceptual modalities are at least partially individuated in 
virtue of distinctive perceptual organs. 
To doubt whether seeing with one’s eyes or hearing with one’s ears is an 
example of a pleonasm would be to suggest that it is informative to say that one sees 
with one’s eyes or one hears with one’s ears. Perhaps it could have been the case that 
a creature saw with a different part of its body or a creature heard with a different 
part of its body? 
33 It might be thought that in acts of the imagination we can distinguish between imagined seeing 
and imagined hearing solely on phenomenological grounds. That is as it may seem. But that does 
not mean that the distinction does not itself presuppose real cases of seeing and hearing which do 
require reference to distinctive perceptual organs to be distinguished. 
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Many creatures detect their prey by detecting infrared radiation emitted by 
their prey. Perhaps this is a case of seeing even though such creatures are not using 
their eyes. There is after all a continuity between the stimuli which are sensed in this 
way and those which are sensed visually. But it seems more plausible to think that 
since such creatures employ different sensory organs, heat sensitive sensory organs, 
they are not perceiving visually. The distinction between seeing and some other kind 
of sensory modality arises despite a continuity between stimuli in virtue of a distinct 
manner in which the stimuli are sensed. 
Might one think hearing were taking place if features of the world, which were 
usually perceived by the ear, were perceived by means of a different sensory organ? 
The argument then has to be made that such a perceptual organ could hlfil the 
fbnction of the ear without being sufficiently like an ear to be classified as an ear. It is 
hardly obvious that this argument could be made. Some insects detect complex 
vibrations generated by other insects and transmitted through plants via their legs. It 
has been said that such insects hear sounds through their legs. According to the 
present considerations, unless parts of their legs were sufficiently like ears, it would be 
better to say that such insects feel sounds (and it might better to say that they feel 
vibrations). Certainly there is a continuity between the stimuli that can be felt and the 
stimuli that can be heard, but we distinguish between the senses of touch and hearing 
in virtue of a distinction between sensory organs. 
A general characterisation of the difference between sensory organs and 
therefore sensory modalities e.g. between auditory and tactile organs and therefore 
between hearing and touch, may not be easy, but in practise it is usually possible. It is 
easiest to draw a distinction between sensory modalities where a creature possesses 
distinct sensory organs. But even where a creature does not seem to possess a number 
of distinct sensory organs we can usually characterise the sensory modalities they 
possess by reference to creatures, which are more easily characterised as possessing 
different sensory modalities. 
But in distinguishing different sensory organs we also need to recognise the 
proper fimction of a sensory organ. One recognises the proper fbnction of a sensory 
organ with respect to the features of the world a perceptual organ is related to and 
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how it is related to those features. The view ultimately endorsed in the previous 
section expanded on the two pleonasms above: hearing presupposes the proper 
fbnctioning of the ear and seeing presupposes the proper hnctioning of the eye. 
Scriabin was not using his eyes in the relevant respect so could not have been seeing, 
let alone seeing sounds. And he did not hear colours because it is the proper hnction 
of the auditory system to perceive sounds. In the other imaginary case the ears were 
not being employed in the relevant respect so the imagined synaesthete could not have 
been hearing, let alone hearing colours. And she did not see sounds because it is the 
proper hnction of the visual system to perceive colours. 
If modes of perception are to be distinguished by reference to the proper 
fbnctioning of sensory organs, then it is plausible to think that they can also be 
distinguished by reference to the type of properties of objects perceived by the 
relevant sensory organs when they are thus fimctioning. If modes of perception can 
also be distinguished by reference to the appropriate properties of objects perceived, 
then it seems plausible to think that modes of perception can also be individuated by 
the particular characters of experience enabled by those properties of objects. Seeing 
visible properties of objects enables experiences of colour, so seeing can be 
individuated with respect to colours. Hearing audible properties enables experiences 
of sounds, so hearing can be individuated with respect to sounds. Perhaps this is a 
more plausible account of the essential relation between a mode of perception and a 
particular set of characters of experience. 
The previous section showed how difficult it is to individuate sensory 
modalities by reference to the character of experience done. The character of 
experience is not a sufficient condition for the individuation of a sensory modality 
because relations other than the relations listed in the previous paragraph exist. 
Characters of experience are enabled by properties other than those that they are 
usually enabled by when sensory organs (or the brain) hnction in a way they were not 
designed to. If the character of experience is not sufficient for the individuation of a 
sensory modality is it necessary? Is it necessary that visual experiences have the 
characters they do and is it necessary that auditory experiences have the characters 
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they do? In other words, would it be possible for creatures relevantly similar to us to 
hear colours or to see sounds? 
To talk of what is possible naturally requires keeping track of what we are 
talking about. We need to know what we are referring to when we say that something 
is possible. According to Kripke a term is a rigid designator if it refers to the same 
thing in all possible worlds. (This does not require that objects exist in every possible 
world.) A term is a nonrigid designator if it does not refer to the same thing in all 
possible worlds. Essential properties of things are properties things have in every 
possible world in which they exist. Non-essential properties of things are properties 
24 
things lack in some other possible world in which they exist. If perceptual processes 
are to be thought of as existing in other possible worlds terms such as ‘seeing’ and 
‘hearing’ should be construed as rigid designators; we should refer to the same kinds 
of processes in every possible world in which the processes exist. 
According to Kripke, we may originally distinguish a natural kind by the 
salient properties possessed by its members. We may then fix the reference of our 
natural kind terms by means of descriptions of these salient properties. But it may 
turn out that these properties are only contingent properties of the kind in question. 
Since natural kind terms should refer to the natural kind in all possible worlds where 
they exist, the name cannot be equivalent to the description. In the case of light, it 
was probably originally identified by the characteristic internal visual impressions it 
produced in us, that made us able to see. And its reference was initially fixed by some 
related de~cription.~~ However, we might have been insensitive to light (it is a fact 
that some people are blind), so ‘light’ cannot be synonymous with the description, 
which was once used to fix the reference. It seems credible that this model can be 
extended to what enables our perception by other sensory modalities. Kripke points 
out how heat is something which we have identified (and something for which we 
have also fixed the reference of its name) by its producing a certain sensation in us, 
which we call ‘the sensation of heat’. 
Can we apply the model of natural kind terms to terms for modes of 
~ 
ICripke 1980: 48-9. 
25 Kripke 1980: 129. 
178 Syuzesthesza 
perception? It may be that we fix the reference for ‘seeing’, for instance, by pointing 
to the specific processes one is undergoing right now with regard to a specific type of 
perceptual organ. A parallel type of reference fixing can be achieved with respect to 
‘hearing’. Or it may be that we fix the reference of ‘seeing’ by pointing to the specific 
process one is undergoing right now with regard to a visible property of an object. A 
parallel type of reference fixing can be achieved with respect to ‘hearing’ and audible 
properties. Once fixed ‘seeing’ and ‘hearing’ can be regarded as rigid designators if 
they named the same kind of processes in every possible world. 
According to Kripke’s model it might turn out that the initial features used to 
fix a reference are contingent properties. How might this be so with respect to 
perceptual modalities? There are hrther reasons to think that seeing is possible only 
where there are eyes to see and hearing is possible only were there are ears to hear. 
(Clearly, the reverse is not the case: it is not an essential property of an eye to see, for 
one might have been born blind and it is not an essential property of an ear that one 
hear, for one might have been born deaf.) And there is less reason than one might 
have thought to believe that it is an essential property of seeing and hearing that they 
be related to the visible and audible properties of objects they are actually related to, 
namely colours and sounds respectively. 
Of course, perception, more generally, is possible only where there are 
material objects to be seen and heard. It seems implausible to think that perceptual 
processes could occur in a world in which there were no material objects only 
disembodied beings which could perceive. But this does not mean that if there were a 
world in which there were material objects and disembodied beings which could 
perceive there would be distinctive perceptual processes with respect to these material 
objects which would constitute the perceptual modalities. We would surely resist the 
view that a disembodied being sees or hears material objects in virtue of the distinctive 
contents of its experience (even if it makes sense to say that it perceived those 
objects). Although we should acknowledge that objects of perception are necessary 
for perception, it is still not clear whether specific objects of perception are enough to 
distinguish modes of perception. 
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It might be argued that sensory modalities could be distinguished in virtue of 
the perceptible relations between visible properties on the one hand and audible 
properties on the other hand. Visible properties can occlude each other but not 
audible properties. Audible properties can mask each other but not visible properties. 
The way visible properties only occlude each other (lines of sight) and audible 
properties only exclude each other demonstrates that visible properties and audible 
properties are differently related to the same subject of perception. Is this not enough 
to talk of a different mode of perception? The trouble with this response is that there 
are some visible properties, which do mask audible properties; baffle-boards mask 
sounds and they are visible. It is not clear that a mode of perception can easily be 
reduced to relations between perceptible properties. More difficult still is that there 
are some perceptible properties whch are so in virtue of related physical features 
nevertheless they are perceived via different sensory modalities, e.g. seeing and 
perceiving infra-red radiation and hearing and touch. 
Grice gives other reasons for thinking that the senses cannot be individuated 
by reference to the perceived properties of objects alone.26 In particular there is the 
difficulty of distinguishing vision and touch by means of the perceived shapes of 
things without referring to the particular character of experience of each sensory 
modality. Various ways of getting around the problem by introducing properties only 
perceived by each sensory modality are rejected by Grice. He fbrther argues that 
reference to sensory organs may not be sufficient for the individuation of a sense.27 
Martians might have two similar sensory organs, which we would otherwise think of 
as enabling sight. But we would have to reconsider our original thought that these 
sensory organs both enabled vision if different characters of experience were 
produced thereby. It might be argued that Grice is simply assuming what he sets out 
to prove by claiming that such a creature would have different characters of 
experience. We might think that we can imagine such a creature but what reason 
have we to think that we really have imagined such a creature or if we can imagine 
such a creature whether it is indeed metaphysically possible? 
'' Grice 1962: 136-40. The purpose of Grice's paper is to show the necessity of a number of criteria 
in the individuation of a sensory modality. See section 4.5. 
27 Grice 1962: 146-52. 
Reference to perceptual organs is required to conceive the possibility of 
perceiving by one sensory modality what is actually perceived by another sensory 
modality. We see colours. In order for it to be possible to hear colours we must refer 
to auditory organs; only they can make the relevant difference. If it is possible to 
perceive by one sensory modality what is actually perceived by another sensory 
modality we have fbrther reason to doubt the view that modes of perception can be 
individuated without reference to organs of perception. 
Given the constitution of the actual world we can see colours and shapes only 
because of the way external stimuli, to which we know colours are somehow related, 
interact with our visual organs. A similar story applies to our hearing sounds. We 
can hear sounds (and such creatures as bats can perhaps hear shapes) only because of 
the way external stimuli, to which we know sounds are somehow related, interact 
with our auditory organs. The metaphysical possibility of hearing colours and seeing 
sounds seems to rest on two possibilities. Consider the following scenario outlined by 
Kripke: 
Perhaps we can imagine that, by some miracle, sound waves somehow enabled some 
creature to see. I mean, they gave him visual impressions just as we have, maybe 
exactly the same color sense. We can also imagine the same creature to be completely 
insensitive to light (photons). Who knows what subtle undreamt of possibilities there 
may be? [. . .] It would be a situation in whch certain creatures, maybe even those who 
were called ‘people’ and mhabited thls planet, were sensitive not to light but to sound 
waves. sensitive to them in exactly the same way that we are sensitive to light. If this is 
so, once we have found out what light is. when we talk about other possible worlds we 
are talking about this phenomenon in the world, and not using ’light’ as a phrase 
synonymous with ‘whatever gwes us the visual impression - whatever helps us to see’; 
and even somethmg else might have helped us to see.28 
Kripke is mainly interested here in naming and necessity, what we refer to by the term 
‘light’ in possible worlds. But his discussion rests on some suggestions about 
perceiving and possibility. These suggestions can be made more explicit in two ways. 
The first is the possibility of auditory organs and visual organs being differently 
related to features of the external world. In this way lightwaves might impinge on 
auditory organs and enable auditory processes (hearing colours) or soundwaves might 
’* Kripke 1980: 130- 1. 
Heuring Colours and Coloured Hearing 18 1 
impinge on visual organs and enable visual processes (seeing sounds). The second 
possibility is one in which auditory organs and visual organs are related to features of 
the external world in the way that they are actually related with one exception; sounds 
are related to lightwaves in the way that colours are actually related to lightwaves 
(seeing sounds) and colours are related to soundwaves in the way that sounds are 
actually related to soundwaves (hearing colours). 
As for the first possibility, that of auditory organs and visual organs being 
differently related to features of the external world: is it possible for lightwaves to 
impinge on auditory organs (and underlying systems) and thus to enable the hearing of 
colours or for soundwaves to impinge on visual organs (and underlying systems) and 
thus to enable the seeing of sounds? If these were possible would we call these 
cases of hearing colours and seeing sounds? There seems little reason why we should 
not think and talk of these as genuine cases of hearing colours and seeing sounds. If it 
is plausible to think that ‘hearing’ and ‘seeing’ can be considered de jure rigid 
designators then the presence of what constitutes colours and sounds in such a 
possible world should provide the grounds for deeming these cases of hearing colours 
and seeing sounds respectively. But are the respective relations metaphysically 
possible? 
Is it plausible that soundwaves could be appropriately related to the visual 
organs and lightwaves could be appropriately related to the auditory organs? One 
way of supporting the view that ‘hearing’ and ‘seeing’ can be considered de jure rigd 
designators is if organs of perception are construed as members of a natural kind; all 
eyes would be members of one natural kind, all ears would be members of another 
natural kind.*’ Science has taught us that one of the properties of the molecules, 
which compose standard examples of eyes is to react to photons in a particular way. 
Different types of eyes may look different and fknction differently (think of compound 
eyes) but they all possess molecules, which have the capacity to transduce lightwaves. 
It would be difficult to resist the notion that, if eyes had essential properties, one 
essential property of eyes would be the property of having molecules, which can only 
-’‘ The idea would be made not immediately implausible by considerations similar to those developed 
in chapter two. Different species have very lfferent eyes, but there are nevertheless features which 
make all of them eyes. Somethmg related can be said of auditory system. 
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be appropriately modified by photons of light. Just as photons have essential 
properties, which are manifested in the basic laws of nature, so the physical 
components of eyes (any possible eye) likewise necessarily have certain physical 
properties, which are also manifested in the basic laws of nature. If such a constraint 
on the essential properties of the kind ‘eye’ is accepted then it follows that 
soundwaves would not be able to cause the retina to emit signals of the appropriate 
nature. On this reasoning, it is impossible that eyes could transduce soundwaves in the 
way that it is impossible that photons could have electric charge or rest mass or spin. 
The same considerations can be adduced for the cochlea and lightwaves; it is 
impossible that ears could process lightwaves. This view simply resists the suggestion 
that soundwaves could have the requisite properties, say energy levels, to modi@ the 
components of eyes appropriately. Only photons have such properties. If we thnk of 
fbndamental physical features as having essential properties, it is natural to extend this 
to whatever those properties are nomically related to.30 Indeed it is for those who 
believe in the possibility of hearing colours and seeing sounds in this way to argue for 
a difference between the laws of nature. We cannot see soundwaves and we cannot 
hear lightwaves. In this sense, we could neither see sounds nor hear colours. 
The second possibility of hearing colours and seeing sounds is the converse of 
the possibility, which has previously been rejected. That possibility was the possibility 
that soundwaves could produce experiences of colour via hearing. But that was 
rejected as a case of hearing colours for conceptual and not for metaphysical reasons. 
Even if this scenario were to occur it would be neither a case of hearing colours nor a 
case of seeing sounds for the reason that neither colours nor sound exist 
independently of the act of perception. But the metaphysical possibility of this 
scenario has not been considered properly. 
There are two obvious ways in which this scenario might be realised. The first 
way is expressed by Robinson who writes: ‘The real thought is that the same stimuli 
could give rise to different experiences if they had been assviated with different 
neural structures. If, for example, the human eye had been connected to those centres 
~ 
Intuitions rnight divide at this point. It might be found more plausible that soundwaves could 30 
interact with visual organs than that that lightwaves could interact with auditory organs. 
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which are in fact associated with hearing, light would have given us sound 
experiences’.’’ Robinson points out that it is not clear that if neural structures were SO 
connected then we would have experiences as w-e actually have when we hear, for the 
underlying neural structures might in this case then be dedicated to selecting 
information about colours and represent them in the way that our visual experience 
actually does. The idea is that the plasticity of the brain would allow different 
structures to represent the same features of objects. (Of course, if some sort of neural 
switching were to take place our intuitions about what will happen in the 
circumstances are likely to vary.) 
One reason why the possibility of sounds enabling experiences of colours 
seems to be a coherent one is that there seems to be no reason why different kinds of 
stimuli should not be relevantly equivalent. It might be claimed that there is a lack of 
isomorphism between the actual transduction of soundwaves into neural signals and 
the actual transduction of lightwaves into neural signals by the retina, and therefore 
the one type of stimuli could not produce experiences as of the other type of stimuli. 
That may actually be the case. But there may be possible worlds in which the effects 
of the two types of stimuli are not so different. 
To motivate the view we would have to imagine both the physical world and 
the respective sensory systems to be structured differently from how they are actually 
structured. We can hear the sounds of objects which we cannot see and we can see 
objects which we cannot hear because of the nature of light and soundwaves and how 
they interact with visible and audible items. Relatedly our visual fields and auditory 
fields have different spatial extensions: we can only see in front and slightly to the side 
of us, whereas we can hear all round us. Presumably all of this will require an 
equivalent difference in the ultimate neural representations. The world and our 
perceptual systems would have to be arranged appropriately to compensate for the 
actual differences between seeing and hearing. But both of these features seem 
contingent. In fact the ears of a bat are so designed as only to hear things in front of 
it, whilst the eyes of the hammerhead shark are so designed as to be able to see all 
around it at once. Such creatures indicate that sensory stimuli perceived via different 
31 Robinson 1993: 69. 
sensory modalities can be equivalent. In the natural world different sensory modalities 
have evolved to fklfil similar fbnctions in different creatures. 
The equivalence of different stimuli is a well-articulated position in the 
psychology of perception. According to such a view, perception is based on the 
detection of invariant information such as optic flow fields in the case of vision, and 
ratios and rates of divergence in acoustic fields in the case of hearing. The 
equivalence of different stimuli means that the stimulus information may be identical 
when stimuli are different.32 
What lies behind the present possibility is the claim that the character of 
experience supervenes on local physical properties. Such a claim can be put in the 
following way. A and B are two families of properties. A supervenes on B iff 
necessarily for any property F in A, if an object has F, then there exists a property G 
in B such that x has G, and if any y has G it also has F.33 Consider creatures which see 
colours. A is the family of colour experiences and B is the family of local neural states 
of the visual system. Colour experiences supervene on local states of the visual 
system iff necessarily for any colour experience if a creature has that colour 
experience then there exists a state of the visual system such that the creature 
possesses it and any other creature which possesses that state of a visual system will 
have an identical type of colour experience. According to Robinson if the brain were 
rewired then light stimuli would produce experiences of sounds and sound stimuli 
would produce experiences of colours. A partial version of this idea is manifested in 
synaesthesia. 
But the supervenience relation so defined above is a weak supervenience 
relation. In another possible world the family C, containing the experiences of sound, 
might supervene on the farmly of properties B. C supervenes on B iff necessarily for 
any property H in C, if an object has H, then there exists a property G in B such that x 
32 See Gibson 1966: 55. Gibson offers the example of fire. It is the s a m e  of four kinds of 
stiinulation. The flames of the fire can be seen, the sounds it makes can be heard, the smoke it gives 
off can be smelt and the heat it radiates can be felt. Gibson claims that as far as the perception of the 
fire is concerned the four kinds of stimulus information and the four perceptual systems are 
equivalent. 
33 SeeKim 1993: 64. 
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has G, and if any y has G it also has H. The claim may not be attractive. But it may 
have some plausibility if different sensory stimuli, lightwaves and soundwaves, are 
equivalent. If they are equivalent then what distinguishes them, might depend on local 
physical states: what makes the difference between experiences of colour and 
experiences of sound are local physical states that realise them. 
But was not most of chapter three spent supporting the rejection of the idea 
that the phenomenal character of experience supervened locally? If this weak 
supervenience claim is to be doubted with respect to it being a local supervenience 
claim then why not countenance a third supervenience claim: in a possible world 
colours could supervene on s o ~ n d w a v e s . ~ ~  If the colours were themselves so related 
to soundwaves then the conceptual objection would no longer apply. If soundwaves 
could produce experiences of colour, and the colours could exist independently of the 
subject’s perception of them then it would be possible to hear colours. It is just 
contingently false that we do so. Few would accept either the second or the third 
supervenience claim, for the reason that they are weak supervenience claims. But the 
reasons we have for rejecting them are neither conceptual nor immediately given. 
They are the result of other claims about the relationship between the mental and the 
physical. And it would be for these reasons that we rule out the possibility of hearing 
colours or seeing sounds. 
4.4 Con Hearing be Coloured? 
It could be that the reason for rejecting the locution of ‘hearing colours’ lies more 
with one of the purported relata rather than the other. The reasoning of 4.2 might 
suggest that the fault lies with the use of the term ‘hearing’ because there are no 
colours external to the subject, which would allow us to count this as a case of 
hearing. On a neutral view of colour concepts it is perfectly acceptable to use colour 
terms both of properties of things, which exist independently of us, and of purported 
phenomena (e.g. hallucinations and memory images), which are dependent upon us 
’‘ The view that colour is a supervenient property is discussed in Campbell 1993. 
186 Synaesthesia 
for their existence? We do not similarly use the term ‘hear’ to refer to a perceptual 
relation with what exists and with what only seems to exist; the term ‘hearing’ is 
supposed to mark just that distinction. However, our evidence also suggests that the 
additional experience the synaesthete has as of colours is enabled by the sound, which 
is heard; the colour is experienced because the sounds are heard. The results of 
earlier considerations can be summarised as follows: colours are not heard, but 
hearing enables an experience as of colours, and we should be neutral about whether 
this is a visual experience, Another way of referring to the experience of colour which 
some synaesthetes have when they hear and which accommodates all of these 
considerations is required. 
It might be wondered why we need to be concerned about the way we talk 
about such experiences. After all synaesthesia is a rare condition and we have a 
technical term, ‘synaesthesia’. Does synaesthesia really tell us anything about the way 
we talk of the senses? Perhaps we should think of synaesthetic experiences (of a 
particular sort) simply as involving coloured visual images involuntarily produced by 
hearing a sound, because, in some respects, the imagery shares some properties with 
visual images. But the point is that, in other relevant respects, it is not comparable to 
a visual image; synaesthetic experience seems to be caused by external features and 
thereby it seems different fiom visual images we might conjure up ourselves. 
Following the previous reasoning, why then should we not think of a case of normal 
hearing as an auditory image of, for instance, a sound involuntarily produced by 
hearing that sound? In the end though, since how we talk about our standard 
perceptual experiences is a topic of interest to philosophers, surely any unusual form 
of experience, such as synaesthesia, which can be used as a test of theories about how 
we talk of perceptual experience more generally, should be of interest to us. 
One alternative terminology - ‘hearing coloured sounds’ - can be quickly 
dismissed. There is a surface similarity between the locutions ‘hearing coloured 
sounds’ and ‘seeing coloured objects’. Even if one were to hold a view of colour in 
which colours were not properties of objects but of our responses to stimuli fiom 
x See Kliewer 1998 €or a defence of neutral colour concepts. 
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objects, one would still want to mark the difference between experiences of colours 
when seeing objects and experiences of colours when hearing objects. For there is 
nothing about the coloured light, which suggests that sounds could be coloured in the 
way objects could be. The superficial similarity of the locutions suggests that there is. 
The problem is that there seems to be no obvious way of removing this surface 
similarity by an analysis of underlying form.’‘ 
Another alternative terminology is that of ‘coloured hearing’. This locution 
also challenges our ordinary usage. Is hearing something which can have the property 
of being coloured? This is not a metaphorical way of speakmg, as when we say that 
our judgement is coloured. Wittgenstein. talks about primary and secondary senses of 
words and, in one case, he might even be talking about synaesthesia: 
Here one might speak of a *primary' and ‘secondary’ sense of a word. It is only if the 
word has the primary sense for you that you use it in the secondary one. The secondary 
sense is not a ‘metaphorical’ sense. If  I say ‘For me the vowel e is yellow’ I do not 
mean: ‘yellow’ in a metaphorical sense - for I could not express what I want to say in 
any other way than by means of the idea of ‘yellow’.37 
Seeing would seem to be a more likely candidate for being coloured and yet we do 
not thinking of seeing as having the property of being coloured; we think of objects 
rather than perceptual processes as being coloured. 
I want to suggest that a reason for us to adopt the terminology of ‘coloured 
hearing’ can be found in the adverbial theory of experience. For the adverbial theory 
was intended as a way of uncovering the underlying metaphysical commitments in our 
talk of appearances in both perceptual processes and quasi-perceptual processes 
(processes like after-imaging and hallucinating which have in some respects the 
phenomenal character of perceptual processes) by translating our surface locutions 
into other locutions. These fbrther locutions would usually not be retained in ordinary 
usage but could be recovered if the need arises, to show the metaphysical 
commitments involved or not involved in our ordinary usage. Synaesthesia clearly has 
--- 
This is not to deny that synaesthetes may nevertheless sometimes use this way of speaking, and do 
so non-metaphorically, as can be seen from Cytowic 1989: 1 ,  ‘What first strikes me is the colour of 
someone’s voice. (s ) has a crumbly yellow voice, like a flame with protruding fibers. Sometimes I get 
so interested in the voice. I can’t understand what’s being said.’ 
37 Wittgenstein 1953: I1 xi: 216. 
36 
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elements of both perceptual processes and quasi-perceptual processes. Perhaps the 
locution of ‘coloured hearing’, which has features in cormnon with these fbrther 
locutions, retains them in ordinary usage. 
The adverbial theory of perception was developed as a way of explaining our 
ordinary talk of appearances in perceiving. We move with respect to objects and 
objects move with respect to us. And conditions which enable us to perceive objects 
are variable. It is for these and similar reasons that we talk of objects appearing in 
particular ways to us, such as: ‘X appears F to S’ (where x denotes an object, F 
denotes a perceptible property such as colour and S denotes a perceiving 
According to the view outlined by Price, that objects appear in certain ways 
involves an unanalysable two-place relation between an object, or the surface of an 
object, and a subject: 
Now the same top surface of  a certain penny stamp may appear to me purk and to a 
colour-blind man grey, to me lozenge-shape and to him trapeziform, whle in itself it is 
square and (perhaps) colourless. Of course the same entity cannot be at once red and 
grey and colourless, trapezifonn, lozenge-shaped and square. But then it does not have 
to be. For though being trapeziform is incompatible with being lozenge-shaped, yet 
appearing trapeziform to A is perfectly compatible with appearing lozenge-shaped to B 
- and with being intrinsically square. So, appearing grey to B is compatible both with 
appearing pink to A and with being intrinsically colourless.39 
But, since F can occur in other contexts than appearing, it does seem more reasonable 
to construe ‘x appears F to S’ as a three-place relation between an object, or the 
surface of an object, a property and a subject. But when we construe the relation in 
this way there is a natural temptation to hrther construe it such that there is 
something - an appearance - which an object presents and that therefore is a certain 
way. The suggestion is as follows: 
(1) We should read ‘x appears F to S’ as ‘ x  presents an F appearance to S’. 
38 The idea tlut objects appear in certain ways can be found in Price 1932: 52-4 and also, as the 
relational theory, in Robinson 1993: 48-50. Ducasse 1942 origmally argued for an adverbial 
construal of sensory experience against MOOR‘S sensedata theory. Ducasse argued that an act-object 
account of sense-data would entail the unobserved existence of sensedata. For developments of 
adverbialism see Chisholm 1957: 115-25. Sellars 1974 and Tye 1985. 
39 Price 1932: 62. 
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In (l), since the appearance is not identical with a property of the object, the 
appearance can then be understood as an F sense-datum which S has. According to 
the adverbial theory there is a better reading which eschews all talk of appearances: 
(2) We should read ‘x appears F to S’ as ‘S perceives (sees, hears etc.) F-ly (with 
respect to) x’. 
Two perceptual acts where the object appears differently to S (say, one in 
standard and one in non-standard conditions, whatever they might be) are, according 
to this analysis, on a par. The object is perceived in both instances, although in 
different ways. 
Some accounts use the term ‘senses’ or the term ‘experiences’ in the analysis 
of ‘x appears F to S’. Instead of sensing or experiencing a peculiar intermediate object 
such as a sense-data, a subject senses or experiences in a certain manner. The 
difference between veridical and non-veridical sensings or experiences, and between 
non-veridical sensings or experiencings, such as hallucinatings and aflerimagings, is 
for such accounts then clarified by reference to the object (x), or the causal factors, 
which enable the respective sensings for S.40 This may be possible, but it seems easier 
to draw the distinction between types of veridical experiences and types of non- 
experiences in the predicate rather than the specific causal provenance. It is certainly 
easier when an analysis of synaesthesia is reached. This explains why the specific 
modes of perception have been made explicit in (2). It should of course be assumed 
that modes of perception and types of non-veridical processes are, for the purposes of 
this analysis, just specifications of sensing or experiencing. And, it might be 
emphasised, this modification does not imply that the subject who is perceiving is 
always able to discriminate between their states of perception and some other sensory 
or experiential states, such as hallucination. 
“’ Chisholm 1957: 120 uses the term ‘sense’ to any though his analysis of perception. So 
someone would sense blue-ly with respect to somethng. Tye 1984 uses the term ’sense’ to carry 
through his analysis of afterimaging. So someone would sense yellow-ly. 
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The question naturally arises as to how we should understand ‘ S  perceives 
(sees, hears etc.) F-ly with respect to x’. Tye proposes that there are two main ways 
of hrther analysing the adverbial form: the structured predicate theory and the event 
predicate theory. 41 
The structured predicate theory claims that adverbs are operators which turn 
the predicates they mod@ into different predicates. The sentence thus retains its 
subject-predicate form. Adverbs stand for fbnctions that map the properties or 
relations expressed by the predicates they modify onto other properties or relations. 
In other words, an adverb turns one verb phrase into another more complex verb 
phrase. Thus the adverb ‘F-ly’ operates on the basic perceptual relation: 
(3) We should read ‘ S  perceives (sees, hears etc.) F-ly (with respect to) x’ as ‘S and x 
instantiate an F-ly-perceptual (-visual, -auditory etc.) relation’. 
It is not clear that this reading really enlightens us in any way about the metaphysics 
underlying appearances in perception. 
The event predicate theory claims that statements about the manner in which 
people perceive are statements about particular events. On this theory there is a 
hidden quantification in the adverbial form: 
(4) We should read ‘S perceives (sees, hears etc.) F-ly (with respect to) x’ as ‘There is 
an event e such that S and x undergo e and e is a perceiving (seeing, hearing etc.) 
-F-ly’. 
Adverbs are then best understood as predicates, which are true of these events: 
(4’)  We should read ‘There is an event e such that S and x undergo e and e is a 
perceiving (seeing, hearing etc.) -F-ly’ as ‘There is an event e such that S and x 
undergo e and e is a perceptual (visual, auditory etc.) event having the property of 
F-ly-ness’ . 
T j c  1985 & 1996. Tye 1983 dismisses a first preliminary waj which would view this locution as 
an unstructured predicate because it fails to resolve issues raised by the identity of images and the 
many-properties objection discussed in Jackson 1977. 
41 
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How are we then to understand the property of F-ly-ness? It should be emphasised 
that a sensible property is not being predicated of the perceptual event. Something in 
the manner of a sensible property is being predicated of the perceptual event e. A 
modified term for a sensible property is being used to denote a specific, as yet 
unexplained, type of property of this kind of event. The reference to sensible 
properties, such as red and square, would have an extended sense introduced by the 
adverbial analysis of ‘red-ly’ and ‘square-ly’ . An adverbial analysis makes us focus 
upon what the extended sense might be, for this extended sense should explain the 
notion of ‘in the manner of introduced by the adverbial analysis. Tye suggests that it 
should be construed as perceiving with the F (e.g. red and square) qualitative 
character. The property of F-ly-ness could also be construed as the representational 
property as of F, or, alternatively, the property of being represented as of F. The 
sense is extended in so far as we are not talking about the property red, but a 
representation of the property red. These two interpretations are not incompatible. 
42 
The application of adverbial theories, dealing as it does with appearances, has 
been extended from perceptual experiences to a family of quasi-perceptual 
experiences. (Some adverbialists seem to focus only on quasi-perceptual experiences.) 
Hallucinations and afterimages both figure as experiences which seem, in certain 
respects, like perceptual experiences. Here the purported appearances are non- 
veridical, so it might be claimed, obviously mental appearances. The adverbial theory 
can express a denial of appearances in quasi-perceptual processes by replacing a 
perceptual term with a quasi-perceptual term: 
(5) We should read ‘x appears F to S’ as ‘S quasi-perceives (afterimages, hallucinates 
etc.) F-ly (with respect to) x’. 
In the case of veridical experiences ‘x’ stands for an object of perception; the object is 
perceived in different ways. In the case of non-veridical experiences, ‘x’ stands for a 
purported object of non-veridical experience; ‘x’ is supposed to refer to an after- 
image or an hallucination or an object which does not exist but which nevertheless 
seems to exist and seems to appear F to S. According to the adverbial reading there is 
42 This paper was written before Tye developed a representational theory of perceptual experience. 
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no such thing as an afterimage or a hallucination or an object, which does not exist. 
This is reflected in the use of a term referring to a quasi-perceptual process. The 
existence of objects of quasi-perception are not entailed by quasi-perceptual 
processes. 43 
How is this reading to be hrther analysed according to the two versions of the 
adverbial theory? According to the structured predicate theory, adverbs are operators 
which turn the predicates they modify into more complex predicates. The difference 
between perception and quasi-perception is marked by the difference between the 
instantiation of a relation and of a property. So the modification of the predicate from 
‘ quasi-perceives’ to the more complex predicate ‘ quasi-perceives F-ly ’ represents the 
predication of a more complex property: 
( 6 )  We should read ‘S quasi-perceives (afterimages, hallucinates etc.) F-ly’ as ‘S 
instantiates an F-ly-quasi-perceptual (-afterimagery, -hallucinatory etc.) property’. 
Once again it is not clear that this reading really enlightens us about the metaphysics 
underlying appearances in perception. 
According to the event predicate theory there is a hidden quantification and 
the adverb knctions as an adjective, which applies to the event signified by the 
predicate ‘quasi-perceives7. Note that in this rendering there is no reference to an 
object x: 
(7) We should read ‘S quasi-perceives (afterimages, hallucinates etc.) F-ly’ as ‘there 
is an event e such that S undergoes e and e is a quasi-perceptual (afterimaging, 
hallucinatory etc.) event having the property of F-ly-ness’ . 
In keeping with earlier ideas, when we predicate a colour of an after-image or an 
hallucination, we are predicating a more complex property of an event of afterimaging 
or hallucinating than we do when we predicate a colour of an external object; we are 
predicating something in the manner of a colour of a quasi-perceptual event. The 
Presumably an analysis which did not explicitly spec@ the state of mind would have to do so 
implicitly by reference to the specific enabling causal factors in the cases of perceptual and quasi- 
perceptual states. 
43 
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references to sensible properties, such as red, has an extended sense introduced by the 
adverbial analysis of ‘red-ly’. This, again, is consistent with the view that the 
properties are representational properties. When we talk of experiencing a red image 
we should recognise that we are using an extended sense of the term ‘red’, for the 
context is intensional. It is not that there is a red object (a red image), but a 
representation of properties of objects, in this case the representation of the property 
red. Lycan argues similarly for an adverbial analysis. His view is that an adverbial 
analysis can be read colloquially by inserting an ‘as if construction’: someone having 
a green afterimage would be sensing as he would be sensing if a green patch were 
present. This forms a topic-neutral- translation, which Lycan argues can be 
understood by any standard semantics for counterfactuals. He krther argues that this 
does not conflict with, but rather leads to, the view that afterimages can be construed 
in intentional terms: 
I take the view that phenomenal indwiduals such as sense-data are intentional 
inexistents a la Brentano and Meinong. It is, after all, no surprise to be told that mental 
states have intentional objects that do not exist. So why should we not suppose that 
after-images and other sense-data are intentional objects that do not exist?’ Thus we can 
consistently adnut that ‘ phenomenal-color properties qualifj, individuals without 
granting that there exist indwiduals that are the bearers of phenomenal-color 
properties’. 44 
The pieces are now in place for justifying the use of the terminology of 
‘coloured hearing’ as a way of talking about synaesthesia. It was claimed at the 
beginning of this section, with respect to the form of synaesthesia exemplified by 
Scriabin, that colours are not heard, but hearing enables an experience as of colours, 
yet this may not be a visual experience. What needs to be incorporated into an 
analysis is the thought that synaesthesia is a perceptual process with quasi-perceptual 
features. 
Following the earlier analyses of perceptual and quasi-perceptual experiences, 
(2) and (5) above, the following adverbialism can be considered: 
(8) We should read ‘x appears F and y appears G to S’ 
etc.) F-ly (with respect to) x and quasi-perceives G-ly I 
as ‘S perceives (sees, hears 
(with respect) to y’. 
‘‘ Lycan 1987: 88. 
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In the original way of speaking ‘x’ and ‘y’ are both subjects of the same type of 
predicate. In the analysis ‘x’ and ‘y’ are each objects of different types of predicates; 
the first is existence-entailing, the second is not. Perhaps, in the synaesthetic 
experience of colour, the object x appears to be both F and G to the subject S. No 
matter, the distinction between perception and quasi-perception should still be drawn, 
for this is not a process of perceiving two perceptible properties, both the F and G, of 
X. 
How is this analysis to be krther interpreted in terms of the alternative 
theories of adverbialism? A consideration of synaesthesia might even offer its own 
grounds for preferring one account of the adverbial theory over the other. Consider 
firstly the structured predicate theory. Since the adverbial modifiers turn the 
respective predicates into more complex predicates: 
(9) We should read ‘S hears F-ly (with respect to) x and quasi-perceives G-ly’ as ‘ S  
and x instantiate an F-ly-auditory relation and S instantiates a G-ly-quasi- 
perceptual property’. 
One problem with this analysis is that a term to characterise a distinctive form of 
quasi-perception is now required. As with cases of hallucination and afterimaging, a 
term would be required to denote the distinctive property a synaesthete instantiates. 
In the case of synaesthesia it seems more plausible to relate the quasi-perceptual 
process with the auditory process since that process causes it. (An analysis in terms of 
causal provenances would have to individuate the process in terms of the sound of the 
object,) So it is not clear that the logical apparatus the structured predicate operator 
theory employs makes the analysis possible, let alone easy. 
The event predicate theory offers a richer logical structure, which, in turn, 
presupposes a richer metaphysical interpretation: 
(10) We should read ‘S perceives (sees, hears etc.) F-ly (with respect to) x and quasi- 
perceives G-Iy’ as ‘S and x undergo a perceptual event having the property of F- 
ly-ness and S undergoes a quasi-perceptual event having the property of G-ly- 
ne&. 
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The problem still remains of having to characterise the type of quasi-perceptual event. 
But what is to make us think that there are two events here. One might individuate a 
quasi-perceptual process in terms of what causes it. (This might be the way one would 
characterise an after-image.) Here the quasi-perceptual experience is caused by what 
causes the veridical experience. If this is so then maybe only one event is taking place. 
Of course the synaesthetic experience has a different phenomenal character fi-om the 
veridical experience; then the event has two properties. Thus: 
(1 0’ ) We should read ‘S perceives (sees, hears etc.) F-ly with respect to x and quasi- 
perceives G-ly’ as ‘S and x undergo a perceptual event having the properties of F- 
ly-ness and G-ly-ness’ . 
Under one interpretation, S and x undergo an event of hearing having the properties 
of F-ly-ness (perhaps B-flat-ly-ness) and G-ly-ness (perhaps coloured-ly-ness). In 
other words, S undergoes an event of coloured hearing with respect to an audible 
property. We are able to reflect the view that hearing enables an additional 
experience as of colours. We are able to reflect the view that this is neutral with 
respect to whether it is a visual experience, for any mention of seeing has been 
excluded. Yet we are able to reflect the quasi-perceptual features by the instantiation 
of a second property, similar to those we predicate of quasi-perceptual events, but 
here, which are more appropriately attributed to another mode of perception. 
Furthermore, pursuing an adverbial analysis is a way of clariQing the point 
that the sense of the term ‘coloured’ in ‘coloured hearing’ is extended. Hearing is not 
literally coloured, or, at least, it is not coloured in the way that we think of objects as 
being coloured. It is in the manner of being coloured, that is to say, the event 
involves the representation of something as being coloured which, in this case, turns 
out not to be 
IS Interestingly, Cytowic does use the tenninology of ‘geometric tasting’ interchangeably with that 
of ‘tasting shapes‘ to describe MW’s synaesthesia. I hope the discussion has shown that there is 
reason to think that they are not interchangeable; synaesthete’s, like MW, do not taste shapes, but 
they may have geometric taste. M e r  all, some creatures might be able to perceive shapes by taste, or 
at least, which is very close, by smell. 
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However it would follow fiom this analysis that we should construe seeing as 
coloured too. Seeing would only be ‘coloured’ in the extended sense, introduced by 
the adverbial analysis, o f  representing properties to be a certain way. We do not talk 
of ‘coloured seeing’ even though this may explain the representational features 
involved in seeing because ordinary usage rightly requires that we emphasise the 
perceptual properties that are veridically represented when we see the colour of some 
item. Ordinary usage would not demand this of coloured hearing because there are 
no equivalent perceptual properties being veridically represented. To talk of 
‘coloured hearing’ is to emphasise the non-veridical nature of synaesthesia. In the 
same way to talk of ‘coloured seeing’ would be to emphasise the non-veridical nature 
of a different form of synaesthesia whereby visible properties enable additional colour 
experiences. 
4.5 Some Further Remarks on the Senses 
In section 4.2 there was little support found for the suggestion that the representation 
of modes of perception accompanies the representation of properties of objects 
perceived via different modes of perception. That is to say, there was little support 
found for the suggestion that a representation of something coloured is represented, in 
the same process, as a visual experience and similarly whether a representation of 
something noisy is represented, in the same process, as an auditory experience. In 4.2 
it was accepted that the first would constitute a visual experience, and that the second 
would constitute an auditory experience and that we can and do then conceptualise 
them as a visual experience and an auditory experience re~pectively.~~ In other words 
although the phenomenal character of experience is often enough for us to distinguish 
between the senses, it is not always a sufficient condition; an experience of colour and 
One difficulty for the analysis might arise in the case of coloured seeing: ‘How does one 
differentiate the use of the term ‘coloured’ when veridical and when non-veridical?’ But it should be 
recalled that the representational view of perceptual experience emphasises that the sense of the 
representation does not determine the reference. Th~s is how it should be. 
It may be that we do represent to ourselves modes of perception non-conceptually. Ths would not 
be via the properties of objects represented but via the representation of properties of organs of 
perception, as was argued in Section 3.3.  
46 
47 
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shape is not always a visual experience. 4.3 pressed the point by suggesting that a 
distinctive phenomenal character of experience may not be a necessary feature of a 
particular mode of perception and by arguing that our reasons for rejecting the 
possibility of hearing colours and seeing sounds would be other than those provided 
by the character of our actual perceptual experience. The focus of this section is the 
way the various criteria of a sensory modality are combined in the individuation of 
that sensory modality. 
Coloured hearing bears upon the issue in so far as it suggests that there is 
nothing intrinsic about the character of an experience, which informs us of its 
perceptual modality. Certainly, in so far as they are in the main equivocal, the self- 
reports synaesthetes offer of their coloured hearing experiences tend to support the 
view that their anomalous experiences of colours and shapes are not intrinsically 
visual experiences. Whether these are represented as visual experiences will depend 
upon criteria other than those intrinsic to the phenomenal character of the 
experiences. The interpretation of 'coloured hearing' in the previous section lefi little 
opportunity for the characterisation of the anomalous features of the synaesthetic 
experience as representing a distinctive modality. If this adverbial reading of 
synaesthesia is to stand, the view that modes of perception are not given or 
represented in the character of experience needs to be supported. 
The issue relates to some influential remarks Grice made about the senses." 
Grice discussed how a number of features we take to be marks of the perceptual 
modalities are related to each other by asking why we might think of a newly 
discovered faculty actually to be that of a familiar perceptual modality. After 
outlining some reasons for thinking a faculty would not constitute a faculty of 
perceiving he claimed that the criteria of perceptual modalities are of four sorts. 
Firstly the senses are to be distinguished by the differing features that we 
become aware of by means of them: that is to say, seeing might be characterised as 
perceiving things as having certain colours, shapes and sizes; hearing as perceiving 
things as having certain degrees of loudness, certain determinates of pitch, catain 
tone-qualities; and so on for the other senses. A perceptual experience would be a 
4y Grice 1962. 
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visual experience if it enabled someone to become aware of the colours of the objects 
in their vicinity. A perceptual experience would be an auditory experience if it enabled 
someone to become aware of the pitch of the sounds objects make. 
Secondly two senses, for example, seeing and smelling, are to be distinguished 
by the special introspective character of the experiences of seeing and smelling; that 
is, disregarding the differences between the characteristics we learn about by sight and 
smell, Grice suggests that we are entitled to say that seeing is itself different in 
character fi-om smelling. 
Thirdly, the senses are to be distinguished by the differing general features of 
the external physical conditions on which the various modes of perceiving depend. 
They can be differentiated by reference to the distinct stimuli connected with the 
different senses: the sense of touch is activated by contact, sight by light, hearing by 
sound waves, and so on. The importance of this criterion has been reinforced in the 
thought experiment of section 4.3. 
Fourthly, the senses are to be distinguished by the internal mechanisms 
associated with the various senses - the character of the sense organs and their mode 
of connection with the brain. The importance of this criterion has already been 
reinforced in the earlier discussion in section 4.2 of how we are to understand 
synaesthesia. 
Grice notes that the criteria are not mutually exclusive and that we are likely 
to call on a multiplicity of criteria for distinguishing the senses. Grice observes that 
one procedure, which he does not broach, would have been to discuss the applicability 
and relative weight of these criteria in relation to difficult cases. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 
can be seen as going a little way in that direction. In sections 4.2 and 4.3 the third 
and fourth criteria are in some conflict with the second criterion. There the 
phenomenal character of experience was subordinated as a criterion of the 
individuation of perceptual modality to other criteria, specifically organs of perception 
and external physical features. In section 4.2 the anomalous chnracter of experience 
was, as it were, overruled by the presence of a distinctive sensory organ as a criterion 
for the presence of a particular perceptual modality. In the thought experiment of 
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section 4.3 the importance of the character of experience in the individuation of a 
perceptual modality was krther undermined. 
Grice’s objective is to discuss the independence of these criteria. It has been 
claimed in section 4.3 that it is more difficult to maintain the independence of the third 
and fourth criteria than the independence of either of those criteria and the second 
criterion. Grice’s particular target is the independence of the first and second criteria. 
For Grice’s objections to the first criterion as a sufficient condition for the 
characterisation of a sensory modality see section 4.3. Grice’s objections to the 
second criterion as a sufficient condition for the characterisation of a sensory modality 
concern the transparency objection and the contingency of the relation between 
character and features detected; these have been touched on in sections 3.2 and 4.3 
respectively. On the first issue he claims that when asked to pay attention to the 
character of experience of a perceptual modality a description of character dissolves 
into a description of the features of objects we see and feel. On the second issue he 
claims that ‘if to see is to detect by means of a special kind of experience, will it not 
just be a contingent matter that the characters we detect by means of this kind of 
experience are such things as colour and shape? Might it not have been the case that 
we thus detected characteristic smells, either instead of or as well as colours and 
shapes?’49 But our perceptual experience does not seem to be like this: ‘it does not 
seem to be a contingent fact that we do not see the smells of things’. Despite these 
reservations Grice’s conclusion is that the second criterion seems to be independent 
from the first criterion, and is indispensable for telling the difference between the 
senses, in large part because the first criterion is insufficient and cannot be sufficiently 
bolstered by the other two criteria (as his Martian thought experiment is supposed to 
show). 
This suggestion should be resisted. That it should be resisted is only to be 
expected. Chapters two and three explored a representational view of the mind 
combined with an externalism about psychological natural kinds and the phenomenal 
character of experience. If one takes such a view then there is no place for qu&a or 
anything else which might individuate the senses or allow creatures such as us to tell 
Grice 1962: 144-5, 19 
the senses apart other than the diverse sensory organs, the differing features that we 
become aware of by means of them and the general features of the external physical 
conditions on which the various modes of perceiving depend. 
Mciver Lopes has recently claimed that ‘a representational theory of mind 
cannot individuate the sensory modalities in a principled manner’.50 The present 
chapter has shown how a representationist view would individuate the sensory 
modalities in unusual cases in a ‘principled manner’. If anything Lopes’ claim that ‘an 
adequate philosophical account of the senses [...I should distinguish the senses by 
their phenomenal character’ is what is open to doubt. The senses are clearly 
distinguished on the basis of more evidence than that of each of the senses 
individually. Lopes’ idea is that an ER-ist is committed to the view that the 
phenomenal characters of experiences are determined by their contents and yet 
experiences of the same content by different sensory modalities can have different 
phenomenal characters. ER-ists might deny that experiences of the same content had 
by different sensory modalities do have different characters. If they accept this then 
ER-ists can still explain the differences in terms of the representation of properties of 
sensory organs. The fact that some sensory modalities are proximal and the 
experiences enabled by them are informed by the mechanisms by which they are had 
should not provide an insuperable difficulty for ER. 
A good motivation for the view that the second criterion can be reduced to the 
first criterion can however be found by a consideration of the distal senses: seeing and 
hearing. The thought is simple enough. Rather than perceiving the same property via 
different modalities, what would one think if the one modality could produce 
additional special introspective features more commonly associated with another 
sensory modality? It seems natural that, if we have a perceptual experience, which 
involves hearing something and thus the hlfilment of criteria (1)-(4) in the accepted 
way accompanied by an experience of colour, then we would be reluctant to regard 
this additional introspective feature as a feature of hearing. &it we would also be 
reluctant to regard the additional introspective feature as being a visual experience. 
”’ Mciver LOPS 2000: 439. 
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This is because the other criteria (l), (3) and (4), which we use to individuate a visual 
process, are lacking here. What remains is simply an additional introspective feature. 
We do not represent it to ourselves as a visual experience simply because it is as of a 
colour and shape for it is in conflict with the other criteria. If anything we would 
represent it to ourselves as though it were an experience as of colour and shape. 
But this extra introspective feature is, in the relevant respects (being as of 
colour and shape), to be classified along with the special introspective features of 
visual perception. But what makes a visual experience a visual experience is not 
simply membership of the class of experiences as of colour and Euclidean shape, but 
also the fact that it typically picks out certain features of the environment. Criteria (1) 
is accompanied by criteria (3) and (4). If one had to weigh criteria (1) and criteria (2) 
together in an anomalous case, such as synaesthesia, criteria (1) would surely 
outweigh criteria (2); in this case it is accompanied by the other criteria. Indeed, it 
would seem that criteria (2) has no independent significance. If we are persuaded that 
a perceptual modality is not represented in the phenomenal character of the 
anomalous experiences which synaesthetes undergo then we have less reason for 
thinking that perceptual modality is represented in the phenomenal character of the 
perceptual experiences which normal perceivers standardly undergo. 
~~ 
’’ A different approach might be adopted. One might ask whether any hfference in phenomenal 
character between seeing and hearing could be adduced (and thus whether there were a character to 
seeing and hearing beyond that which is enabled by the features perceived) if one were in a possible 
world. such as was considered in 4.3, in which colours were heard. 

Chapter 5 
Synaesthesia and Mind 
5.1 Outstanding Issues 
Synaesthesia, so it has been argued, is a distinct and unusual psychological 
phenomenon. A consideration of synaesthesia as such has lead to a certain view of 
the mind. If the mind is at least partially constituted by cognitive modules then 
synaesthesia shows us that those modules should be individuated externalistically: 
with respect to their proper hnctions. The view of the underlying nature of 
synaesthesia as either a breakdown in modularity or an extra module might prove to 
be untenable. Although it seems unlikely, it might turn out that synaesthesia is caused 
by central coptive processes of some kind (perhaps psychological associations 
between sounds and colours). The issue of the phenomenal character of experience 
can be related to the issue of modularity: the output of modules are representations of 
the properties of objects which constitute the phenomenal character of experience. A 
view on the latter issue depends in some ways on a view on the former issue: if 
modules are constituted teleologically then it would be wrong to argue that the 
representational properties of the additional character of synaesthetic experience can 
be reconstituted teleologically. If synaesthesia turns out not to involve modularity in 
something like the way discussed here it will still not mean that the representational 
properties of the additional character of synaesthetic experience can be reconstituted 
teleologically. There is no sound argument for qualitative properties of experience to 
be found in a consideration of synaesthesia. It is difficult to detach the issue of the 
phenomenal character of experience from an account of the individuation of the 
sensory modalities; synaesthesia, the characteristic mark of which is the additional 
phenomenal character of experience, indicates (perhaps contrary to first impressions) 
an argument for the identification of the phenomenal character of experience with the 
properties it is the fbnction of the various senses to represent or the properties of the 
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senses which it is the function of other senses to represent. 
Coloured hearing, the synaesthetic association between hearing and colour 
experiences, has been at the focus the discussion. The constitution of modularity, the 
composition of the phenomenal character of experience and the individuation of 
sensory modalities have all largely been discussed in terms of coloured hearing 
synaesthesia, especially those forms of coloured hearing which involve language. 
There is a simple reason for this: coloured hearing synaesthesia involving language 
processing is the most common form of synaesthesia. There are probably reasons for 
this too: hearing language and seeing colours are of such central significance to our 
lives. The majority of auditory stimuli we attend to are complex linguistic stimuli and 
colour processing is basic to conscious object recognition. It should be no surprise 
that a significant volume of the brain is devoted to language and colour processing or, 
at least, is related to areas o f  the brain, which are devoted to language and colour 
processing. Therefore it should be no surprise that coloured hearing synaesthesia is 
the commonest form of synaesthesia. But the amount of neural processing devoted to 
language processing and colour representation may be only part of the reason for the 
prevalence of coloured hearing synaesthesia. It might be that language and colour 
processing areas of the brain are close to each other. It might turn out that, for some 
reason, the developmental processes underlying synaesthesia and language acquisition 
favour synaesthetic links between auditory and visual areas of the brain. Or it might 
turn out that, for some reason, the neurological processes underlying coloured hearing 
synaesthesia favour links between auditory and visual areas of the brain, e.g. the 
auditory cortex has a high rate of neural firing and cellular metabolism. 
G-rossenbacher points out that the strong alerting &ects of auditory stimuli might also 
play a role in the preponderance of cases in which hearing enables colour experiences. 
He has also suggested that more recently evolved cognitive systems contribute more 
to conscious experience and since colour processing is a recent evolutionary 
development it is one of the main contributors to conscious experience. Colour 
experiences might be the type of experiences most frequently enabled by other senses 
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because of the salience of colour in conscious experience. 
It may be that there are different underlying physiological reasons for other 
forms of synaesthesia. The case of MT studied by Cytowic suggests this. But even if 
this is so it would not necessarily follow that the philosophical issues considered here 
would not then apply in a similar way to those forms of synaesthesia. Two remaining 
issues need to be considered. The first one is whether the preceding arguments apply 
to other forms of synaesthesia. What merits the arguments of earlier chapters have 
might be supported if they can be generalised. Section 5.2 suggests that they can. The 
second issue concerns how the preceding arguments, in particular concerning 
synaesthesia and the modularity of mind, might depend on the outcome of future 
synaesthesia studies. Section 5.3 considers this question. 
5.2 Generalisations 
There are potentially at least as many types of synaesthesia as there are possible 
pairings across the sensory modalities. Grant that there are five sensory modalities, 
realised by five physiological sensory systems, then there would be twenty possible 
pairings: each of the five sensory modalities could be associated with the other four 





































Grossenbacher 1997: 152-7. 
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Gust at ion 3 Sound experience Touch = Smell experience 
The first term in each association refers to a sensory modality. Sensory modalities 
may be individuated along lines outlined in the previous chapter. The second term 
(following the arrow) refers to a type of secondary experience where the typing is 
determined by phenomenal character. 
Some may wish to divide the perception of touch such that one recognises a 
separate sense of temperature or a separate sense of pain. Synaesthesia may even 
support this view. It appears to support the view that the auditory processing o f  
language is divisible. Others may wish to conflate taste and smell. 
Synaesthetes usually display consistency in the types of synaesthesia they have. 
Typically hearing will not enable colour experiences on one occasion and taste 
experiences on another occasion. A synaesthete might however have more than one 
type of synaesthesia at different times. She might have a colour experience in response 
to hearing a sound and on another occasion she might have a taste experience on 
touching an object. It is possible although unlikely that a synaesthete might instantiate 
more than one type of synaesthesia at the same time. She might have colour 
experiences on hearing something and have tactile experiences on seeing the same 
thing. Synaesthetes have manifested opposite types of synaesthesia at the same time: 
sounds have enabled colour experiences and visual stimuli have caused sound 
experiences. More likely are cases in which stimulation to one perceptual modality 
simultaneously enables more than one secondary experience. Someone who has 
secondary experiences of colours in response to hearing sounds might at the same 
time have secondary experiences of taste. Granted that there are five sensory 
modalities, another list could be made to add to the above list consisting of 55 
possible permutations of types of synaesthesia: each sensory modality could enable 
two types of secondary experiences in six different ways (30 permutations); each 
sensory modality could enable three types ef secondary experiences in four different 
ways (20 permutations); and each sensory modality could enable all four types of 
secondary experiences (5 permutations). Some of the possible associations of one 
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sensory modality with more than one secondary experience were in fact evident in 
Luria’s experiments with subject S. In response to hearing sounds sometimes S had 
colour experiences and taste experiences.2 There is little reason to think these forms 
of multiple synaesthesia should constitute new types of synaesthesia rather than 
combinations of more basic types3 Explaining the different types of synaesthesia is 
arguably a more hndamental task than explaining the co-occurrence of different types 
of synaesthesia, although the latter issue may she some light on the former issue: why 
some forms of synaesthesia occur together may help explain why some forms of 
synaesthesia occur at all. 
Not all of the potential types of synaesthesia have actually been recorded. O f  
the types of synaesthesia which have been recorded some are more common than 
others. And there are on record few of the various possible forms of multiple 
synaesthesia. Of the forms of multiple synaesthesia which have been recorded some 
are more common than others. The most common type of synaesthesia occurs when 
an auditory stimulus induces a colour experience. This type of synaesthesia can be 
divided more finely by reference to the nature of the eliciting stimulus (e.g. music, 
language? types of words). But even where the secondary experience is not a colour 
experience the eliciting stimulus will most frequently be a sound. And even when the 
perceptual modality involved is not that of hearing the elicited experience will most 
likely be a colour experience. By contrast? there appear to be no reports o f  
synaesthetic pairings in which the perceptual modality is gustation or olfaction and the 
secondary experience is a sound experience. The reason for this might be that 
gustatory and olfactory processing areas of the brain and the auditory processing 
areas of the brain are not close together. It might turn out that, for some reason, the 
developmental processes underlying synaesthesia do not favour links between 
3 oustatory, olfactory and the auditory processing areas of the brain. Or it might turn 
out that the neurological processes underlying synaesthesia do not favour links 
between gustatory, olfactory and the auditory processing aizas of the brain. Some 
~ ~~ 
’ See section 3.3. 
from those which realised the basic types of synaesthesia. 
It would however be interesting if multiple synaesthesias were realised by brain states different 
indication of the frequencies of different types of synaesthesia can be ascertained. Out 
of 175 reported cases the following types of synaesthesia had the following 
frequencies? 
Numberdletters enabling colour 121 69% 
Time enabling colour 42 24% 
Spoken sounds enabling colour 24 14% 
General sound colour 23 13% 
Musical sounds enabling colour 21 12% 
Musical notes enabling colour 
Pain enabling colour 
Odours enabling colour 
Personalities enabling colour 
Tastes enabling colour 
Sounds enabling taste 
Sounds enabling touch 
Vision enabling taste 
Touch enabling taste 
Sounds enabling odour 
Temperature enabling colour 
Taste enabling touch 
Touch enabling smell 



























Can the arguments of chapter three be generalised? One option is to canvass 
all the possibilities listed above. It will quickly become clear that there is nothing 
peculiar to a particular type of synaesthesia in respect of those arguments before the 
end of the list is reached. Consider first types of synaesthesia other than coloured 
hearing in which stimuli to one sensory modality produces experiences of colour. 
The catalogue. quoted in Lemley 1999, was compiled by S a n  Day. These have not been tested for 4 
genuineness. 
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Cases of synaesthesia have been reported in which tasting something has produced 
colour experiences, as have cases of synaesthesia in which smelling something has 
produced colour experiences. Ginsberg refers to colour experiences produced by 
tastes and odours of cloves and rhubarb. Collins records that for one subject: sweet 
tastes are pink, acid tastes are green, salt tastes are blue, bitter tastes are magenta, 
sharp odours are magenta, lavender is pale straw yellow, peppermint is white and so 
The series of studies conducted by Wheeler and Cutsforth in the 1920’s were 
based on Cutsforth’ s own experiences. For Cutsforth, blind since childhood, touching 
objects produced colour experiences. More recently Lemley reports the case of Carol 
Steen for whom acupuncture consistently produces colour experiences. In so far as he 
could employ his synaesthetic experiences in the way non-synaesthetes might employ 
their tactile experiences Wheeler and Cutsforth claimed that the colour experiences 
represented an objective feature just as much as tactile experiences would have done. 
It can be agreed that such experiences are representational. Just because Cutsforth 
was able to employ his colour experiences usefblly does not make them veridical 
representations. Most significantly however, is the fact that nowhere is there 
conspicuous in the above cases reports of colour experiences in which the colours 
were not similar, with respect to hue, saturation and brightness, to colour experiences, 
which were produced in visual perception. These types of synaesthesia do not lead us 
to doubt the conclusions of chapter three. For they do not suggest that the 
phenomenal character of colour experiences in more unusual types of synaesthesia 
cannot also be h l ly  explained in terms, either of the properties objects are represented 
as having, or the properties objects present to us. 
What about types of synaesthesia, which enable other types of phenomenal 
character? In an unusual but hl ly  documented case in which the sound of words, 
nonsense words and non-linguistic sounds produced taste experiences, under test 
conditions, the subject was able to respond to nearly all the stimuli (which amounted 
to 150 words) by reference to 
produced a gustatory experience 
-’ Ginsberg 1923 and Collins 1929: 14. 
a taste normally produced -(e.g. the word ‘doubt’ 
as she would have had were she tasting apples; the 
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word ‘hope’ produced a gustatory experience as she would have had were she tasting 
celery). The remaining words produced no taste. Of none of the auditory stimuli does 
she state that they produced a taste she had never experienced before. And, consistent 
with the analysis of section 4.4, Pierce names this type of synaesthesia ‘gustatory 
audition’. ‘ 
The above cases all concern so-called ‘secondary qualities’. If the class of 
secondary qualities form a distinctive class of qualities then there is no reason to think 
that the other potential types of synaesthesia, which w-ould involve secondary soLind 
experiences and secondary smell experiences can be accounted for in ways similar to 
the above. 
But one might have thought that there was a distinction to be drawn between 
the types of synaesthesia with respect to primary and secondary qualities. It is true 
that when secondary experiences involve shapes there is a clear disagreement between 
the senses in the way that there is not when the secondary experience is as of a 
secondary quality. When a stimulus, for instance a taste, enables the feeling of a 
shape, which cannot be seen, there is arguably more apparent disagreement between 
the senses than there is when a stimulus, for instance a sound, enables a colour. The 
apparent feel of the shape clearly conflicts with any related evidence vision supplies. 
The apparent colour enabled by sound does not so clearly conflict with any evidence 
vision can supply i.e. vision cannot supply any appropriate evidence. 
But primary and secondary qualities may nevertheless still be considered to be 
on a par with respect to synaesthesia. In the case of MW studied by Cytowic, where 
tastes produce tactile experiences, MW is always able to describe his experiences by 
reference to the properties of objects, which would be required to enable those 
experiences. When pressed to elaborate the sensations he felt, he once said: 
’I can reach my hand out and rub it along the back side of a curve. I can’t feel where 
the top and bottom end: so it’s like a column. It’s cool to the touch, as if it were made 
of stone or glass. What is so wonderful about it, though, is its absolute smoothness. 
Perfectly smooth. I can‘t feel any pits or itiikntations in the surface, so it must not be 
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Mw refers to properties of objects in just the way that he would were his  experiences 
veridical. There is good reason to think that the phenomenal character of all types of 
synaesthetic experience can be understood in ways consistent with representationist or 
presentationist explanations of the phenomenal character of normal perceptual 
experiences. There is no more reason to think that any types of synaesthesia are 
constituted by qualia, in the sense of intrinsic (monadic or non-relational) properties 
which determine the phenomenal character of experience. Indeed the success of both 
ER and EP in accounting for all types of synaesthesia gives added reason to thlnk that 
normal perceptual experiences are not composed of qualia. 
Just as the other types of synaesthesia corroborate the conclusions of chapter 
three with respect to the phenomenal character of experience, so they corroborate the 
conclusions of chapter four with respect to the individuation of sensory modalities. 
The use of terminology consistent with those conclusions has already been noted in 
the case of gustatory audition. Cytowic terms the type of synaesthesia had by M W  
alternatively feeling shapes and geometric gustation. For reasons already given it is 
the latter terminology which best describes this type of synaesthesia. But these two 
types of synaesthesia also show that, since the extra phenomenal character of 
experience does not contribute to the individuation of the sensory modality used, 
there is less reason to think that it should contribute to the individuation of the 
sensory modality in the case of veridical experiences. There is nothing intrinsic to the 
secondary experiences of taste, which make them gustatory experiences, only the fact 
that they are indiscriminable from gustatory experiences. Nor is anything intrinsic to 
the secondary experiences of touch, which make them tactile experiences, only the 
fact that they are indiscriminable fi-om tactile experiences. So there is less reason than 
we might have had to think that the phenomenal character of experience is something 
extra, which could be called upon to individuate a sensory modality. 
It might be argued that the distinction to be drawn between the distal and the 
proximal senses (hearing and seeing are both distal senses whilst touch is a proximal 
sense) has a bearing on the individuation of sensory modalities: there is a residual 
difference in phenomenal character between distal and proximal senses which 
contributes to the individuation of those sensory modalities. Of course hearing and 
seeing are enabled by different stimuli; to that extent they represent different 
properties of objects. Sometimes it is their hnction to represent the same properties. 
There is little reason to think that any remaining differences between hearing and 
seeing are essential differences. In as much as there are no other differences in 
phenomenal character o f  each distal mode of perception there is no motivation for the 
phenomenal character of different distal modes of perception to figure additionally in 
the individuation of sensory modalities. But surely touch is essentially different fiom 
distal senses even when it represents the same properties as they do. The essential 
difference necessarily involves a difference in the phenomenal character of the 
respective types of experience. But the difference between distal and proximal sensory 
modalities lies in the way the sensory organs fbnction. If this difference is apparent to 
the perceiver then she is simply representing those difference to herself, just as does 
the synaesthete does who is aware that their secondary experiences are enabled via an 
unusual sensory modality. 
5.3 Prospects 
Psychologists are interested in synaesthesia because of what it can tell us about the 
detailed structure of the mind. In particular the more we know about synaesthesia so 
the more we are likely to know about the interlevels of cognitive processing and thus 
the constitution of different cognitive modules. Investigation of the different forms of 
coloured hearing synaesthesia enabled by language seems likely to shed hrther light 
on the inter-levels of language processing and thus the way that language 
understanding is realised by modular processes. 
But as chapter two made clear interest is not restricted to empirical findings. 
Empirical findings are open to different interpretations. Nevertheless the metaphysical 
arguments of chapter two did rest on current empirical findings. Those arguments 
inight be further supported or indeed undermined by future empirical research. Most 
importantly more details are required about the neurological, developmental and 
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genetic processes underlying coloured hearing synaesthesia. The argument concerning 
psychological natural kinds was ultimately premised on the view that synaesthesia has 
a distinct genetic component which gives rise to unusual developmental processes 
which in turn determine neural processing. It is because of these features that 
synaesthesia might be characterised as an extra module or that fbrther conditions on 
modularity are required. As important is the investigation of the mechanisms 
underlying other forms of synaesthesia. Understanding other forms of synaesthesia, in 
particular understanding the neurological, developmental and genetic processes 
underlying them, will serve to hrther test the modularity hypothesis. 
Merleau-Ponty pointed to three issues connected with synaesthesia: the 
question of how we talk of the senses, the primacy of experience and the underlying 
nature of mind. Each of these issues has received a response here, each response being 
different from the response endorsed by Merleau-Ponty ’ s phenomenological 
approach. Are there other issues which synaesthesia might make us look at again? 
Probably, but other issues will arguably be ramifications of these three. In this sense 
the three issues are central philosophical issues. If this is so then synaesthesia should 
also be seen as of some importance for philosophy. 
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